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"Never count on making a good sale. Have the 
purchase price be so attractive that even a mediocre 
sale gives good results."  
- Warren Buffett  
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Abstract 
Globalization, geographic diversification and deregulation of markets have led 
to an increasingly competitive environment for most companies. Increasing 
competition often leads to higher efforts to persuade consumers to by the given 
company’s product, and consequently margins are affected. Moreover, this 
development of the business environment also faces as a threat to most companies’ 
organic growth. For this reason, companies often envision mergers and acquisitions as 
a solution to this problem. The decision of taking on a larger transaction to acquire 
another company is often motivated by the fact that it may create additional 
opportunities for the company, enable higher growth, and ultimately create 
shareholder value. 
Mergers and acquisitions are especially apparent in industries that are highly 
affected technological innovations. The rationale for this is grounded in the potential 
target company’s technological assets or specific capabilities, which may pose as 
highly valuable for the acquirer. The acquisition of the target company enables the 
transfer of these skills and may create a competitive advantage, which in turn creates 
a driver for long-term sustainable growth.   
This paper will analyze the possibility of creating additional value through 
mergers and acquisition. The paper will start of by surveying literature on various 
theories on valuation of companies. This part will also present evidence on what 
valuation techniques that proves to yield reliable results, and discuss value creation in 
the light of mergers and acquisitions. In the second part the paper the presented theory 
will be put into practice by through a proposed M&A-situation between Microsoft 
Corporation and Activision Blizzard, Inc. This part will present a thorough company- 
and industry analysis that will provide the basis for a valuation of the companies, both 
on a standalone basis and on a consolidated basis. The final part of the paper will 
present the acquisition process itself, and discuss issues that are related to the 
acquisition. This part will also present the optimal way for Microsoft to proceed in 
acquiring Activision Blizzard. 
When valuing the companies individually, both companies show indications 
of being undervalued compared to their average market values for the last year. 
Microsoft value is displaying signs of being overly undervalued, while Activision 
Blizzard only is slightly undervalued. A valuation of the combined company reveals 
that there were considerable opportunities for additional value creation through a 
merger.  
Finally, based on the analysis and the valuations in the paper suggests that that 
Microsoft should proceed with the acquisition. The acquisition will be presented to 
Activision Blizzard’s shareholders as a friendly tender offer, in order to persuade 
them to sell their shares in the company. The price offered for the outstanding shares 
of the company is suggested to provide current shareholders with a premium of 29.4% 
to the average market capitalization of the company. Moreover, the acquisition will be 
financed with a cash-only transaction, as to maintain financial flexibility and in line 
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1.   Introduction 
This paper will present the case of a proposed M&A situation between the 
companies Microsoft Corporation (Microsoft) and Activision Blizzard, Inc. 
(Activision Blizzard). Microsoft is one of the worlds most widely known software 
companies, while Activision Blizzard is an entertainment software company that 
publishes video games. The objective of the case study is to present the value creation 
opportunities that can be created in a M&A situation, and reflect on how to proceed in 
such a situation. Moreover, it will be analyzed how to value these opportunities and 
how to increase the likelihood of realizing the value creation.  
The literature review will survey literature on various theories on the valuation 
of companies. It will present the most important theoretical frameworks that are 
applied practitioners and academics, discuss their reasonableness and their ability 
reliably capture the value of a given company. These theories will build the 
framework for assessing the value of the two companies in the proposed merger. 
Moreover, this section will also shed some light on important considerations in M&A.  
The company and industry analysis will present the historical performance for 
both companies and their respective industries. This information will be necessary to 
build a reliable valuation model that reflects the current and expected performance of 
the companies in relation to their respective industry. Without having this information 
at hand, a valuation may provide dubious results and may misrepresent the value that 
can be realized through a potential merger.  
The following sections will forecast important value drivers that enable the 
estimation of the standalone values for the companies. When these values have been 
firmly established, the values of the combined company will be analyzed in order to 
find potential value enhancements in the merger. 
Finally, after valuing the companies on a standalone- and merged basis, the 
acquisition itself will be considered. This section will provide valuable insights on 
necessary considerations in an acquisition, and present a proposal for how Microsoft 
should proceed with its intended acquisition in order to ensure that value is created.  
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2.  Literature Review 
In recent years, the number of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) has soared 
(Barkema and Schijven, 2008), and it has become an increasingly popular way of 
attempting to gain ground as a company and creating value for its shareholders. The 
strategic motives behind M&As differ from transaction to transaction. However, most 
mergers appear to be justified with the notion that they enhance value of the 
combined company. This value is often unattainable for the companies operating 
separately, and is realized only through the combination of the two entities. 
Damodaran (2005b) refers to this added value as the synergy obtained by the 
combined company, and is the result of new opportunities created directly through the 
merger. Whether or not companies are able to consistently capture this added value, 
and hence create value for its shareholders, remains more or less inconclusive.  
Ultimately it will be the price paid for the target, and whether the envisioned 
improvements are realized, that will determine if the investment yields value for the 
acquirer’s shareholders. This introduces valuation as an essential part of M&A, and it 
provides managers with a useful tool to manage value, while it provides investors 
with a tool for considering potential investments. Hence, a reliable estimate of the 
corporate valuations can improve the likelihood of realizing the potential added value. 
The forthcoming section of this paper will provide a discussion on common 
approaches in the valuation of companies, followed by a review of findings 
specifically related to M&As. 
 
2.1  Measuring Value 
To present date it can be identified a wide range of different approaches to 
valuation. The rationale for the application each approach is usually different (Koller 
et al., 2010), and the degree in which it is applied differs by academics and 
professionals. In academic literature there has been an extensive focus on discounted 
cash flow models (e.g. Koller, et al., 2010), while practitioners more frequently apply 
relative valuation frameworks (Lie & Lie, 2002).  
Most valuation models base their estimation on some form of present value 
approach to current and future income streams to the company or its investors (Young 
et al., 1999), and has its roots in the model presented by Modigliani and Miller 
(1958). It has become common to distinguish between two broad types of valuation 
methods, namely equity valuation models and pure enterprise models. The former 
estimates the value attributable purely to equity shareholders, while the latter 
estimates the value for the entire business that ascribes to all claimholders of the 
enterprise. Further, Young et al. (1999) distinguishes between models that focuses on 
cash flows, returns or multiples. The cash flow models center its attention to the 
stream of future cash flows that becomes available to investors or other claimholders, 
while models based on returns link the valuation to the excess return on existing and 
future investments. The multiples approach implies creating a multiple using one or 
more fundamental value drives and comparing this to the value of a group of similar 
companies. This approach implicitly assumes that the market is able, on average, to 
provide us with the real value (Damodaran, 2005a). Other authors have emphasized 
that value can estimated using a real options approach (e.g. Copeland & Antikarov, 
2003; Trigeorgis, 1996). 
Young et al. (1999) argues that most models are based on the same 
understanding of value creation, and that they will yield the same result as long as the 
assumptions are applied consistently across models. Damodaran (2005a) shares this 
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stance, and adds that the determinants of multiples are the same as for discounted cash 
flow models. This means that relative valuation should produce approximately the 
same result as for other valuation approaches. Further, it is recommended to rather use 
scenario-based cash flows with probabilities than to apply the real options approach 
(Kester & Froot, 1997). The reason for this is that the real options approach is argued 
to easily overrate the value of follow-on opportunities and hence produce a biased 
valuation (Kester & Froot, 1997). 
The theory presented above suggests that it will be undesirable to evaluate all 
of the existing models to provide a sound presentation of valuation. The discounted 
cash flow valuation approach is argued to be the most precise and most flexible model 
(Koller et al., 2010) and the model with the best credentials (Damodaran, 2005a). For 
this reason, this model will be the basis for the following discussion on valuation. As 
a supplement, the model will also be considered in the light of relative valuation. 
 
2.1.1	   	   The	  Components	  of	  Discounted	  Cash	  Flow	  Models	  
There are multiple versions of discounted cash flow models. In the following 
section, the focus will be on the components of the Free Cash Flow to Firm model, as 
this remains the most preferred DCF model by practitioners and academics (Koller et 
al., 2010). It captures the value attributable to all of the capital providers of the firm. 
The model will be presented in the next section, with the addition of the Adjusted 
Present Value (APV) approach that also relies on discount rates.  
The discounted cash flow models utilizes the expected cash flows that will 
yield from the assets in place and the growth assets in the company, and discounts 
them back to reach a present value for the firm (Damodaran, 2005a). In order to find a 
value for the future cash flows it is necessary to make qualified assumptions about 
current cash flows, expected growth and expected return on invested capital (ROIC) 
(Koller et al., 2010). In addition, the value subsequently attained will rely heavily on 
the assumptions for the discount rate. These issues will be discussed in more detail 
below. 
 
Future	  Cash	  Flows	  
The future cash flows are an essential part of any DCF valuation model. In 
order to estimate the value of the company, it is essential to calculate the free cash 
flow to the firm, i.e. the value that in reality could be distributed to providers of 
capital. Although there exist various definitions for this measure, the most common 
type is described by Damodaran (2005a) as “cash flow after taxes and reinvestment 
needs but before any debt repayments” (p. 719). 
 
Free Cash Flow to Firm = EBITA(1−TC )− (CapEx −Depreciation)−ΔWC  
 
In order to find the expected FCFF, the underlying cash flows (earnings, costs, 
etc.) have to be forecasted into the future. An important driver in these cash flows is 
the expected growth rate (g) for the company. The growth in earnings can be traced 
back to investments in new assets and improvements in efficiency on existing assets 
(Damodaran, 2008a).  
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 Large growth rates tend to be more frequently observed in small successful 
companies, as efficiency improvements and investment opportunities are plentiful. 
However, as these companies grow larger the efficiency improvements will diminish, 
and as their success attracts competition the investment opportunities become scarce. 
As of this reason it is hard to sustain high growth over longer periods of time. 
Damodaran (2008a) states that companies seldom grow at rates higher than the 
economy for extended periods. In the same line of thought, the median earnings-
growth across companies is found to be close to the growth in gross domestic product 
(Chan, Karceski, & Lakonishok, 2003). Damodaran (2008a) defines long-term 
sustainable growth in operating income as: 
 
g = Reinvestment Rate ⋅Return on Invested Capital (ROIC)  
 
where (Damodaran, 2007) 
 
Reinvestment Rate = CapEx −Depreciation+ΔWC
EBIT (1−TC )
Return on Invested Capital = EBIT (1−TC )
Fixed Assets+Current Assets−Current Liabilities−Cash  
 
There are two things one should take note of in the rearmost formula, for 
ROIC. First, the invested capital, the denominator of the formula, should always be 
stated in book value terms to avoid the downward bias and the markup that market 
values adds to existing assets. Second, the reason why cash is subtracted is to keep the 
model consistent, i.e. earnings income is our measure of growth, and interest income 
from cash is not included in the operating income (Damodaran, 2007). 
In the long-term, it is also important to remember that the level of depreciation 
ultimately is based on the size of the capital expenditures. Broadly speaking, this 
means that in long run it is impossible to have depreciation that is greater than the 
capital expenditures. Hence, when the company reaches its long-term sustainable 
growth rate it is common to assume that the depreciation matches the capital 
expenditures (Coffey, 2009), i.e. the assets are replaced continuously as they wear off. 
In the following section it will be uncovered how the future cash flows comes into 
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The	  Cost	  of	  Capital	  
The rate that should be applied when discounting future cash flows should 
optimally reflect the investors’ opportunity cost of taking on that particular 
investment. In other words, the discount rate should reflect the time-value of money 
(the risk free rate) and a risk premium to compensate the investor for the additional 
risk (Luehrman, 1997b). One should note that the discount rate applied in each case 
will depend on the valuation approach. The discount rate utilized in a FCFF valuation 
is a weighted-average cost of capital (WACC), which is a risk-adjusted rate that 
reflects the overall risk of the capital provided in the firm. The APV approach is 
slightly different and hence the discount rates required are the cost of debt and the 
unlevered cost of equity in order for the model to serve its purpose.  
The weighted-average cost of capital is an approach that balances the discount 
rate in to reflect the risk of the company’s financing sources. In a given company 
there can be several costs of debt depending on the mixture of liabilities used for 
financing. Apart from regular bank debt, a company can make use of alternative 
investment sources through bond offerings, securitization and the hybrid market 
(Shivdasani & Zak, 2007). The cost of debt is commonly determined as a function of 
the current level of risk free interest rate and a default spread (Damodaran, 2010).  
 
Cost of Debt (rD ) = (Risk−Free Rate+Default Spread)  
 
As the risk free rate affects both the cost of equity and the cost of debt, it is 
important find a reliable estimate for it. An asset is considered risk free if its actual 
return equals the expected return, i.e. there is no uncertainty or variance associated 
with its return (Damodaran, 2008b). Further, for this to be true neither default risk nor 
reinvestment risk can be present. As the risk free rate tends to vary with time, one 
should optimally use year-specific rates. However, using rates with longer maturities 
tend to make little difference if the duration of the risk free rate matches the duration 
of the cash flows (Damodaran, 2008b). Damodaran (2008b) argues that the risk free 
rate should be consistent with the currency of the cash flows, and that using a rate 
with 10-year duration (e.g. Treasury bond) is a good practice for valuation. 
The default spread in the model reflects the default risk of the company. As 
the probability of default increases, the lenders require a higher compensation for the 
additional risk. This measure can be challenging to estimate reliably for a company. If 
the debt is widely traded the implied default spread can easily be extracted using the 
bond price and the risk free rate. However, if the debt is not traded on a regular basis 
it is more common to estimate the cost of debt by examining similar rated bonds 
traded in the market. For non-traded debt it is normal to use the historical borrowing 
history as a proxy (Damodaran, 2010). 
 The equity investors of the firm, however, require a return rate for their 
residual claim on the firm – known as the cost of equity. Because these investors only 
hold the residual claim, increasing debt will affect their overall risk and it 
consequently needs an alternative assessment. The most frequently used model to 
estimate the cost of equity is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) derived by 
William Sharpe (1964), John Lintner (1965). The model forms a linear relationship 
between the cost of equity and the company’s risk profile (β) in relation to the market.  
 
E(rE ) = rf +βL (E(rm )− rf )  
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The model is based on the assumption that diversification enables the investor 
to escape all risks except for the overall market risk. Since all other risks are 
diversifiable it is argued that only the company’s rate of return to the level of 
economic activity is relevant in when considering risk (Sharpe, 1964). When the 
company is purely equity financed, or when using the APV, the model will be 
expressed as: 
 
E(rU ) = rf +βU (E(rm )− rf )  
 
In order to provide a reasonable understanding of the CAPM model, a proper 
assessment of its components is necessary. The components will be discussed as they 
appear in the model, except for the risk free rate just discussed. 
The beta is a relative measure of systematic risk, i.e. a stock’s risk added to a 
diversified portfolio (Koller, Goedhart, & Wessels, 2010). This means that if an 
investor adds a stock that increases the overall risk of the portfolio, this investor will 
require a higher return. Damodaran (2010) encourages the use of regression modeling 
to estimate the beta. This should be done my regressing equity returns on a market 
portfolio, and the resulting slope coefficient measures the company’s beta. Further, he 
recommends the application of at monthly data, and using a broad index for the 
market portfolio. However, Kaplan and Peterson (1998) argue that using only one 
company in the regression induces considerable statistical noise, and hence high 
standard errors for the beta. They propose using companies with similar 
characteristics and who operates in the same line of business, to improve the accuracy 
of beta. The best way to perform this procedure is by estimating the betas for each 
individual company, unlevering the betas, and using the relevered median as a proxy 
for the company. The betas are unlevered in order to control for different capital 
structures within the sample (Kaplan & Peterson, 1998), and relevered to reflect the 
given company’s capital structure. The following formula converts the beta 
(Damodaran, 2010). 














'   
 
It can be directly observed from the formula that the unlevered beta will 
always be lower than the levered beta, as one should expect. 
The last component of the CAPM model is the equity risk premium (E(rm) – 
rf), which measures the excess return an investor would expect to earn while holding 
the market portfolio (or a well diversified portfolio). There is a wide range of 
determinants of the size of this premium, some of which are investor risk aversion, 
market liquidity, and macroeconomic volatility. 
Studies on the risk premium have used different approaches to find a reliable 
estimate, but there seems to be little consensus on what is the best approach 
(Damodaran, 2011). The most apparent approach is using historical premiums over an 
extended period of time. However, using this approach for a given mature market it 
may yield historical premiums that are higher than expected premiums due to survivor 
bias, i.e. failing companies have been removed from the historical databases since 
they have ceased to exist. Damodaran (2011) argues that looking across multiple 
markets for very long time periods can mitigate this bias. In their recent report, Credit 
Suisse (2012) reports a global risk premium of 4.4%, which is close to what Koller et 
al. (2010) classifies as the appropriate range (4.5-5.5%). Other approaches include 
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estimating the premium is through surveys, and by using the implied premium. The 
resulting premiums from surveys tend to vary depending on who the targets are in the 
survey, and seem to have little prediction of future premiums (Damodaran, 2011). The 
implied approach has the advantage of being market-based and forward looking, but 
its results still show signs of being highly dependent on the model chosen for the 
valuation and the reliability of the inputs (Damodaran, 2011). The research shows that 
estimating a reliable value for the equity premium is a daunting task, and that 
assumptions for its value must be made in order to perform important financial 
analyses or valuations.  
Summarizing, the CAPM should consist of a risk free rate with duration of 10-
years, a median beta for the industry and an estimate for the equity risk premium. The 
model has been given extensive attention in literature and is the most common 
measure for cost of equity (Koller et al., 2010). However, the model has also been 
heavily criticized for its inability to explain the expected return with solely using the 
beta on a market risk premium (e.g. Banz, 1981). The frontrunners of these critiques 
have been Fama and French (1992, 1996, 1997), with the argument that the cost of 
equity is distressingly imprecise. They argue that there are several other variables 
(e.g. size, book-value-equity/market-value-equity) that could add increased 
explanation to the model. However, they also suggest that the CAPM’s inability to 
describe the cost of equity could be due to bad proxies for the market portfolio (Fama 
& French, 1996). In spite of this, the model remains common among practitioners and 
academics alike, and it continues to exist as an important model in valuation.  
 
The	  Weighted	  Average	  Cost	  of	  Capital	  
The cost of debt and the cost of equity come together as an essential input in 
the WACC model, referred to earlier. The WACC is a tax-adjusted discount rate that 
also captures the value created or destroyed through financing (Luehrman, 1997a). 
When incorporating cost of debt and the cost of equity the WACC is mathematically 
defined as follows: 
 







⋅ rD ⋅ (1−TC )  
 
Estimating this model may seem as a reasonably easy task considering that the book 
values of debt and equity is widely available in the financial statements. However, 
since the WACC forward-looking measure and captures the cost of raising new funds 
it is more appropriate to apply market value weights (Damodaran, 2010). Koller et al. 
(2010) takes the discussion one step further by advocating the use of targets rates 
rather than current rates if the capital structure is expected to change, as the discount 
rate should reflect the long-term capital structure. The target capital structure should 
be assessed based on the long-term trend for the company in its particular industry. 
Furthermore, Damodaran (2009) and Koller et al. (2010) argues that the level of debt 
should be adjusted to reflect off-balance sheet items such as operating leases and 
pension liabilities. These items will have significant effects on both the income 
statement and the balance sheet, and if unadjusted for they might distort the real value 
of debt. The adjustment needs to be carried out consistently with the definition of the 
free cash flow. 
 Nevertheless, the WACC model tends to be suitable only for companies with 
simple and static capital structures (Luehrman, 1997b), and its calculation often 
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becomes intricate with the introduction of complex securities (Koller et al., 2010). 
Harris and Pringle (1985) assert that its application is limited to the evaluation of 
added risks that are of the equivalent risk as the company’s current operating and 
financial risk. This should suggest the use of the same proportionate capital structure, 
and underlying risk, in all projects/acquisitions undertaken by the company. For this 
reason, a number of alternative approaches have been suggested to improve 
flexibility, one of which is the Adjusted Present Value (Myers, 1974). It differs in its 
application by breaking up the independent components of risk and discounts them 
separately in order to reach the enterprise value.  
 
2.1.2	   	   The	  Discounted	  Cash	  Flow	  Models	  
 In this section the Free Cash Flow to the Firm model based on WACC will be 
presented in detail, in addition to the APV model. These are the two most common 
approaches to value discounted cash flow models. The latter valuation approach was 
first presented by Stewart Myers (1974) and it values operations with different risks 
and the financial maneuvers separately. It is argued to be a helpful tool for managers 
in display where value is created (Luehrman, 1997a). 
 
The	  Free	  Cash	  Flow	  to	  the	  Firm	  Model	  
The free cash flow to the firm model, also referred to as the enterprise model, 
has been widely accepted as the standard of discounted cash flow models (Luehrman, 
1997a). The model estimates the value attributable all capital suppliers of the 
company (equity and debt), and is based on the future free cash flows to the firm 
discounted back using the WACC. Mathematically the calculation can be written as 
(Damodaran, 2005a): 

















The FCFF model consists of two main components, which each explains the 
future income streams that are expected to yield to the company. In principle, the 
formula could be expressed as a function of all the future cash flows discounted at 
WACC (with only the first part of the formula). However, the practice of discounting 
each and every of the future can be a tedious process, and it has hence evolved as a 
common practice to use a terminal value to determine the remaining value after the 
growth of the firm has stabilized. The second part of the equation is this terminal 
value, and accounts for the value created after the explicit forecast period. The 
terminal value tends to capture between 80% and 90% depending on the length of the 
forecast period (denoted by n in the formula) (Young et al., 1999). The length of the 
forecast depends on the nature of the company, but it is in general a good idea to use 
10 to 15 years of data. Using a shorter explicit forecast period tends to result in 
undervalued companies (Koller et al., 2010).  
 When the formula has been estimated, one can obtain the value of equity by 
incorporating the value of non-operating assets and then subtracting the value of all 
non-equity claims outstanding (Damodaran, 2005a). The valuation using the free cash 
flow to the firm can be illustrated as follows. 
 
M&A: The Case of Microsoft Corporation and Activision Blizzard Inc. 
© Robert Stenmark  9 
 
Adjusted	  Present	  Value	  Model	  	  
The Adjusted Present Value, also referred to as valuation by parts, has been 
argued to be a better valuation model when the capital structure is complex and when 
the financial side effects are important (Koller et al., 2010). The model can be 
estimated based on four or more steps, depending on how many different sources 
capital there are and how the analyst wants to separate the enterprise value. First, the 
firm is valued as a fully equity financed (unlevered) company and discounted using 
the unlevered cost of equity. Secondly, the benefits of leverage (provided by the tax 
shields you obtain) are valued using the cost of debt as the discount rate. Thirdly, the 
cost of leverage, referred to as cost of financial distress, is valued. Finally, the 
individual components of value are totaled to reach the value of the firm.  
 
Value of Business =Value of Unlevered Firm+Value of Tax Benefits
−Value of Bankruptcy Costs
 
 
The real value of this approach is that it provides a more complete and 
transparent perspective on where the value resides and it can be used as an effective 
tool to improve value. The formula above can be broken down and expressed as 
follows (Damodaran, 2006). 






















Present Value of Bankruptcy Costs = π a ⋅PV (BC)
 
 
The former of the equations is identical to that of the FCFF, apart from the 
fact that it discounts the cash flows at the unlevered cost of equity, thereby obtaining 
the value of the company without debt. The second equation yields the value of future 
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shields are as uncertain as the principal and interest payment on debt (discounting 
with cost of debt). However, it may be unreasonable to use this formula if the firm is 
growing and expects to increase its debt proportionately with the growth of the firm. 
This way, the formula is better expressed as (Luehrman, 1997a): 
 
Present Value of Tax Shields = TC ⋅ rD ⋅Dt
(1+ rD )
t +














The expected bankruptcy costs are a function of the probability of default and 
the costs of bankruptcy. This is often the element in the APV that constitutes an 
estimation problem since neither the probability or the cost of bankruptcy can be 
directly observed (Damodaran, 2005a). However, Damodaran (2010) suggest the use 
of default rates for the given bond rating of the company to find its probability of 
default. And in assessing the bankruptcy costs he recommends assuming a percentage 
of firm value, or a scenario-based calculation.  
The APV valuation process can be illustrated as in Figure 3 below, where the 
values of the company are unbundled and rebundled to find its value (Luehrman, 
1997a). The valuation approach has both advantages and disadvantages. It provides us 
with the opportunity to calculate the value of a company with changing capital 
structure, and to get more insights into where value is created. However, the difficulty 
of the model lies in the estimation of default and the cost of bankruptcy.  
Under the same assumptions, the APV and the cost of capital should provide 
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2.1.3	   	   Relative	  Valuations	  
In discounted cash flow valuation, the value of a firm is determined by 
analyzing variables such as future cash flows and growth, and their underlying levels 
of risks. However, in relative valuation, the value is determined by examining similar 
assets that are already are priced in the market (Damodaran, 2010). This approach is 
based on the explicit assumption that the market “makes mistakes on individual 
stocks, but are correct on average” (Damodaran, 2005a, p. 769). This can be 
illustrated by the following graph, where the multiple is the straight black line (the 




A note to multiples is that they can yield completely different conclusions 
about value depending on which set of multiples that are applied to the company 
(Goedhart, Koller, & Wessel, 2005). For this reason it is important to choose a set of 
multiples that provides precise and unbiased estimates for value. It is also noteworthy 
to mention that it is useful to use several multiples in the valuation in order to reach a 
value that is reliable. Computing several multiples can provide an analyst with a 
perspective on what drives the value and elements that may provide a more sound 
valuation.  
Multiples can be of financial or non-financial nature, where the non-financial 
are more suitable for companies with small or negative profits (Goedhart et al., 2005). 
The financial multiples can be separated into equity-value multiples and total 
enterprise multiples. In both categories the multiples’ distributions are positively 
skewed, i.e. the mean of the multiples are larger than the medians (Lie & Lie, 2002). 
This leads us to suggest that the median is a more proper measure for the multiple, 
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Lie and Lie (2002) reports in their analysis of multiples that total enterprise 
multiples are better estimates of value, and that the multiple Enterprise Value / Book 
Value yields the most accurate estimator. The reason for the lower precision of the 
equity valuation multiples are that they include nonoperating or extraordinary items, 
which lead to misleading multiples (Goedhart et al., 2005). Further, an adjustment 
that has been advocated is the use of multiples based on forecast rather than historical 
returns (e.g. Liu, Nissim, & Jacob, 2002; Kim & Ritter, 1999). This adjustment yields 
greater accuracy and lower prediction error. 
When the proper multiples are obtained, it is necessary to find set of 
comparable companies in order to find a multiple that reflects proper market 
expectations. Damodaran (2005a) states that all multiples are a function of risk, 
growth and cash flow generating potential, and hence the companies in the peer group 
should be comparable on these variables. However, Andrew Alford (1992) found in 
his research of 4,698 companies that choosing the peer group based on industry, in 
general, led to improved accuracy of the valuation. Similar results where also found 
by Kaplan and Ruback (1996). Furthermore, it has been found that industries 
classified using the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) system are 
significantly better at explaining cross-sectional variations in multiples (Bhojraj, Lee, 
& Oler, 2003). Still, it is important to not overlook the fact that the companies should 
have roughly the same growth rates, returns on invested capital, and capital structure 
(Goedhart, Koller, & Wessel, 2005). 
The research on relative valuation suggests that it can provide reliable 
estimates of value. Furthermore, the approach is given considerable amount of 
attention by analysts in equity research valuations and acquisitions (Damodaran, 
2005a). Koller et al. (2010) suggest using the multiples as a supplement to the DCF 
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2.2  M&A Essentials  
The globalization, geographic diversification and deregulation of markets have 
been key drivers of mergers and acquisitions across the word (Zenner et al., 2008). 
The last decade, acquisition activity levels have been soaring (Barkema & Schijven, 
2008). However, the conventional wisdom on mergers and acquisitions is that they 
tend to fail in delivering value. If this was true and failure was inevitable, would not 
the observed M&A activity in the long run disappear? 
In this section important features of M&A will be discussed. Firstly, the 
distinct types of acquisitions will be established. Secondly, the opportunities created 
by acquisition will be discussed in the light of valuation considerations. Thirdly, the 
reasoning behind M&A and structure of the deal will be discussed. Finally, the issue 
will be examined when taking the shareholders into considerations. 
 
2.2.1	   	   Classifying	  Acquisitions	  
Although M&A is referred to as one sort of activity, it can be made a 
distinction between different types depending on who acquires the company and how 
the companies intend to operate after the transaction. Damodaran (2002) distinguishes 
between acquisitions where the acquirer is a company, and where the acquirer are 
existing managers or outside investors. In this paper, the main focus will be on 
acquisitions by companies. Damodaran (2002) distinguishes between the transaction 
types between companies as follows: 
• Mergers – target firm becomes a part of acquiring firm 
• Consolidations – target firm and acquiring firm becomes a new firm 
• Tender offers – target firm continues to exist as long as there are dissident 
stockholders holding out (successful tender offers ultimately become mergers) 
• Acquisition of assets – target firm remains as a shell company, but assets are 
transferred to the acquiring firm 
 
The acquisition-types with the greatest relevance to this paper are mergers, 
consolidations and tender offers. These are acquisitions that are virtually the same 
when considered in the long-term. Tender offers tend to ultimately become mergers, 
while consolidation is a merger of the companies into a new entity. 
 
2.2.2	   	   Creating	  and	  Valuing	  Synergies	  
M&A frequently creates new opportunities for the combined firm, and the 
value generated from these opportunities is referred to as synergies. The synergies are 
not to be confused with value of control, which is the value of operating the company 
more efficiently under different control (Damodaran, 2005c). The two elements need 
to be valued separately in order to obtain a reliable estimate for the value.  
Damodaran (2005b) categorizes the synergies into operating synergies that 
improves operations of the combined company (e.g. economies of scale), and 
financial synergies that affects the cash flows or the cost of capital (e.g. tax benefits). 
Moreover, he argues that the best way to attain an unbiased value of synergies is 
through a three-step procedure. First, the companies involved in the transaction 
should be valued independently. Second, the combined company should be valued by 
adding the values found in the first step. Third, the value of the combined company 
with synergies should be calculated. The synergies will be the difference between the 
values found in step two and step three. The process can be illustrated as follows. 
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Some synergies yield value that is more apparent than others, and some tend 
to be perceived as value improving for the wrong reasons. For instance, use accretive 
acquisitions of targets with lower earnings per share (EPS) in order to gain an 
immediate value improvement. This should clearly not add value to the firm apart 
from the synergies that are apprehended by investors. However, a study on EPS 
accretion found that it actually yields value, albeit most apparent for companies with 
unsophisticated investors (Andrade, 1999). Another dubious synergy is the purchase 
of prospective high growth companies. High growth companies are often highly 
priced and they will only yield value if the right price is paid.  
As not all synergies are equally pronounced and some can be dubious in 
nature, it is important to exercise with caution when valuing these. In addition, 
Damodaran (2005b) argues that if the synergies are substantial they should be fairly 
allocated based on the benefits the companies add to the combined company. 
 
2.2.3	   	   The	  Focus	  of	  the	  M&A	  
The potential synergies that are created in M&As are often said to be the 
underlying motivation behind acquisitions (Damodaran, 2005b). However, these 
projected synergies often prove to be illusory (e.g. Damodaran, 2010; Buffett, 1997). 
A frequent question asked in M&A is whether to pursue a diversified or a related 
acquisition strategy. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) suggest that managers are 
motivated to take on diversified acquisitions to make up for poor performance, reduce 
risk and assure survival of the company. They further report that this type of 
acquisitions have been performing poorer than related acquisitions. Bruner (2004) 
argues that the benefits are clearer and easier to exploit in related acquisitions, and 
they hence provide higher returns. However, the findings on M&A diversification are 
not unanimous. A study by Morck and Yeung (1997) finds that companies that are 
information-intensive (e.g. R&D) can benefit from diversification because they 
possess valuable intangible assets that are problematic to trade. The acquisition of 
such type of assets can be justified by the potential additional synergies created. 
 
Figure'5:'Steps'in'Valuing'Synergies,'based'on'informa9on'from'(Damodaran,'2005b)''
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2.2.4	   	   The	  Optimal	  Structure	  of	  the	  Deal	  
The optimal structure for the M&A depends largely on the acquisition itself, 
but research has still managed to find some useful guidelines on method of payment. 
The alternatives that are present for the acquiring companies are cash-based deals, 
stock-based deals, or a combination of the two. Acquirers tend to use cash rather than 
stocks to finance their transactions whenever possible (Zenner et al., 2008). Cash-
based deals are frequently associated with better returns than stock-only deals 
(Bruner, 2004). For instance, Heron and Lie (2002) studied the relationship between 
payment type and the operating performance of M&As. They reported no significant 
differences in operating performance based on payment type, however, returns on 
cash-based deals were higher compared to stock-based deals. Bruner (2004) reports 
that cash deals tend to have neutral or positive returns, while the straight stock deals 
tended towards negative returns. It has been suggested that the reason for this 
negative return is the market’s perception of the acquiring company’s stock. Since 
managers possess private information about the company’s financial position, they 
tend to finance deals with cash when its stock is undervalued, and with a stock-based 
structure when its stock is overvalued (Loughran & Vijh, 1997). Hence, the market 
perceives stock deals as an indication of overvaluation, and accordingly adjusts for 
this. 
A supplement to cash-based and stock-based payments is the use of earnouts. 
An earnout provides the deal with a variable payment that is contingent on future 
performance. Several studies have reported that the use of earnouts has induced 
higher returns for both payment methods (Bruner, 2004). The acquirer can utilize it as 
risk management tool for the targets future performance, and improve chances of a 
successful merger. However, this is a tool that is more appropriate when the target 
company’s managers have large ownership stakes. 
 
2.2.5	   	   What	  About	  the	  Shareholders?	  
When considering synergies and the structure of the deal it is of high 
importance to also have the acquisition price in mind. The value created for acquiring 
shareholders will directly depend on the price paid for the target. If the premium paid 
for the target is larger than the potential synergies that can be obtained, the transaction 
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Koller et al. (2010) defines the value created for the acquirer with the 
following formula. 
 
Value Created for Acquirer = (StandaloneValue of Target +
+Value of Performance Improvements)




There has been a fair amount of research on the value gain in acquisitions, 
both for acquirers and for targets. A study performed by Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) 
revealed that in the short-term, acquirers has a hard time creating value, and that the 
excess return usually was negative. A similar fashion, Agrawal, Jaffe, & Mandelker 
(1992) researched the long-term performance of acquirers in M&A transactions. They 
report that acquiring companies suffer significant losses over the five-year period 
following the transaction. In more recent and uplifting survey by Robert Bruner 
(2004), he reports that close to half of his sample experienced value creation, while 
the remaining companies either had value preservation or value destruction. 
The findings for value creation for target companies are more evident. Early 
studies on the topic suggest that targets in general are able to obtain positive abnormal 
returns (Asquith & Kim, 1982). The same results are obtained in Bruner’s more recent 
survey, and he states that “the M&A transaction delivers a premium return to target 
firm shareholders” (Bruner, 2004, p. 66). 
Some research has also considered the merged company as a whole. One such 
study was performed by Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988), they found an increase in the 
combined value with an average of 7.4%. Furthermore, they found the value creation 
to be in line with the literature presented above, i.e. the targets contributed with most 
















In the same vein, the premium paid for the target can affect the acquirer’s 
performance. Sirower and Sahni (2006) present a useful framework for boards when 
considering the premium to be paid for the target in relation to potential synergies. 
Their model, Meet the Premium (MTP) line, defines the premium paid for the target 
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sanity check for assessing a sensible price range in the transaction, given various 
combinations of synergies (Sirower & Sahni, 2006). In order for a premium to be 
justified it has to be located above the MTP line, and at the same time within the 
“plausibility box”, which specifies upper ranges for synergies that can be obtained.   
Using this framework, managers will be able to consider the premium in 
relation to potential synergies, which may provide a better estimate for the premium 





















2.2.6	   	   Concluding	  Thoughts	  	  
Media frequently presents M&As as a worrisome case that never succeeds, but 
is this right? It is true that the findings within M&A are found to fail and that research 
somewhat inconsistent in providing clear conclusions on M&A effectiveness. 
Nevertheless, presenting all M&As as a failure waiting to happen is clearly a 
misstatement. 
Research shows that most M&A manage to add value to the economy as a 
whole. And the existing literature on the topic has inarguably added some valuable 
insights for practitioners, academics and current managers. However, it is argued that 
the problem with current research is that it is of semi-strong form and not strong form 
(Bruner, 2004), meaning that if the conducted studies were of strong form one could, 
with certainty, draw conclusions on what would have happened if the merger had not 
been executed. In addition, future research could benefit from a more consistent and 
organized classification of types of acquisitions that actually adds value for both 
target and acquirer. Furthermore, a thorough improvement of Damodaran’s (2005b) 
framework for fair sharing of the benefits of synergies could also prove to be a 
valuable tool in making acquisitions more successful.  
More consistent research and additional useful tools for managers could lead 
to value enhancement to shareholders of both companies as well as additional value 

























M&A: The Case of Microsoft Corporation and Activision Blizzard Inc. 
© Robert Stenmark  18 
3.  Company and Industrial Analysis 
In order to perform an accurate and reliable valuation of a company it is 
important to have extensive insight into the companies in question, and into their 
respective industries (Koller, Goedhart, & Wessels, 2010). Having a perspective on 
this can reveal valuable information on value drivers in the company and its industry, 
possible competitive advantages, and noticeable trends that may evolving that alter 
the valuation. 
In this part of the paper, an outline of Microsoft Corporation (Microsoft) and 
Activision Blizzard, Inc. (Activision Blizzard) will be presented. Subsequently, the 
industries where the companies perform their day-to-day operations will be discussed. 
The latter part will also be discussing current trends in the industry as well as future 
developments in terms of products. 
 
3.1  The Companies 
For the purpose of this paper, the companies will be discussed with an 
acquisition perspective in order to understand the companies’ main operational 
business and what makes them distinct from other firms. For a more sound 
understanding of each of the companies, their divisions and their competitive position, 
Appendix 1 provides a company overview and a SWOT-analysis for each respective 
company. 
 
3.1.1	   	   Microsoft	  Corporation	  (MSFT)	  
Today, Microsoft is ranked among the 500 largest companies in the world in 
terms of revenue, ranking above all competing computer software providers (Fortune, 
2011). The company provides a wide selection of technological products for 
professional clients as well as consumers. The products include Microsoft Office suit, 
online search engine Bing, Xbox 360 gaming console, various video games and 
operating systems for computers, servers and mobile phones (Microsoft Corporation, 
2011a), 
The company has a healthy capital structure composed of 83% equity and 
17% long-term debt. It has a positive working capital and generates a financing 
source through the short-term operating cycle (through short-term liabilities) 
(Microsoft Corporation, 2011a). This capital structure enables Microsoft to create 
positive net cash that can be used for investment purposes or such (see Appendix 2 for 
more details). 
In 2011, Microsoft reported annual revenues totaling almost US$70 billion, 
and a net income exceeding US$23 billion, obtained from five different business 
segments. On the next page is an illustration of the revenue development in 
Microsoft’s specific segments for the last three years. As can be seen in the figures, 
Microsoft has an own specific division for each market.  
The figure shows that Microsoft has experienced an average positive revenue 
growth of 9.4% year over year (yoy) from 2009 to 2011. A considerable part of the 
revenue accrues from three of the divisions, which in total accounts for 82% of all 
revenues. All of these divisions have growth that is fairly close to the average of the 
business. The Entertainment and Devices Division (EDD) possesses the highest 
growth of 16.6%. When analyzing the total revenue growth in the period from one 
year to another, growth was almost twice as high in 2011 compared to 2010 
(Appendix 3). 
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The division with the highest revenue growth serves the market with the 
greatest importance for the purpose of this paper, namely the entertainment software 
industry. The growth in this industry can be recognized as the main driver for the 
acquisition of Activision Blizzard. Consequently, the following discussion will be 
directly linked to this division. For more information on the other divisions and 
segments the reader is referred to the first part of Appendix 1. 
 The EDD offers products meant to entertain and connect people. Principal 
products and services marketed include Windows Phone, Mediaroom, the Xbox 360 
and related products and accessories (detailed product overview and description can 
be found in Appendix 4). The products associated with the Xbox 360 account for a 
significant proportion of the revenues, almost 90% of the total over the three-year 
period. In 2011, Microsoft (2011a) sold 13.7 million Xbox 360 consoles, an increase 
of 33% from previous year sales of 10.3 million consoles. At present, Xbox 360 


















The increased sales of Xbox 360 and associated products are the main cause 
for the recent revenue growth. Increased sales has also lead Microsoft to experience 
cost increases of 11.2% yoy in this segment as a result of higher cost of revenue, 
higher marketing expenses and increased cost of R&D (Microsoft Corporation, 
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overall increase in performance is in terms of operating income. Operating income for 
the division displays an average growth near 100% yoy for the period (Appendix 3). 
 There has been some recent development in the division in terms of products. 
In late 2010, Microsoft added Windows Phone operating system to its product 
portfolio (Microsoft Corporation, 2010b). Following the release, several mobile 
providers revealed devices powered by the operating system (e.g. HTC, LG, 
Samsung). Then, in early 2011, Microsoft announced the entrance into an alliance 
with Nokia with the intentions of providing market-leading mobile products and 
services to customers (Microsoft Corporation, 2011b). The first Windows phone was 
released by Nokia in October 2011, and has since then penetrated many new markets 
for Microsoft in this segment (e.g. Microsoft Corporation, 2012f). 
 There have also been developments in terms of the Xbox 360 console. 
Microsoft has carried out improvements on the console in order to deliver a more 
complete entertainment hub to customers. As of this reason, Microsoft has introduced 
new features such as motion- and voice control (Kinect), online access to music and 
TV-services and more entertainment content (Microsoft Corporation, 2011c). 
How this division will preform in the future remains to see. However, the 
recent partnership with Nokia, and the increased entertainment content available on 
Xbox 360 seem to have yielded good financial results over the last three years. 
Following up these products properly could present sound prospects for future growth 
in the division. 
 
3.1.2	   	   Activision	  Blizzard,	  Inc.	  (ATVI)	  
 Unlike Microsoft, Activision Blizzard has a very focused strategy and only 
serves one particular market, namely the interactive entertainment software market. 
More specifically, they are a worldwide leader in publishing interactive software 
products and content for computers, consoles, handheld devices and mobiles. They 
also operate their own distribution network in Europe. Their strategy is built on a 
focus to develop high-quality game content in order to generate a loyal customer base 
that continues to buy the games they publish (Activision Blizzard Inc., 2011a). This is 
illustrated in their highly popular game-sequels such as Call of Duty, World of 
Warcraft and StarCraft. They also hold many other titles such as Guitar Hero, James 
Bond 007 and the newly published Skylanders: Spyro’s Adventure. 
The capital structure of the company consists exclusively of shareholders’ 
equity. This structure yields, similar to Microsoft, positive net cash due to a positive 
working capital, and a financing source arising from the operating cycle (Appendix 
2). In addition, the company has large cash reserves that provide financial flexibility if 
needed. 
Activision Blizzard has produced several games with online multiplayer 
functionality, and has an “active global community of millions of players” (Activision 
Blizzard Inc., 2011a, p. 8). Due to the nature of some of these products, they are 
subscription-based, meaning that the consumer pays regular fee to access the product 
contents and/or its additional features. Considering that Activision Blizzard has an 
active user base in excess of 30 million paying users (Activision Blizzard Inc., 
2011b), this segment generates a substantial proportion of the company’s revenues. 
 For the fiscal year 2011, Activision Blizzard generated revenues of US$4.8 
billion, where 31.3% can be ascribed to the online segment just described. Other 
important segments include published games for the Xbox 360 and the PlayStation 3 
console, also known as high-definition platforms (see Figures 12 and 13). All 
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together, these three segments account for 79% of all revenues, and they are 
contributing to most of the growth in the company. It is, however, important to note 
that the game-series Call of Duty, StarCraft and World of Warcraft accounts for a 
significant amount of these revenues (Activision Blizzard Inc., 2011a). In other 
words, the future earnings will be highly dependent on the continued success of these 
game-series.  
 An analysis of the cost development at Activision Blizzard shows that costs 
have been decreasing. Netting out the effects of impairments on intangible assets, the 
costs have decreased with an average of US$234 million per annum, or 6.2% yoy. 
The largest contributor to the decrease is the cost of sales, which has come as a 
consequence of a reduced number of game-titles published, and increased distribution 



















 The increase in revenues and the subsequent decrease in costs have lead to a 
healthy increase on the bottom line. Over this three-year period, the company’s net 
income has increased almost tenfold, from US$113 million to US$1.1 billion 
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It should, however, be given a cautionary note about this performance. As 
noted earlier, the profitability is high dependent on the company’s “ability to develop 
high quality games that will generate high unit sales volumes” (Activision Blizzard 
Inc., 2011a, p. 7). In addition, the release of new game-titles is very “hit” driven, 
meaning that only a small number of high quality titles often account for very large 
portions of the revenue (Activision Blizzard Inc., 2011a). Examples include Call of 
Duty: Black Ops, which achieved in excess of US$1 billion retail sales in 2010 
(Activision Blizzard Inc., 2010); and Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3, which had 
US$775 million in retail sales within five days of launch of the product (Activision 
Blizzard Inc., 2011a). On the other end of the scale are titles such as Guitar Hero, 
which suddenly dropped from US$1.7 billion in revenues to US$300 million (Nuttall, 
2011a). In other words, performance could take a drastic change if some game-titles 
did not perform as well as expected, and consequently pull down the bottom line. 
 For the future, Activision Blizzard is focusing on the areas that it believes will 
make a positive impact on future operations of the business (Activision Blizzard Inc., 
2011a). This means that it reduces investments in areas with lower potentials for 
profits, such as Guitar Hero, while focusing on building on the success of existing 
games, and developing new high quality game-series. One such game recently 
released is Skylanders: Spyro’s Adventure, which is a game targeting the kids-
segment. It combines the use of console gaming with toys (see Appendix 6 for game 
description), and was awarded the number 1 selling kids-title in 2011 (Activision 
Blizzard Inc., 2012b). Furthermore, the company intends to build on digital delivery 
of content and other services to establish a long-term relationship with its gamers in 
order to strengthen the online community of players. In order to do so they will 
continue to develop online product innovations, such as value-adding content and 
social networking features (Activision Blizzard Inc., 2011a). This way they are best 
positioned to increase popularity of their games and, accordingly, their share of loyal 
customers. 
 
3.2  The Entertainment Software Publishing Industry 
Worldwide, it exists a wide range of sectors and industries, and they are 
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become common to classify the industries according to standards, such as SIC (e.g. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 2012), NAICS (United States Census Bureau, 
2012) or GICS® (Standard & Poor's, 2012). The industries in which Microsoft and 
Activision Blizzard are affiliated with can be found in Appendix 7, in addition to a 
description for each respective industry according to United States Census Bureau 
(2012). The following discussion’s primary focus will be the industry in which the 
acquisition between Microsoft and Activision Blizzard will take place, namely the 
entertainment software industry. 
 The entertainment software industry is a segment within software publishing 
industry that focuses primarily on delivering products and services that entertain 
people. This is a multibillion-dollar industry, and in 2010 it enjoyed a worldwide 
consumer spending of US$67 billion (Gartner, Inc., 2011). The spending is not purely 
driven by hardcore gamers (see Figure 16 for gamer demographics), but also by 
consumers that seek to satisfy their needs in terms of interactive entertainment 
(Adolph, 2011; Los Angeles Times, 2012). Further, the actual companies operating in 
this industry is highly exposed to cyclicality. Consumer demand tend to be at its 
highest levels during the holiday buying season in the end of each year, while the 
quarter ending in June tends to have lower sales volumes (Electronic Arts Inc., 2011a; 
Activision Blizzard Inc., 2010; Microsoft Corporation, 2011a). Consequently, higher 
levels of revenues will be reported in the second half of the year. This cyclicality also 
exposes the companies to operational risks that can affect their bottom line, i.e. if they 
are unable to release products in a timely manner, it may critically hurt the 
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3.2.1	   	   The	  Hardware	  Providers	  
In the industry, it can be made distinction between the market for interactive 
entertainment hardware and interactive entertainment products and content, such as 
games. The hardware market has experienced an allover positive annual growth in 
market value over the last five years of 4.7%. This growth is mainly affected by high 
market values for the fiscal years 2008, 2010 and 2011. The positive growth is 
expected to continue to somewhat higher levels due to increased usage of the 
entertainment services offered by the gaming consoles (Gartner, Inc., 2011).  
 
The market for interactive entertainment hardware has for long been very 
focused, with Microsoft, Sony Corporation and Nintendo Company as the main 
players. These three companies are offering consoles, such as Xbox 360 (Microsoft), 
PlayStation 3 (Sony) and Wii (Nintendo), in addition to other handheld devices, such 
as PSP Vita (Sony) and 3DS (Nintendo). Xbox 360 and PlayStation 3 are often 
referred to as core gamer platforms, or “high definition” platforms, while Wii and 
handheld devices are defined as casual platforms (Karimzad, Grant, & Fassler, 2012). 
Below is an illustration of each manufacturer’s share of the installed hardware base, 
based on life-to-date (LTD) data (Microsoft Corporation, 2012g; Nintendo Co., Ltd., 
2012; Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc., 2012). The hardware market is 
characterized by a high degree of competition between the companies, as they are 
delivering fairly similar products to the end consumer. The Nintendo Wii has focused 
directly on interactive gameplay using lower graphics at a lower price point to attract 
a broader user-base (USA Today, 2006). Its success has granted it a higher installed 
hardware base than its competitors. However, the introduction of similar interactive 
products for Xbox (Kinect) and PlayStation 3 (Move) in 2010 has lead to tougher 
competition (Reuters, 2012) and sales has gradually declined. Other reasons for its 
loss of ground are the lack of high definition graphics, the little interest from third-
party publishers and the natural loss of market share as the console ages (Karimzad, 
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Analyzing the installed hardware base over the last three years we can follow 
Nintendo’s trend compared to the trend of Microsoft and Sony (Appendix 8). In 2011, 
the total installed hardware base increased with 20.8% or 36.6 million consoles. For 
the high definition platforms this was equivalent to an increase of approximately 30% 
compared to existing hardware base. In contrast, the Wii only experienced a slight 
increase of 10%. Evaluating the Wii’s hardware increase in year-over-year terms 
reveals that, compared to the sales increase in 2010, the hardware sales in 2011 had 
decreased by 40% yoy. Similar can be observed for 2010 and 2009, where the 
decrease was 26.5% yoy and 20.9% yoy, respectively. Despite the good performance 
of the high definition platforms, the low performance of the Wii creates a collective 
negative yoy rate for the whole three-year period. This can point to higher popularity 
of high definition platforms, and that the Wii is approaching the late stage in its 
product life cycle. However, an alternative explanation could be the fact that most of 
the consoles are approaching the latter part of the product life cycle. As they are 
approaching this part they are lowering their price points and are consequently able to 
attract consumers in the segment formerly governed by the Wii. 
In terms of the geographical expansion of the consoles market, the total 
market for gaming consoles is mainly driven by sales in Europe and in the U.S., with 
40.0% and 32.5% of the global market, respectively (MarketLine, 2012a). The rest of 
the world holds a somewhat smaller share of 27.4% of the global market. In recent 
years, the European market has experienced the most apparent growth, tightly 
followed by the United States (Appendix 9). These markets have increased their 
markets share by 3.5% at the expense of market share formerly held by the category 
“Rest of the World.” The increase, accompanied by higher growth rates, has lead to 
increased importance of the North American and European markets (MarketLine, 
2012a; MarketLine, 2012b; MarketLine, 2012c). 
In the last couple of years, the manufacturers of interactive hardware have 
been facing a tougher environment as mobile phones and tablets have become 
increasingly popular means for playing games (e.g. Adolph, 2011; Mintel Group Ltd., 
2011). This is especially apparent for manufacturers of portable and handheld 
platforms. The observed demand for these types of platforms has declined as a 
consequence of the expansion in the market for mobile gaming (Karimzad, Grant, & 
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high-resolution screens that make them able to perform well as gaming platforms 
(PwC, 2011). The gaming platforms that recently have experienced the most 
explosive growth are social networks and mobile phones (Bilton, 2011). These types 
of channels are increasingly offering games at lower or no cost and are often 
subsidized through in-game advertising. It is believed that the mobile gaming segment 
will have an ever more important role in the interactive entertainment industry in the 
future, and that its market share will increase to 20% of the gaming software market 
by 2015 (Gartner, Inc., 2011).  
 
3.2.2	   	   The	  Content	  Providers	  
The other part of the industry is the publishers of software and content 
designed for consoles and handheld devices. The manufacturers are among the main 
players here, but there are also an abundant number of third-party publishers. This 
part of the market absorbs about two-thirds of total consumer spending (Gartner, Inc., 
2011), and is hence the most important market of the industry. As the profit 
opportunities in this market is immense, the participants in this market regularly face 
intense competition from new and existing players (Activision Blizzard Inc., 2011a). 
In terms of revenues, the largest third-party publishers are Activision Blizzard 
(US$4.8 billion), Electronic Arts (US$3.6 billion), Konami (US$3.2 billion) and 
Ubisoft Entertainment (€1.4 billion).  
 The interactive software market is characterized by high levels of releases 
around the year-end holiday buying season, in line with the cyclicality of the industry. 
This is particularly evident for well-known game releases. The market among the 
publishers is very fragmented, and hence even large publishers hold a relatively small 
share of the market, e.g. Electronic Arts held a leading market share of 16% in the 
Western markets in 2011 (Electronic Arts Inc., 2011b). In addition, each respective 
company’s market share and growth is highly dependent on the achieving “hit” titles. 
The reason for this is that the consumers tend to place their game-title preference over 
their preference for a given publisher. To put this in perspective, there were over 300 
games published in 2011 (IMDb, 2012) and the top 10 game titles accounted for 26% 
of the sales in the U.S. (Activision Blizzard Inc., 2011a). This means that many 
developers may face a situation where games do not sell as anticipated and hence 
lowers the company’s bottom line due to the sunk costs associated with developing 
and marketing the given game. To build on the effect that origins from “hit” titles, 
many publishers have shifted their focus to development of game-titles that may 
become future popular game franchises, and to the continued development of existing 
game franchises that have proved to be successful (e.g. Electronic Arts Inc., 2011a; 
THQ, 2012). The existing game franchises tend to attract more consumers as they 
have built up a reputation for delivering high-quality entertainment experiences to the 
consumer. 
 In addition to be a very “hit” driven industry, the software sales are is to some 
degree driven by prior-year sales of gaming consoles (Karimzad, Grant, & Fassler, 
2012), i.e. a higher number of consoles sold prior year should advocate a higher base 
of prospective software buyers and hence increase the likelihood of additional 
software sales this year. According to the discussion on hardware demand, this should 
suggest that over the last few years the entertainment software providers should have 
been experiencing increasing revenues for games designed for high definition 
platforms, while experiencing declining revenues for games designed for casual 
platforms. In fact, this is a trend observed among many software providers (e.g. Take-
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Two Interactive Software, Inc., 2011; Electronic Arts Inc., 2011a). For the industry, 
the number of high definition units sold has had double-digit growth up until 2011 
(Appendix 10), while casual games have experienced an average negative growth of 

















The hardware-software relationship would also suggest that a similar trend would be 
observed for 2012. It should, however, be noted that Nintendo has the largest 
exposure to portable games (Karimzad, Grant, & Fassler, 2012), and hence reduces 
third-party publishers’ exposure to the lower sales associated with casual games. 
 Over the last few years, the hardware manufacturers have continued to 
develop the entertainment services offered through their platforms. With this 
evolution, and the fact that the number of consumers with broadband access has 
nearly doubled over the last three years (ITU, 2011), online services have become 
increasingly popular. The growing online popularity has enabled game publishers to 
enjoy some of the network-effects that other industries are benefit from, e.g. the 
telecommunications industry. Consequently, publishers are now able to provide its 
consumers with additional online content and features that extends the lifetime of the 
product. This enables the publishers to benefit from new revenue-models, and is at the 
same time a means to build a longer-term relationship to its consumers. Having a 
longer-term relationship with consumers can facilitate the attraction of a more loyal 
base of buyers. Furthermore, numerous publishers are offering direct online 
distribution of some of their games to their consumers, e.g. Activision Blizzard 
(Activision Blizzard Inc., 2011a), Electronic Arts (Electronic Arts Inc., 2011a). 
Figure 20, on the next page, illustrate the digital revenues for the two largest third-
party publishers in the industry, and gives a perspective on the increased importance 
of digital online distribution. The online distribution networks can be recognized as a 
strength in the development in the market for games publishing, because it provides 
game developers and publishers with the opportunity to sell games at higher margins 
and simultaneously enabling shorter time-to-market cycles. In other words, the 
publishers lowers their distribution cost, while the consumers benefit from more 
frequent content- and game-title releases. Still, the online distribution can also 
possibly pose a threat to existing market players as it lowers barriers to entry to the 
market through the lower cost of distribution. This type of entry is particularly 
apparent in third-party distribution channels for mobile-, tablet- and computer games 
such as Apple App Store or Google play. As noted earlier, the mobile segment and 
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market share, in the entertainment software industry by the year 2015 (Gartner, Inc., 
2011). It is highly probable that all of these digital distribution channels receive 
increased importance in the future, but a change to online-only distribution seems less 
likely, at least in the short-term perspective. Increased online- and digital revenues 
will yield higher margins and result in improved profitability for those companies that 


















3.2.3	   	   Trends	  in	  the	  Industry	  and	  Future	  Developments	  	  
Overall, the demand for entertainment software products will be highly 
dependent on how much, and where consumers spend their money. If less money is 
spent, spending on will be naturally reduced over all product groups. In other words, 
if drastic negative movements in consumer spending patters were observed, a likewise 
trend in the spending on entertainment products would be highly probable. Analyzing 
the trend in consumer spending over the last decade (2001-2010) through household 
final consumption expenditure growth per capita (The World Bank Group, 2012), it 
can be observed that the world consumer spending has experienced a fairly stable 
growth rate of 1.1-2.3% p.a. up until 2008. In 2008, the observed market risks 
increased and a higher level of uncertainty among consumers could be discerned as 
effects of the financial crisis kicked in. These effects have created an overall lower 
consumer spending on a worldwide basis. This trend is depicted in Figure 21 on the 
next page. In terms of the industry, the most important markets are currently Europe 
and the U.S. These geographical regions have experienced trends that are very similar 
to that of the world, and hence also observed lower levels of consumer spending as 
well as negative growth. This trend is likely to have impacted the sales of the 
industry, and consequently lowering observed revenues compared to the levels that 
would have been observed with a consumer spending similar to that of the period 
2001-2007.  
Other markets that may become important for the industry in the future 
include emerging countries, such as BRIC countries. These regions have experienced 
a consumption pattern very similar to the Western world, albeit much higher levels of 
growth. In the years before the financial crisis, these countries experienced high 
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financial crisis, negative growth has not been present. If this trend continues, and if 
these countries’ purchasing power increases, it is highly likely that these markets may 
become increasingly important targets for entertainment products in the future. 
Furthermore, developing countries are also experiencing high levels of growth in 
consumer spending, although not as high as for emerging countries. These countries 
currently have purchasing power that is considerably lower than in other parts of the 
world and have consumption priorities are very different, which makes them 
unsuitable target markets for the software entertainment products. However, in the 
very long-term perspective, these economies may as well receive increased attention 




Lately, manufacturers Microsoft and Sony have attracted a broader range of 
prospective buyers by increasing their emphasis on delivering a home entertainment 
system to their consumers. The console is no longer a pure gaming-console but also 
offers multiple other services such as music streaming, TV-series and movie rentals. 
Furthermore, increased online compatibility and the additional services provided by 
both Microsoft and Sony has equipped them both with online communities of millions 
of players. Through these communities one can communicate with other members, 
compare game statistics and other services that make the entertainment experience 
more social. These communities have received escalated attention in recent years, as 
Microsoft and Sony desire to make the entertainment experience a part of the 
consumers’ day-to-day lifestyle.  
The recent increases in sales of high definition games platforms and associated 
software gives some indications that consumers value high quality gaming and 
entertainment experiences that these consoles provide. It can also be observed a 
similar trend among many software publishers, which shift their focus towards a 
higher exposure to high definition games publishing (e.g. Activision Blizzard Inc., 
2011a; Electronic Arts Inc., 2011a; THQ, 2012). For the market leaders, Activision 
Blizzard and Electronic Arts, such moves have led to improvements in margins and 
stabilizing operating trends (Karimzad, Grant, & Fassler, 2012). It may be that these 
Figure'21:'Household'Final'Consump6on'Expenditure,'based'on'informa6on'from'(The'World'Bank'Group,'2012)'
2001$ 2002$ 2003$ 2004$ 2005$ 2006$ 2007$ 2008$ 2009$ 2010$
$European$Union$ 2.1%$ 1.5%$ 1.3%$ 1.6%$ 1.5%$ 1.7%$ 1.7%$ 80.2%$ 82.0%$ 0.9%$
$United$States$ 1.7%$ 1.7%$ 1.9%$ 2.3%$ 2.4%$ 1.9%$ 1.3%$ 81.5%$ 82.7%$ 1.2%$
$BRIC$ 4.4%$ 2.3%$ 3.2%$ 3.1%$ 5.9%$ 6.8%$ 9.9%$ 8.1%$ 1.2%$ 4.4%$
$Developing$Countries$ 1.1%$ 0.6%$ 3.5%$ 5.5%$ 5.9%$ 6.0%$ 7.5%$ 4.6%$ 81.9%$ 4.1%$


















M&A: The Case of Microsoft Corporation and Activision Blizzard Inc. 
© Robert Stenmark  30 
observed improvements in margins have led additional companies to pursue similar 
strategies, but it is also possible that increased competition from mobile and tablet 
gaming segments have led to the shift.  
 There have been some recent developments in terms of new hardware in the 
industry. In December last year, Sony released its new portable gaming platform PS 
Vita. The portable platform released with a price somewhat lower than existing 
products in the same category, as to compete with the growing competition form 
mobiles and tablets (Nuttall, 2011b). In contrast with early beliefs, the new product 
experienced a slow adoption in the markets where it has been introduced and has 
performed below expectations (Karimzad, Grant, & Fassler, 2012). Moreover, there 
are rumors around the future release of several next generation consoles from all the 
major hardware providers. At the Electronic Entertainment Expo in 2011, Nintendo 
expressed its intensions of launching the next generation Wii console in the near 
future. Nintendo has recently reported pullback on sales, and their financial situation 
does not look bright at the moment (Bloomberg, 2011a). Improvement of their current 
situation, and a follow through on the expectations created by the early announcement 
of the product, points towards a likely launch of the console near the year-end holiday 
season this year. The new console, Wii U, is expected to be equipped with high 
definition capabilities and the controller is said to take the form of a tablet (Nintendo, 
2011). Upon launch of the current generation Wii console, Nintendo sold an estimate 
of 1,3 million units of the product worldwide (IGN, 2006; Eurogamer, 2006; 
GamesIndustry International, 2006a; GamesIndustry International, 2006b). This could 
give an indication of what sales numbers that may be expected after the launch of the 
Wii U. However, the real question is if the new console offers capabilities that exceed 
the existing platforms and if these capabilities are powerful enough to attract as many 
early adopters as the current generation Wii. Furthermore, rumors also flourish around 
new consoles from Microsoft and Sony. However, unlike the Wii U, the consensus 
expects the launch of the next generation high definition consoles to be postponed to 
2013 (Karimzad, Grant, & Fassler, 2012). The relevant questions in relation to these 
consoles are the price point intended for the consoles and if they are able to deliver 
any improved graphics power, which was the main driver for adoption of the current 
generation consoles (Karimzad, Grant, & Fassler, 2012). It may also be that the next 
generation of these consoles will have increased focus on home entertainment that 
may lead to lower interest of upgrading by of core gamers (Karimzad, Grant, & 
Fassler, 2012). 
 In relation to announcement of new game consoles, the expectations of the 
market are often triggered and rumors of new features flourish around the Internet. 
One would think that hardware sales would slow down somewhat in response to the 
consumers’ anticipation for the next generation consoles launch, but no notable 
decline is observed. As noted earlier, software sales are to some extent related to 
prior-year hardware sales. In addition, expectations of new consoles releases tend to 
slow down software sales, as consumers wait out the new console releases (Karimzad, 
Grant, & Fassler, 2012). This often leads to a decline in software revenues in the year 
of launch, although a rebound is frequently observed in the first years after the launch. 
This has been particularly apparent for software products when Microsoft or Sony has 
released their new generation consoles in the past (Karimzad, Grant, & Fassler, 2012).  
In terms of software, the major recent trends have been briefly discussed 
above as the trends towards a more concentrated portfolio of game titles, increases in 
online content from the publishers and emergence of new sales models. An 
increasingly larger part of the publishing industry is recognizing that revenues are 
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created in the form of a few very successful titles. In this belief, many publishers have 
opted for an operational model that focuses on the release of fewer high quality game-
titles (e.g. Activision Blizzard Inc., 2011a; Electronic Arts Inc., 2011a; Take-Two 
Interactive Software, Inc., 2011). Furthermore, the product cycles for games are 
shortening. To mitigate some of this effect, the publishers are providing the 
consumers with additional game content as well as online services. The development 
of these additional features for the games has made it possible for publishers to 
employ new sales models, such as subscription-based services and fee-based 
downloads, to increase revenues. In addition to these trends, there has been a 
development towards reduced demand through retail distribution and growing sales of 
used video games (Karimzad, Grant, & Fassler, 2012). The reduced demand through 
the retail channel comes as a consequence of changes in retail sales patterns, which 
has reduced number of sales following a launch (Electronic Arts Inc., 2011a). 
Besides, increased sale of used games through the retail-channel is contributing to this 
trend. Retailers, such as GameStop and Best Buy, are earning higher margins through 
the sale of used games, and have hence increased their focus on selling this type of 
games to their target market (THQ Inc., 2011). Moreover, consumers are attracted to 
used games for their lower prices compared to new games (Electronic Arts Inc., 
2011a), and the popular titles often arrive to the used market within the span of a 
couple of months (Karimzad, Grant, & Fassler, 2012). The retailers’ focus on selling 
used titles leads to lower demand for new games and could consequently have a 
negative effect on sales for the software publishers. Last but not least, it can be 
observed a tendency for many publishers (Activision Blizzard Inc., 2011a; Electronic 
Arts Inc., 2011a; THQ Inc., 2011) to experience a decreasing proportion of costs to 
revenues. Analyzing various software-publishing companies, there appears to exist 
few common explanations for this trend apart from lower cost of sales due to fewer 
sold titles. Independently, many of these companies have cost reductions that are 
more or less idiosyncratic and that do not share common traits with other companies. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that even though many companies are able to report 
lower costs, this is not unanimous for the whole industry.  
Overall, the future in the entertainment software industry has positive 
outlooks. Throughout the next two years it is expected that each of the major 
hardware suppliers will launch a new generation of their game console. If the Wii U 
follows through with the high definition experience it promises, it could also benefit 
the publishers that have increased their exposure to high definition game publishing. 
This could create larger opportunities for expanding popular game franchises to the 
new console, and reaping additional revenues from the software market. Even though 
software sales historically has declined in relation to new console releases, it is not 
expected any major swifts in revenues across the industry for the short term. 
Historically, higher sales volumes are awaited for the years following new launches, 
correcting for lower sales volumes in the introductory year (Karimzad, Grant, & 
Fassler, 2012). Indirectly, future success of entertainment software will be highly 
dependent on the success of the next generation consoles. On one hand, if these 
consoles are able to capture an even broader range of consumers this may be reflected 
in the financial performance of the software publishers. On the other hand, if the new 
consoles deliver well below expectations, software publisher can be caught in a 
situation where sales starts to decline due to the low sales volumes of hardware. 
Furthermore, it is expected that the publishers will continue to build on the new sales 
models and the downloadable content in order to increase post-sale revenues and 
retain consumers as long as possible.  
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The future market performance for the overall industry is expected to offer the 
whole industry opportunities of growth (Gartner, Inc., 2011). The hardware providers 
are expected to maintain a constant proportion of the total market, while software 
providers are expected to lose some market share to online-game spending. However, 
subscription-based software services is expecting annual increases of up to 27% up 
until 2015, which gives software publishers room to counteract some of the effects of 
lower software volumes. The expected market performance for the next years can be 
illustrated as in Figure 22. 
The performance illustrated in the figure appears reasonable. The hardware 
segment is expected to remain approximately constant to the total market. 
Furthermore, this segment is expected to have a growth that is high in the period 
2011-2013, while spending growth declines in the following period. This would be a 
sensible reaction to the release of the next generation consoles in 2012 and 2013, 
followed by a period of stabilization of revenues. Gaming software, however, is 
expected to lose some headway to online-gaming. Lower priced or free-online games 
are expected to lure consumers away from the traditional gaming software, which will 
yield lower market shares for this segment. Taking everything into account, the whole 
industry may experience high levels of growth if the right strategies are implemented 
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4.  Rationale For the Proposed Acquisition 
 As discussed in the Company and Industry Analysis section, the entertainment 
software industry is expected to increase. This is not only in terms of video games, 
but also in terms of online games that are accessible through computers, tablets and 
mobile phones. To put the expected growth in perspective, some sources have cited 
that they are expecting the software entertainment industry to bypass the music 
industry, and triple this market by 2014 (Edgecliffe-Johnson, 2010). 
The above analysis showed that both Microsoft and Activision Blizzard, 
historically, have reported desirable results and that they both face fairly good 
prospects for the future of the entertainment software industry. On the one hand, the 
importance of Microsoft’s Entertainment and Devices division has increased, both in 
terms of absolute value of its revenues and in terms of its importance in relation to the 
overall revenues. Moreover, the division has experienced an average growth of 16.6% 
yoy over the last three years. On the other hand, Activision Blizzard has reported 
increasing revenues and decreasing costs, which has led to the recognition of an 
average growth in net income exceeding 200% yoy. The two companies, if well 
managed, can complement each other’s resources and intellectual capital in order to 
be better prepared to face the expected increase in competition in this industry.  
 Microsoft currently has a long track record for acquisitions and partnerships, 
and they have a strategy that aims at attaining long-term growth prospects and 
technological leadership through their acquisitions (Microsoft Corporation, 2011a). 
By attaining Activision Blizzard, Microsoft is acting in line with their acquisition 
strategy and at the same time, they are also able to expand within the software 
entertainment industry and increase their focus in a market that is expected to receive 
increased importance in the future. 
 The merger can have several positive side effects for both companies. In terms 
of games, the acquisition opens the opportunity for Activision Blizzard to develop 
games that have an even better compatibility with the existing and next generation 
consoles by Microsoft, and utilize Microsoft’s cloud services to distribute software 
products to the end-consumer. In addition, some popular game-titles may also be 
released exclusively for the Xbox platform in order to increase the popularity of this 
entertainment platform. Furthermore, there are also direct opportunities for Activision 
Blizzard to increase their proportion of mobile games by creating games for 
Microsoft’s Windows Phone. 
 As both companies do some sort of software development, cost reductions 
should also be expected. The first, and most obvious, cost reduction will be the 
elimination of licensing fees, which are costs that are paid to the console 
manufacturer for the right to publish games. In the same vain, software products 
usually go through an approval process by the console manufacturer that will be 
shortened if the two companies operate as one. Both these cost reductions will lead to 
higher margins, and will affect the bottom line. Moreover, other possible cost 
reductions include lower marketing expenses by cross-marketing products, the use of 
Activision Blizzard’s distribution network to distribute Microsoft products, and 
lowering combined costs of fighting the trend of software piracy.  
 The merger can also yield opportunities of risk-reduction. Offering video 
games for multiple consoles can smoothen revenues for Microsoft, if the Xbox were 
to experience declining sales. While Activision Blizzard can go through a smoother 
process in order to approve their new games. This will lower the risk of failing to 
launch products in the year-end holiday season.  
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 Overall, the two companies possess intellectual capital and certain skills that 
may be valuable in a potential merger and that may create synergies. The companies 
also share common traits that enables a potential increase technological expertize in 
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5.  Recent Stock Performance 
 After the recent financial crisis most advanced economies have experienced a 
downturn. The year 2011 was no different, and was characterized by macroeconomic 
instability and volatile equity markets. Most advanced economies experienced the 
phenomenon of flight-to-quality, i.e. investors fled from the uncertain equity markets 
and pursued safer investments, such as government bonds, or cash. Although many 
companies improved performance and could point to positive earnings, it still did not 
persuade the majority of investors to rush back to the equity markets.  
When it comes to Microsoft and Activision they appear no different than the 
rest of the market. Figure 23 below illustrates the cumulative total return on a $100.00 
investment in either stock (ATVI or MSFT) or index (IXIC), including reinvestment 
of dividends (for an illustration of daily stock data see Appendix 11). Although the 
both companies can refer to good financial performance throughout the year, none of 
the stocks or the index performed very well, and they all drew to a close of 2011 with 
a negative return on investment. Nevertheless, the start of 2012 appears to have 
slightly better outlooks, and returns are making its way in the positive direction. 
 
 
A summary of relevant stock information for Microsoft and Activision 
Blizzard can be observed in Table 2. This table will be relevant when comparing the 
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6.  Standalone Valuation 
 In order to reach a value for the merged company with synergies, a separate 
valuation of each of the companies is necessary. To perform separate valuations for 
the two companies, forecasts of the future performance have to be modeled to form 
the foundation for potential value-creation opportunities for each respective company. 
The future value-creation opportunities, or potential growth, provides information that 
enables the execution of a valuation. The following valuations are based on data 
collected on past performance of the companies as well as past growth and forecasts 
for each of the markets they operate within. The past performance assessed, are using 
information that is made publicly available through each company’s web site and 
filings to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and for this reason, 
does not include any internal or private information that may be available to 
management or employees associated with the company. It should be noted that both 
Microsoft and Activision Blizzard recently has undergone restructuration of their 
businesses, and for this reason historical information beyond the last three years is 
unsuitable for direct comparisons. The forecasts for the various markets are built on 
market research from third-party publishers, as to obtain the most proper assessment 
of the future potential for each market. Observe that all assessments of future 
performance are subject to great uncertainty and may for this reason not perfectly 
reflect the future.  
 As stated in the literature review, the following valuations are performed using 
the weighted-average cost of capital approach and the APV approach. The different 
valuation approaches rely on uniform assumptions about the future, and should hence 
produce fairly similar results. Furthermore, using two approaches to the valuation 
allows for an evaluation of the valuation that lead to a more reliable estimate for the 
value of each respective company. Finally, in the end of the section, a sensitivity 
analysis has been carried out on the valuations in order to reflect on on essential 
valuation inputs that may alter the valuation. 
 
6.1  Performance Forecast and Valuation 
 When forecasting performance in order to perform a valuation, the factors that 
should be given the uttermost attention are the components of the free cash flow 
formula. These components represent the cash flows available to all claimholders of 
the company for each given year, and when forecasted, it put forth the value created 
for the claimholders in the long term.  
 
Free Cash Flow to Firm = EBITA(1−TC )− (CapEx −Depreciation)−ΔWC  
 
The formula’s components are assessed for each company, starting with 
revenues and costs to find the operating income, and consequently the EBITA. 
Subsequently, the other components of the formula are forecasted. Finally, after 
forecasting the free cash flows, an analysis of the relevant financial leverage and the 
cost of capital have been performed. These parameters provide the necessary 
information to determine a relevant value for Microsoft and Activision Blizzard.  
  The valuations are based on a quite lengthy forecast of 10 years. This may 
appear as a relatively long forecasting period. However, the software publishing 
industry is facing an era of faster paced technological developments, shorter product 
lifecycles, and intensified competition. Using a long-term forecast, will allow for a 
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better representation of the potential growth and let the different segments stabilize 
before applying the terminal value. All forecasts are performed in real terms, i.e. the 
effects of price increases (inflation) are not incorporated in the forecasts. The use of 
real terms or nominal terms does not matter for the valuation, and should optimally 
yield the same result as long as their application is consistent. Furthermore, the 
relevant financial leverage that is applied for each company is equal to the average 
industry debt-to-equity ratio in the long term.  
 
6.1.1	   	   Microsoft	  Corporation	  
 In this section, the components of the free cash flow are forecasted for 
Microsoft. Before starting the analysis, observe that Microsoft allocates revenues on 
divisional level; however, the operational expenses are not allocated on a line-to-line 
basis to each division but on a total consolidated basis. For this reason, the expenses 
are analyzed on a consolidated basis for the whole company. And for the sake of 
presenting each division’s potential effect on the overall profitability, the operating 
income are presented for each division with the assumption that the percentage of 
expenses allocated will remain equal to the allocation observed in 2011. This 
assumption may be somewhat inaccurate, as expenses often tend to vary slightly 
depending on a wide range of factors (e.g. importance of the division, number of new 
products developed). Nevertheless, this assumption is only for illustrative purposes 
and will not have any ramifications for the valuation. 
 
Revenue	  Forecast	  
Microsoft’s future revenues depend on their performance in five different 
divisions, namely Windows & Windows Live division, Server and Tools division, 
Online Services division, Microsoft Business division and Entertainment and Devices 
division. As the different divisions rely on different types of products and services, 
they will have different growth opportunities for the future.  
 
Windows	  &	  Live	  division	  
This division is one of the largest divisions in Microsoft in terms of revenues. 
It offers products to corporate clients as well as private consumers. The main products 
include operating systems, Microsoft PC hardware and advertising services through 
Windows Live. Although the division offers multiple products, its overall importance 
is built on the success of its operating system Windows, which accounts for 75% of 
the revenues (Microsoft Corporation, 2011a). In this segment, Microsoft has market 
dominance and holds a market share in excess of 90% (Net Market Share, 2012). 
Competition in this segment is low at most, and Apple is second in line in terms of 
market share. Apple faces as a relatively low threat, as their operating system is 
designed for Macintosh computers, which account for a small share of the personal 
computer market. As most computers are supplied with operating systems when they 
are purchased, growth in this segment will be highly dependent on growth in the 
personal computer hardware market. As can be seen in Table 2, the computer 
hardware market has historically experienced a growth close to 5% on a nominal yoy 
basis. Furthermore, forecasts suggest that the global market for personal computers 
will grow at a nominal rate of 5.0% p.a.  
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Considering Microsoft’s dominating position in this segment and the forecasts 
for computer hardware suggests that Microsoft should be able to match the overall 
growth, assuming that they are able to maintain a strong market share. When 
adjusting for an expected inflation of 1.5% for advanced economies (IMF, 2012) for 
2012 and 2013, a growth of 3.5% p.a. in real terms should be observed. The following 
period is expected to have a slightly higher inflation rate of 1.8% (IMF, 2012), 
leading to a potential growth rate of 3.2%. As previously mentioned, Microsoft serves 
a large part of the world’s demand for computer software, which should suggest using 
an inflation rate that reflects global conditions to reach the real rate. However, the 
reason that justifies the use of an inflation rate for advanced economies is the fact that 
the majority of Microsoft earnings are generated in the United States, other Western 
markets and developed countries, which all can be classified as advanced economies. 
It should, however, be noted that the release of new operating systems 
historically has led to stronger sales the release year due to a higher adoption rate 
from consumers that choose to upgrade, but also from consumers that buy new 
computers in order to acquire the new operating system. This suggests that a 
somewhat higher growth rate should be observed in 2012, when Windows 8 is due to 
be released (Bloomberg, 2012). When Windows 7 was released in 2009, the new 
operating system accounted for 23% of the total revenue growth for that year. 
Assuming that a similar release pattern can be discerned in 2012, a growth rate of 
4.3% (3.5% + 3.5% ⋅ 0.23) should be observed in 2012. Furthermore, popularity of 
tablets has increased over the recent years, which may affect both the release of 
Windows 8 and the overall sales of operating systems. Microsoft has prepared a 
release of the operating system compatible with tablets; however, it has not yet 
established a firm position in this market. The increased direct (from companies such 
as Apple and Google) and indirect competition will probably reduce future growth 
opportunities and a decline will hence be observed in the latter part of the forecasting 
period. The growth will reflect a slow decline to a long-term real growth rate of 1.8%, 
a growth rate that is slightly lower that the expected future growth rate of advanced 
economies (IMF, 2012). The growth rate is set lower because Microsoft is assumed 
not to have an as strong position in the new and wider operating system segment, 
which includes a larger range of products (e.g. tablets) aside from personal computers. 
 
Server	  and	  Tools	  division	  
This division is also amongst the largest divisions of Microsoft in terms of 
revenues, currently accounting for 24.5% of total revenues. Its products include 
specialized server software, cloud-based services, support and consulting services for 




200892009 200992010 201092011 CAGR 201192016
United'States 6.0% 6.2% 7.6% 6.6% 4.2%
Europe 70.5% 3.5% 5.0% 2.6% 5.5%
Rest'of'the'World 0.6% 8.3% 7.2% 5.3% 5.6%
Global 2.4% 6.2% 6.8% 5.1% 5.0%
Historical))Annual)Growth
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year licensing agreements, while retail sales and consulting services account for 30% 
and 20% respectively. In server segment, Microsoft faces fierce competition from 
numerous companies (e.g. Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Google, Amazon and open source), 
but has still managed to maintain a relatively high growth rate. The division has 
numerous years reported double-digit growth in the segment of server and tools. The 
growth in revenues was relatively low in 2009 and 2010, which could be the effects of 
the recent financial crisis. However, in the period 2009 to 2011, the division still 
reported a revenue growth of 7.9% yoy, which mainly can be attributed to increased 
adoption of Windows platform applications. The large number of competitors, the 
fierce competition and the high historical growth rates, points in the direction of lower 
opportunities of high growth rates for the future. When the market for server and 
associated services matures, the long-term growth for such products should be limited 
to the real growth in real GDP.  
The above arguments advocate the use of a high organic growth rate in the 
initial part of the forecast, followed by a yoy decline in growth as the revenues from 
the segment for server and associated products converge to the economy-wide growth 
rate. The initial growth rate is set equal to the average yoy growth rate for 2009 to 
2011 corrected for an average inflation of 1% for the period (IMF, 2012). For the 
following years the growth for is decreased slightly by 13.5% p.a. in order to reach a 
growth in the division of 1.9% for the final forecasted year. This yields a CAGR for 
the whole forecasting period of 4.3%, and considers that this segment of the software 
industry will reach its mature stage within the forecasting period.  
 
Online	  Services	  division	  
 The Online Services division accounts for 3.5% of Microsoft’s total revenues, 
and is hence the smallest division revenue-wise. Its portfolio of products includes 
MSN, Bing and various advertiser tools. Currently, the most important product is the 
search engine Bing, which generates revenues through offering online advertising.  
Historically, the division has reported positive as well as negative growth in revenues, 
and in general the growth rate has not been consistent. The most probable reason for 
this inconsistency is the aggressive competition among the three largest market 
players, namely Microsoft Bing, Yahoo! and Google. Google holds a well-established 
position in the market for search engines with its 66% market share, followed by 
Microsoft and Yahoo! with a market share of 14% and 16% respectively. However, as 
there are several other smaller search engines that offer the possibility to market third-
party products or services (e.g. Ask.com, Timway), this segment of the industry faces 
intense competition. In 2011, Microsoft and Yahoo! initiated a partnership in order to 
improve their competitive position against Google. This partnership has lead to 
increased market shares for both companies as well as higher revenue growth.  
The online advertising spending grew with approximately 23.0% from 2010 to 
2011, while Microsoft had a revenue growth in this segment of 13.7%. This illustrates 
that even though Microsoft is one of the largest players in this market, it faces strong 
competition from both large and small firms that are able to capture a larger part of 
growth in the market. Table 4 summarizes the future prospects for advertising. The 
table includes the segment with importance for Microsoft, the online advertising, 
which is expected to have double-digit growth that slowly declines over the 
forecasting period. 
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 One would think that advertisers would seek to advertise through search 
engines that are able to capture the largest number of prospective buyers. 
Furthermore, one would also think that the market leader, that has the largest amount 
of viewers, is able to do this best. As of this reason, is reasonable to think that more 
advertisers will seek to do their services through the market leader, Google. With this 
assumption in mind, the prospective growth in real terms is set somewhat lower for 
Microsoft compared to the overall market for online advertising. Figure 24 illustrates 
the growth forecasted for Microsoft. The growth for the period 2011 to 2012 is set 
somewhat higher than for the prior period (13.7%), and then the growth will follow 





2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Print$Ad$Spending
Newspaper 20,700 19,400 18,400 17,900 17,400 17,000
Magazine 15,300 15,400 15,300 15,300 15,200 15,300
TV$Ad$Spending 60,700 64,800 65,600 67,800 68,900 72,000
Online&Ad&Spending 32,000 39,500 46,500 52,800 57,500 62,000
(in$percent)
2011=2012 2012=2013 2013=2014 2014=2015 2015=2016 CAGR
Print$Ad$Spending
Newspaper G6.3% G5.2% G2.7% G2.8% G2.3% G3.9%
Magazine 0.7% G0.6% 0.0% G0.7% 0.7% 0.0%
TV$Ad$Spending 6.8% 1.2% 3.4% 1.6% 4.5% 3.5%
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 The average decline in the online advertising spending over the whole period 
from 2011 to 2016 equals 26.7% p.a. However, as observed in the figure, the decline 
in growth is slowly decreasing and moving towards a stabilization of the market. 
After the initial forecast (up until 2016), it is assumed that the real growth for 
Microsoft will decline by 15.0% annually, which is the same decline in growth as for 
the last period in the initial forecast. With these assumptions Microsoft’s growth 
reaches a growth of 2.0% for the final forecasting year. 
 
Microsoft	  Business	  division	  
 The Microsoft Business division is the most important division for Microsoft, 
as it generates over 30% of the total revenues. Its product offerings include the widely 
popular Microsoft Office system and the Microsoft Dynamics business solutions. The 
future performance of the division will mainly rely on the adoption of current and 
future versions of the Microsoft Office system, as these products currently generates 
90% of the division’s revenues. In the first half of the last decade, the division 
enjoyed high single-digit or low double-digit growth, which increased the overall 
importance of the division (Microsoft Corporation, 2005; Microsoft Corporation, 
2007). However, over the latter part of the last decade, Microsoft has faced increased 
competition from substitute office suit products, which has lead to lower growth rates 
(Microsoft Corporation, 2009; Microsoft Corporation, 2011a). Competitors include, 
but are not limited to, Apple, Google and OpenOffice (open-source community). 
Apple provides similar software package called iWork that is a direct substitute of 
Microsoft Office but at a lower price, while Google offers a free web-based office suit 
called Google Docs. OpenOffice is an alternative free office suit that is available for 
download on both consumer and enterprise level. These companies and communities 
have gained ground over the last few years, and face increasingly larger threat to 
Microsoft. Despite for the increased competition, Microsoft has been able to obtain 
low double-digit growth rate in years with new product launches (13.0-16.0%).  
 The future growth will, as mentioned earlier, rely on the rate of adoption of 
the current and future versions of the Office suit. The forecasted growth for 
computers are expected to grow at real rates of 3.5% and 3.2% for the periods 2012 to 
2013 and 2014 to 2016, respectively (IMF, 2012; MarketLine, 2012d). In years 
without new product launches, this growth rate will reflect the largest growth rate that 
can be obtained, assuming that Microsoft does not improve its market share position. 
Considering the increased competition and the amount of freeware available, it is 
more likely that other companies will gain a larger market share at the expense of 
Microsoft’s current share. This can, consequently, lead to lower potential growth rates 
for Microsoft. Additionally, it is important to consider that not all purchasers of 
computers are in need of an office suit, and may opt out on acquiring such a product 
or choose a freeware version, which in turn decrease potential growth rates in the 
segment for office suits. Based on these assumptions, the future growth for Microsoft 
in years without product launches is set to 30% of the total growth potential for this 
market, as displayed Table 5. For the total market it is assumed that after 2016 the 
potential growth will decline by 10% annually to reach a stable growth equal to the 
real GDP in 2021.  
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 The years with new product releases, Microsoft will have a higher growth rate 
compared to years when there are no new releases. This is based on the assumption 
that an increased number of consumers will choose to upgrade to the newest version 
of Office, and that historical growth points in the direction of higher revenues when 
new products are released. Furthermore, it is assumed that Microsoft will release a 
new version of its Office suit every third year, as this is consistent with the interval 
between the two last releases. The growth associated with the release in 2013 is 
assumed to be 13.0%, equal to the average growth of past releases. From then on, it is 
assumed that growth will decline with 40% between every release due to increased 
competition from substitute products.  
 
Entertainment	  and	  Devices	  division	  
 In terms of revenues, this division is one of the divisions with less importance 
to Microsoft, and generates currently about 12.5% of the total revenues. However, the 
growth prospects for the software entertainment industry and the introduction of the 
Windows Phone in 2010 may turn this division into a future growth driver for 
Microsoft. Over the last few years, the growth in the division has been fairly small 
apart from the fiscal year 2011. This year alone produced a large uplift of 40% in 
revenues due to increased sales of Xbox and associated products. In the future, 
Microsoft is likely to closely follow the forecasted performance of the industry for 
gaming hardware; assuming that it is able to maintain its current market share. This 
assumption is a reasonable since the competition in this market is fairly stable 
(Nintendo and Sony), and all market participants have a well-established reputation. 
However, it should be noted that if any of the hardware manufacturers proves more 
successful than the others in release of the next generation console, the forecasted 
growth for Microsoft might be altered. Outlooks for Windows Phone is still 
ambivalent as it only has been a part of the division’s product portfolio since late 
2010, and the financials has not presented any clear trends for the product’s direction. 




Maximum$Real$Growth 3.5% 3.2% 2.9%











Historical)Real)Growth 2013 2016 2019
13.0% 7.8% 4.7%
Table&5:&Forecasted&Real&Growth&for&the&Office&Suit,&Real&Terms&(IMF,&2012;&MarketLine,&2012d;&MicrosoF&2005,&2007,&2009,&2011)&&&
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 With the presented information in mind, it is assumed that Microsoft is able to 
withstand the competition from the expected new generation console from Nintendo 
in 2012. During this year the division will have a real growth of 14.0%, which is 
somewhat lower than the expected 16.1% real growth of the gaming hardware market. 
The reason for the lower growth is that Microsoft is expected to launch its next 
generation console in 2013, and it is likely that demand for the current console will 
decline in 2012 in anticipation for the newer console. However, some of the decline 
will be offset by increased demand for the Windows Phone. The forecasts for 
Windows Phone are quite pessimistic across the whole forecast, with only one percent 
above the expected growth in the gaming hardware segment. This one percent real 
growth reflects Microsoft’s strategy of expanding market share by increasing the 
market penetration of the Windows Phone. In 2013, the division’s real growth is 
assumed to experience a modest uplift to 17.1% to reflect the growth of hardware 
market and 1.0% growth from the Window Phone. This higher growth will also 
reflect Microsoft’s launch of the new console in the year-end holiday season. The 
following period the growth will continue to follow the industry with the additional 
Windows Phone growth, at a 4.8% real growth (3.8% + 1.0%), which will continue 
up until year 2017 and then slowly start to decline. The stabilizing growth until 2017 
will be driven by the increased amount of consumer spending on entertainment, and 
the decline will start as a consequence of a saturating market with lower demand for 
the aging console. The decline will partly offset by revenues generated by the 
Windows Phone. In 2021, Microsoft will reach a real growth rate of 1.3%. This 
growth rate reflects the expected consumer expenditure growth when using the 
average of 2.3% for the period 1994 to 2013 as a proxy (IMF, 2012), and subtracting 
one percentage point due to the atypical growth in this period. The motivation for 
using such a long period to find the proxy for the growth is to neutralize some of the 
effects of the lower or negative growth experienced after the recent financial crisis. 
 
Expense	  Forecast	  
 The expense forecast is performed on a consolidated level due to Microsoft’s 
representation of the statement of financial income. The operational expenses are 
categorized as Cost of Revenue, Research and Development, Sales and Marketing, 
and General and Administrative. The individual expense categories differ in nature, 
and will hence having different impact on the bottom line for the core operations of 
Microsoft. 
  
Cost	  of	  Revenue	  
 Cost of revenue includes expenses that arise from manufacturing, distribution, 





Gaming$Hardware 17,797 24,621 27,354
Gaming$Software 44,730 51,129 56,512
Online$Gaming 11,899 21,453 28,298
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these expenses have represented between 19.8% and 22.3% of the total revenues. 
Examining older financial statements reveals that these costs have been somewhat 
lower percentage of the total revenues. The recent expense increase can be derived 
from the following three cost drivers (Microsoft Corporation, 2011a): 
• Increased costs related to manufacturing to support sales volumes of Xbox 
consoles and Kinect sensors 
• The royalty costs related to third-party suppliers have increased due to new 
digital features added to Xbox 
• Increased consultancy services, with lower margins have influenced the cost 
base 
 
Some of the expense increase is likely due to increased competition, and consequently 
larger efforts are necessary to attract consumers. For the forecast, a continuation of 
the trend of high cost-to-revenues should be observed. In 2012 the cost of revenue is 
expected to account for 21.0% of the total revenues, which is equal to the average of 
the last three years. The following year Microsoft is expected to release its next 
generation console, and similar to other release years, cost of revenues should 
increase. In 2005, Microsoft experienced an increase of $1,600 million in cost of 
revenues associated with the launch of the Xbox 360. The new console is not 
expected to introduce revolutionary new hardware and the demand is expected to be 
lower than on past consoles (Karimzad, Grant, & Fassler, 2012), for this reason a 
somewhat lower increase in costs associated with the launch is assumed. The forecast 
for the launch year and the following year (2013 and 2014), assumes that the cost of 
revenues will account for 23.1% of the total revenues. After these initial years, it is 
assumed that production and manufacturing costs will fall slowly back to an average 
of 21.0% of total revenues and remain constant for the distant future. The decline will 
mainly be a result of more efficient production of its products and a stabilization of 
costs associated with product support.  
 
Research	  and	  Development	  Expenses	  
 The research and development expenses are related to internal as well as third-
party work related to product development and programming costs. Historically, the 
R&D spending has been varying slightly, both in terms of absolute value and in terms 
of percent of total revenues. For this reason, it is difficult to discern any clear trend. 
What can be observed is a trend of lower R&D spending over the last 10 years in 
terms of total revenues, decreasing from 20.1% (Microsoft Corporation, 2002) to 
12.9% (Microsoft Corporation, 2011a). As the R&D spending have experienced both 
upswings and declines over this longer period, it is assumed that Microsoft’s expenses 
in this category is equal to the average of the last three years (14.1% of total revenues) 
up until the end of 2016. After the initial forecast, it is assumed that the R&D 
expenses, in terms of total revenues, will drop to the industry median. The assessment 
of the industry median rate is based on the closest direct competitors of Microsoft, 
identified in their most recent annual report (Microsoft Corporation, 2011a). These 
are companies that should be expected to have fairly similar R&D expenses because 
they provide similar software products, which demand considerable investments in 
research and development. When analyzing the identified competitors, their levels of 
R&D spending seem to coincide. It can also be observed that, in most cases, the 
median expenses exceed the average expenses due to some outliers in the data (see 
Table 7). This yields a negatively skewed distribution for the industry R&D expenses, 
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and would suggest that the median expenses should be able to better reflection of the 
actual R&D expenses. The result of this assessment is an industry median of 12.0% in 


























For the extensive list of all the competitors recognized by Microsoft and their 
R&D spending in relation to total revenues, see Appendix 12. The appendix also 
outlines how the average and median industry R&D costs are calculated for 
Microsoft’s diversified software business. 
 
Sales	  and	  Marketing	  Expenses	  
 Historically, the sales and marketing expenses have been accounting for the 
largest proportion of total costs. In terms of total revenues, these expenses have been 
close to 20.0%. Faced with fierce competition and numerous substitute products, 
marketing is essential for Microsoft to retain existing customers and to attract new 
customers. Over the last few years, this type of expenses has slowly declined to 
19.9% of total revenues. Microsoft are due to release their new operating system 
Windows 8 in 2012, and an expected launch of the next generation gaming console is 
set for 2013. Under these circumstances, it is assumed that Microsoft will increase its 
marketing efforts to attract consumers to buy their products. For this reason, the 
forecasts for the sales and marketing expenses assumes an increase in 2012 and 2013, 
accounting for 20.4% and 21.0% of total revenues, respectively. After these two 





















2009 2010 2011 Average
Average$R&D 11.1% 11.1% 10.9% 11.0%
Median$R&D 12.0% 12.0% 11.8% 12.0%
*(Calculated(based(on(the(proportion(of(the(operating(segments'
(((revenues(to(total(revenues
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General	  and	  Administrative	  Expenses	  
 These expenses arise from in-house services associated with facilities, finance, 
legal, HR and administration. These expenses are likely to display a high degree of 
correlation with revenues, as the company will have to perform more administrative 
procedures when demand increases. Analyzing older financial statements, this type of 
expenses has been as high as 14.0% of total revenues. Up until to day, these costs 
have been trending to lower levels of total revenues. The last three years has seen 
costs that are 6.5% of the total revenues, on average. As Microsoft has not directly 
expressed any intensions of expanding beyond what they have historically have done, 
it is assumed that the general and administrative expenses will stay constant at the 
average of expenses to total revenues of 6.5% (2009-2011).   
 
Tax	  on	  EBITA	  
The tax rate that will be applied to the EBITA to find the first expression of 
the free cash flow formula is assumed to be equal to Microsoft’s statutory tax rate 
adjusted for foreign income, 19.4%, i.e. a blended global tax rate. Assuming a 
constant tax rate for the future also explicitly assumes that the statutory tax rate, the 
tax of foreign earnings and the proportion of revenues from each geographic region 
will remain the same in the future. 
 
Capital	  Expenditures	  
The capital expenditures reflect investments that are carried out in order to 
provide future benefits for the company. For Microsoft these expenditures mainly 
comprise investments in property and equipment. Moreover, due to the nature of their 
operational activities, intangible assets are also included as capital expenditures. 
Microsoft regularly acquires intangible assets, which provide the company with future 
benefits. The most important, and largest, investments in property and equipment are 
buildings for operational purposes and computer equipment (Microsoft Corporation, 
2011a). In order to remain competitive and stay on top of technological developments 
it is essential that they possess up-to-date computer equipment and have the proper 
facilities to perform their day-to-day operational activities. To do this, continued 
capital expenditures are required.  
The investments in property and equipment for the years 2009, 2010 and 2011 
have been $3,119 millions, $1,977 millions and $2,355 millions, respectively 
(Microsoft Corporation, 2011a). Only analyzing these years reveals little consistent 
direction of the capital expenditures. However, looking at older annual reports reveals 
that the investments in property and equipment, generally, has been in the range of 
$2,200-$3,100 million. This should suggest that future expenditures should be 
approximately in this range in the future as well. Analyzing the capital expenditures 
in terms of the account balance of the Property and Equipment the prior year can 
provide useful information to build a potential forecast. Figure 25 reveals that the 
capital expenditures were relatively high in 2009 and more stable in the two following 
years. 
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 However, one would think that analyzing them in relation to total revenues 
would provide a better reflection of the capital expenditures. The reason for this is 
that years with higher revenues should be more likely to have larger capital 
expenditures in anticipation for similar demand the next year, and vice versa. 
Forecasting in terms of the prior year account balance would not be able to capture 
this effect directly. Figure 26 displays the capital expenditures in relation to the total 
revenues for each of the last three years. 
 
 
 The years 2010 and 2011 seem to reflect a consistent pattern in relation to 
capital expenditures. In order to take into account years with potential higher 
expenditures, forecasting is based on a constant rate of 3.5% of current year’s 
revenues. This percentage is somewhat smaller than for the average of the last three 
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The last capital expenditures that will be considered are related to the 
intangible assets and goodwill. First, the intangible assets, applies the same rationale 
used to calculate the future capital expenditures in property and equipment. However, 
the constant rate is set equal to the average of the last three years, as these 
expenditures appear to be more consistent. Hence, the future capital expenditures in 
intangible assets are 0.5% of the total revenues. Second, the goodwill is assumed to 
remain constant over the forecast, besides an increase in 2012. The account increase 
of $7,117 million in 2012 is associated with the purchase of the Skype Global S.á r.l. 
 
 
As investments in the long term tend to stabilize at a level that preserves the 
assets that provide future benefits to the company, the capital expenditures will fall to 
a level that neutralizes the effect of depreciation or amortization in the final year of 
forecast.  
 
Depreciation	  and	  Amortization	  
 Forecasted depreciation and amortization is expected to assume values that are 
similar to historical levels. On one hand, the depreciation of tangible assets over the 
last three years has varied between 23.9% and 27.2% of prior-year balance of the 
property and equipment account. Applying a proxy of 25.7% to the historical data 
yields the estimated depreciation with the lowest total error compared to actual 
depreciation. For this reason, a rate of 25.7% is applied to the forecasting of 
depreciation. On the other hand, amortization of intangible assets has historically had 
somewhat larger percentages of 25.5% to 33.7%, in terms of prior-year balance of the 
intangible asset account. When applying the same framework as used for 
depreciation, the rate that yields the lowest estimation error based on historical 
amortization is 29.9%. This rate is held constant throughout the forecast to estimate 
the future amortization. 
 
Dividends	  
Microsoft has not announced any targets for the future payout ratio of its 
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of net income. If the financial performance of Microsoft continues, it would be likely 
to observe future dividends with the same payout ratio as in 2011. However, 
Microsoft currently has a retained deficit, as opposed to retained earnings, that stems 
from a special dividend and a share repurchase that was performed in 2005. This 
retained deficit has been trending towards reduced levels, and Microsoft is expected 
to restore positive levels to this account in 2012. For this reason, it is likely that 
Microsoft will have a somewhat higher future payout ratio than declared for 2011, to 
grant its shareholders with a larger share in the company’s financial performance. As 
a proxy for the future payout ratio, an average of the last three years of 26.6% is 
applied to the net income. This payout ratio will still enable growth in retained 
earnings, and will provide Microsoft with increased financial flexibility that may be 
advantageous in the industry’s increasingly competitive environment. 
 
Net	  Operating	  Working	  Capital	  
 The last component of the free cash flow formula is the net working capital, 
which is a measure of the company’s ability to manage its current liabilities. In other 
words, a company should optimally have short-term assets that are able to fund its 
short-term liabilities (positive working capital), and hence relieve the company of its 
obligations if necessary. However, if levels of inventory and accounts receivables are 
low, a negative working capital can be indicative of operational efficiency. To 
calculate the net operating working capital for Microsoft the following formula has 
been applied. 
 
   NWC =Current Operating Assets excluding Cash−Current Operating Liabilities  
 
 When applying this formula, it is important to emphasize that only operating 
assets/liabilities should be included in the calculation, i.e. items that concerns the core 
operations of the company. In Microsoft’s situation, this means that operating assets 
will encompass Accounts Receivable, Inventories and Other Current Assets, while 
operating liabilities will include Accounts Payable, Accrued Compensation and Short-
Term Unearned Revenue. These items will now be discussed to form the basis for the 
forecast of the net working capital. 
 On the asset side, the first item is the Accounts Receivable, which is 
forecasted based on an annual percentage of 20.5% of total revenues. Over the last 
three years, the accounts receivable has moved within a tight band around 20% of 
total revenues, but increasing slightly in the last fiscal year. It is unlikely that the 
percentage will continue to increase in the long term, and it is hence assumed that the 
receivables will stabilize in terms of total revenues. The applied percentage of 20.5% 
represents the average for the last three years, and is consistent with historical values 
of the accounts receivables. Second, inventories are likely to correlate with the 
amount of cost of revenues. Over the last three-year period inventories have increased 
in these terms, from 5.9% to 8.8%. These findings do not point in the direction of any 
clear trend. However, examining older data reveals that the inventories have been 
quite low after the financial crisis and are increasing to more normal level (see Figure 
28). Moreover, it should be expected that Microsoft will increase their proportion of 
online delivery of products over time, and inventory should decline accordingly. For 
this reason, a more complete forecast of the inventories is based on the average of the 
last five years of 7.9% of the cost of revenues.  
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Third, it is not made explicit what the account Other Current Assets include, for this 
reason it is hard to make any direct assumptions about what values this account may 
take on in the future. Consequently, it is assumed that this account will remain 
constant for the distant future at levels reported in the last quarterly earnings 
announcement, $2,608 millions (Microsoft Corporation, 2012h).  
 On the liabilities side, the first item is the Accounts Payable. As suggested by 
Koller, Goedhart, & Wessels (2010), the accounts payable are forecasted in 
percentage terms of cost of revenue. Since the account has been slightly volatile in 
these terms (26.9% to 32.5%), a historical three-year average of 28.9% is applied 
throughout the forecasting period. Second, the Accrued Compensation’s most rational 
forecasting ratio is based on total revenues, as the generation of higher revenues are 
motivated by employee compensations. Over the last three years, the account has 
slowly converged towards 5.0% of total revenues, decreasing from 5.4% to 5.1% 
(Microsoft Corporation, 2011a). Its reduction has been 2.7% annually, and it is 
reasonable to assume that a similar trend will be observed for the long-term future. 
The reasoning behind this line of thought is that some of the revenues will tend to be 
somewhat self-generating after some time due to past efforts by employees. 
Consequently, the compensation in terms of total revenues is likely to decline. In 
order to not cause demotivation amongst the employees, the annual reduction in 
compensation is set to 2.3%. It is noteworthy to mention that accrued compensation 
will decrease in percentage terms, but not in absolute terms, due to higher revenues. 
Third, the Short-Term Unearned Revenue will, similar to Accrued Compensation, 
correlate highly with current revenues. The average account balance the last three 
years has been 22.2% of total revenues. In estimating the net working capital it is 
assumed that the future levels of these revenues are somewhat lower at 21.5%, since 
the account currently (2011) is at historical high levels both in terms of percent of 
total revenues and in absolute terms.  
 An analysis of the working capital for the last three years reveals that 
Microsoft has a negative net working capital, i.e. it is unable to fund its short-term 
liabilities using solely short-term assets. With continuation of this trend, and the 
above assumptions about the items included in the formula’s calculations, the 
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Financial	  Leverage	  
As stated earlier, the financial leverage of the company is assumed to 
converge to the industry average. The change in financial leverage will not affect any 
of the variables outlined above, but will affect the ultimate value of the company 
through the discount rate. For Microsoft, the industry average debt-to-equity ratio is 
7.5% (Damodaran, 2012a). This debt ratio is considerably lower than Microsoft’s 
current ratio of 20.88%. The reason for the high current debt-ratio is that Microsoft 
has “taken advantage of the favorable pricing and liquidity in the debt market, 
reflecting [their] superior credit rating and the low interest rate environment” 
(Microsoft Corporation, 2011a, p. 31). Moreover, it is likely that it will return to 
lower levels of debt in the future, when the economic situation stabilizes. Consistent 
with these arguments, it is assumed that Microsoft slowly will decrease its debt ratio 
to the industry average over the course of the next five years. 
 
Cost	  of	  Capital	  
 Having forecasted all the essential components of the free cash flow, what 
remains to finalize the valuation is the calculation of the cost of capital for Microsoft. 
The cost of capital is applied to the future free cash flows in order to discount them 
back to current levels and consequently find the enterprise value of the company. As 
outlined in the literature review, the cost of capital in the Free Cash Flow to Firm 
model is represented by the weighted-average cost of capital, while the cost of capital 
in the Adjusted Present Value model is represented by the unlevered cost of equity. 
Both these measures of cost of capital are based on the CAPM model. For this reason, 
assumptions about the CAPM’s components will be outlined below, followed by the 
estimation of the WACC, which also includes the cost of debt.  
 All of the components of the CAPM model are of equal importance, and if any 
one of them were to be based on data that does not necessarily reflect the reality, the 
ultimate enterprise value may result in being unsound.  
 
E(rE ) = rf +βL (E(rm )− rf )  
 
The first component of the CAPM model is the risk free rate, which should be 
set equal to the rate of return a long-term government bond with ten years duration 
and that carries no risk. The recent turmoil in the financial markets has resulted in rate 
of returns on bonds with long duration to drop to historical low levels. Consequently, 
most economies are going through an era with risk free rates that have never before 
been observed, nor are reflective of rates that are expected for the future. For this 
reason, it is assumed that using the average of past bond rates from 2007 to 2012 will 
provide a more reliable estimate of the risk free interest rate. Microsoft operations are 
mainly located in the United States, and majority of its investors have their origins in 
this geographic region. This suggests using an American risk free rate of return based 
on U.S. Treasury bonds. Based on the average of the 10-year Treasury bond from 
2007 to 2012 yields a proxy for the risk free rate of 3.42% (U.S. Department of the 
Treasury, 2012).  
 The second component necessary to calculate the cost of equity is the relevant 
company beta, which will measure the systematic risk of Microsoft. As discussed in 
the literature review, there are two kinds of betas, one unlevered beta and one levered 
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beta for each company. As the levered beta is based on the value of the unlevered 
beta, the latter will be discussed first. Damodaran identifies an unlevered beta of 1.18, 
corrected for cash, for the computer software sector (Damodaran, 2012a). The reason 
why the beta is corrected for cash is because cash often is assumed to have beta equal 
to zero, or close to zero, i.e. high cash holdings will lower the unlevered beta. In other 
words, this means that exclusion of the cash holdings in the calculation of the 
unlevered beta for the industry provides a beta that is more reflective of the actual 
riskiness of the assets that are specific to the particular industry. Furthermore, 
converting the unlevered beta using the target industry debt-to-equity ratio yields a 
levered beta equal to 1.24 for Microsoft. 
 The third and final component required to find the unlevered cost of equity 
and the levered cost of equity is the market risk premium. According to Credit 
Suisse’s (2012) the most recent version of their Investment Returns Yearbook, the 
historical risk premium for the United States is 5.20%. As the American equity 
market is one of the most mature markets in the world, and the fact that the analysis 
by Credit Suisse is based on over one hundred years of data, this risk premium is a 
reliable estimate of the true risk premium.  
 Using the obtained information to find the unlevered and the levered cost of 
equity yields rates of 9.57% and 9.95% respectively. The unlevered cost of equity is 
applied directly to the valuation using the APV approach, while the levered cost of 
equity fits into a wider context. In order for the levered cost of equity to prove its 
usefulness it has to be included in the WACC. Before the WACC can properly 
calculated, an assessment of the cost of debt is required. Damodaran (2012b) provides 
an easy framework for assessing the cost of capital based on the creditworthiness of 
the company. As outlined in the literature review, this framework calculates the cost 
of debt by using the risk free rate and adding a default spread reflecting the credit 
rating of the company. Microsoft currently has a credit rating of AAA that suggests a 
default spread of 0.65% over the risk free rate, and results in a cost of debt of 4.07% 
using the risk free rate identified earlier. However, it should be kept in mind that most 
of the debt outstanding is issued quite recently (Microsoft Corporation, 2011a), while 
the assumption for risk free rate is an average from 2007-2012. Rationally, since these 
data are not fully consistent they will provide a cost of debt higher than the true cost 
of debt. An analysis of Microsoft’s most recent annual report reveals record of the 
effective interest rates that are to be paid on outstanding debt. Calculating a weighted-
average on the total debt outstanding yields a cost of debt of 3.16%, which is 
considerably lower than the results using Damodaran’s framework. This new rate 
yields a more appropriate cost of debt, and is more suited with the assumption that 
Microsoft is expected to reduce its future debt levels. 
 






⋅ rD ⋅ (1−TC )  
 
 It would now be tempting to use the U.S. marginal tax rate of 35% (IRS, 
2012) to find the cost of capital. However, for the valuation to be consistent the 
marginal tax rate used in the free cash flow needs to be applied (Koller, Goedhart, & 
Wessels, 2010). In Microsoft’s case, this tax rate is represented by the blended global 
tax rate of 19.4%. All the essential components required to calculate the WACC are 
now in place. Applying the target rate for debt-to-equity yields a cost of capital 
(WACC) of 9.43%. The assumed rates, ratios and betas are summarized in Table 8. 
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Finally, applying the identified valuation parameters to the forecasted free 
cash flows and assuming a long-term sustainable growth rate of 1.9% (equal to the 
average forecasted real growth in advanced economies 2011-2017 (IMF, 2012)) for 
the terminal value, yields an enterprise value for Microsoft of $344.6 billions 
(Appendix 14). When accounting for net debt (adjusted for off-balance-sheet items 
such as operating leases) the value of pure equity is $340.3 billion, or $40.09 per 
stock. Compared to total market capitalization of $237.4 billion in 2011, the 
theoretical value seems excessively high. However, there should be noted that 
Microsoft are experiencing increasing competition from several sources and that 
investors have lost some of the confidence in the company’s expected future 
performance. For this reason, it is reasonable to believe that the future outlooks for 
the company have lead to an underpricing.  
Furthermore, this valuation assumes that Microsoft will not perform any stock 
repurchases or stock issues in the future. This is not necessarily a realistic assumption, 
as the company had still has an option outstanding to repurchase stocks for $12.2 
billion. However, this will not have a major impact on the valuation, as stock 
repurchases is a balanced process. This means that when stocks are repurchased, the 
balance of cash is reduced while the number of shares outstanding is also reduced, 
and it should for this reason yield only a minor impact on the value of the company. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the impact on the valuation would be highly 
dependent on the stock price at time of repurchase and the future value of the stock 
price, i.e. if the stocks are bought back at a premium or a discount. 
 
Tax	  Shields	  and	  Costs	  of	  Financial	  Distress	  
 In order to perform a valuation using the APV framework, it is necessary to 
split the valuation into three (or more) components. The following valuation is 
focusing on the unlevered value of the company, the value of any tax shields, and the 
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In order to perform a proper assessment of the value, each of the components 
needs to be discounted with a rate that reflects their overall riskiness. The discounted 
values are then summarized, to find the value of the company. Many practitioners 
prefer this valuation method because provides better insights on where value is 
created. However, as mentioned in the literature review, estimating a reliable value 
for the cost of bankruptcy may prove to be difficult. 
 The first component of the model is the unlevered value, i.e. the value of the 
company as if it was financed entirely with equity. This means that the free cash 
flows can be discounted by the unlevered cost of equity, which was calculated earlier. 
The value of Microsoft, assuming no debt, is equal to $341.1 billion.  
 The second component is the tax benefits that the company is granted because 
it holds debt. The calculations of the tax benefits follow much of the same logic as 
with the unlevered value of the company. Basically, the calculation involves 
estimating the annual tax deductions that the company are provided with, and 
discount them back to the present. Since the discount rate should be reflective of the 
riskiness of the given component, the benefits provided by the reduced tax should be 
discounted at the cost of debt. With this in mind, and explicit assumptions regarding 
debt, yields a value for Microsoft’s tax shields of $7.9 billion using formula below.   
 

















The last, and most intricate, component is the present value of the probable 
bankruptcy costs. Formula-wise they are easily calculated as the company’s 
probability of default multiplied by the present value of the bankruptcy costs. 
However, finding estimates for these variables prove to be more difficult. Usually the 
probability of default can be found by analyzing historical defaults rates based on 
credit ratings (Damodaran, 2006). However, the number of companies that have 
entered a state of financial distress have drastically increased during and after the 
financial crisis. Under these conditions, it may be argued that using a probability of 
default based on historical data is unfeasible. For this reason, the implied probability 
of default has been calculated based on the current prices of Microsoft’s bonds. The 
formula applied to achieve this, is expressed as follows (πa – probability of default) 
(Damodaran, 2006, p. 20).  
 











It should be noted that calculating the implied probably was not as 
straightforward as it may seem. Many of the calculations using the current price of 
Microsoft’s bonds yielded negative probabilities of default, which in fact should not 
be possible. Based on this discovery it can be argued that the bond prices are too high 
to reflect their respective future earnings, i.e. they are overpriced. The most likely 
reason for this is the increased demand for these financial instruments, or in other 
words, the investors’ flight-to-quality. Moreover, as negative estimates of the 
probability of default are unfeasible to include in the calculation of a reliable proxy, 
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only the positive estimates have been included. The remaining estimates after this 










Furthermore, the bankruptcy costs associated with a potential distress situation 
was set equal to the same as for the electric equipment industry, as no suitable rate 
was found for the software industry. The electric equipment industry has bankruptcy 
costs amounting to 113.8% of the unlevered value of the company, which is assumed 
to be very similar to the software industry. The reasoning for this is that the costs 
associated with distress in software companies are for various reasons also likely to be 
very large. The substantial size of these costs are likely originate from the likelihood 
of losing many loyal customers if entering a stage of financial distress; the large 
amounts of intangible assets that are not easily converted to hard cash; and the high 
expected legal fees associated with bankruptcy. Acknowledging that this rate is a 
reliable estimate for the actual bankruptcy costs, the probable bankruptcy costs for 
Microsoft can be estimated at $4.5 billion, based on the estimated unlevered value.  
As all the components of the APV have estimated, the enterprise value can be 
retrieved by adding the unlevered value and the tax benefits created by debt and 
subtracting the cost of bankruptcy. This yields an enterprise value of $344.5 billion 
for Microsoft, which is $99 million below the value obtained using the WACC. This 
slight difference can be argued to be directly attributable to the intricate process of 
estimating a reliable estimate for the probability of default. 
 
Sensitivity	  Analysis	  
Over the past ten years, there have been a constant flow of new developments 
from the software industry, and the technological advances have been immense. As a 
result of this, the future may prove to be very different than initially expected, which 
will have an impact on the valuation. A resolution to this issue would be to perform a 
sensitivity analysis by altering some of the important variables in the valuation. The 
analysis will provide a more complete understanding of what affects the value, and 
offers a way to reflect on the explicit assumptions for the future. 
 In performing the sensitivity analysis for Microsoft, some of the valuation’s 
most important variables have been altered to examine their overall impact on value. 
The different alterations are presented with their effect on the equity value, i.e. 
adjusted for net debt of $4,263 million, and compared to the base case of Microsoft.  
When presented in equity terms, it reflects how the stock price is likely to change. 
Moreover, it is important to emphasize that the analysis only takes into account the 
isolated effect of changes in the relevant variables. For this reason, the effects that are 
presented below are not representative if the changes were to happen simultaneously.  
The first variable assessed in the analysis is the terminal growth rate, which 
will have the biggest impact on Microsoft’s valuation. The analysis shows that if 
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exponentially, i.e. the higher growth rate, the more it adds to the overall equity value 











The second variable that has been assessed is the level of debt. Even though it 
is assumed that it is unfeasible for Microsoft to issue more debt, it is interesting to 
inspect its effect on the equity value. Table 11 illustrates that the value-added by debt 
is linear, i.e. every 2.5 percentage point increase in the debt-to-equity ratio increases 
the value of equity a slight 0.7%. The results verify that it is unfeasible for Microsoft 












The last variables that have been assessed are concerned with variables of a 
more operating nature. As Figure 29 illustrates, a change of only a percentage point 
can make significant impact on the equity value of Microsoft. Implicitly, this means 
that if any of the specified variables experiences an unexpected change, the value for 


















0.90% 1.40% Base*Case 2.40% 2.90%
Change'in'Equity'Value 022,929 012,180 0 13,916 29,968
Change'in'Value'per'Share 02.70 01.43 0 1.64 3.53




5.00% Base*Case 10.00% 12.50% 15.00%
New$WACC 9.46% - 9.37% 9.33% 9.29%
Change$in$Equity$Value -2,473 - 2,421 4,766 7,046
Percentage$Change -0.7% - 0.7% 1.4% 2.1%
Target*Debt*Ratio
Table&11:&Microso/’s&Sensi3vity&to&Increased&Amounts&of&Debt&
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6.1.2	   	   Activision	  Blizzard,	  Inc.	  
This section discusses the forecasted inputs of the free cash flow, the target 
debt ratio and the cost of capital to enable a valuation of Activision Blizzard. It should 
be noted the company’s financial information prior to 2008 is incomparable with the 
newer financial information due to Activision’s recent merger with Blizzard. 
Furthermore, Activision Blizzard presents their public financial information in 
multiple ways, i.e. segmented information, in order to provide some perspective on 
the company’s financial performance. The segmentation structure opted for, to 
forecast the revenues, is presented on a platform-basis. Moreover, since Activision 
Blizzard has not segmented their costs in similar fashion, it does not allow for a 
visualization of the future costs that are in line with the revenue forecast. For this 
reason, the costs are presented in a consolidated fashion that that does not reveal each 
respective segments actual expense.  
 
Revenue	  Forecast	  
The forecasting approach for the revenues follow same line of thought as the 
historical- and forecasted performance outlined in the industry analysis, 
distinguishing between revenues from Online Subscriptions, High Definition 
Platforms, Casual Platforms, PC and Other, and Distribution. Allocation of revenues 
in this fashion allows for a clear presentation of trends in each of Activision 
Blizzard’s operating segments. The forecast for total revenues will be in line with 
expected future trends for gaming software provided by Gartner, Inc. (2011), earlier 
depicted in Table 6. With this in mind, it should be noted that Activision Blizzard 
might acquire higher growth rates at the expense of other companies if they continue 
to release successful game titles. 
Moreover, in the long term, much of the growth in revenues is likely to 
converge to the future growth in private consumer expenditure. As with Microsoft, 
this is assumed to be equal to 1.3%, which is the average growth in consumer 
expenditure during 1994-2013 (IMF, 2012) adjusted down by a percentage point for 
the historically high level of growth during this period. The reason why the future 
private expenditure is applied is that future spending on software entertainment is 
likely to have a high correlation with consumer spending patterns.  
 
Online	  Subscriptions	  
 Online subscriptions comprise all types of revenues from all of the World of 
Warcraft products; this “includes subscriptions, boxed products, expansion packs, 
licensing royalties, and value-added services” (Activision Blizzard Inc., 2011a, p. 53). 
Through the launch of several updated versions of the game over the last decade, this 
segment has managed to attract a considerable number of subscribers. According to 
Activision Blizzard, the segment has over 10 million monthly active users (Activision 
Blizzard Inc., 2011b). Analysis of the past performance of this segment reveals a 
relative growth for 2010 and 2011 of -1.4% and 10.3%, respectively. From this 
information it is hard to discern any clear trend. However, including the relative 
growth of 8.33% for 2009, and assuming that the CAGR for these years are reflective 
of future performance yields a potential annual growth of 5.6%, or 4.3% in inflation-
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adjusted terms (IMF, 2012). This growth can be justified by Activision Blizzard’s 
long track record of releasing updated versions and expansions of the game with 
regular intervals, which optimally should enable the attraction of additional 
consumers. Moreover, the fact that the game is the world’s most popular in its 
category (MMORPG) and that it has a large existing base of subscribers should also 
underpin this growth. Consequently, the first five years of the forecast is based on a 
real growth of 4.3%, followed by a steady decline in growth to the expected growth in 
private consumer expenditure of 1.3% for 2021 (as illustrated in Figure 30). 
 
 
High	  Definition	  Platforms	  
 This segment of Activision Blizzard has, through a switch in strategy and 
restructuring, received increased attention lately. The segment offers the largest 
potential for future growth, especially when considering the upcoming launch of the 
next-generation consoles. The introduction of the next-generation consoles will also 
make the market for casual games smaller, and should consequently drive a tougher 
competition in the high definition segment.  
 At Activision Blizzard, the high definition segment has enjoyed very high 
growth recent years due to some highly successful franchises, such as the Call of Duty 
titles. Figure 31 illustrates the high historical growth that has been reported in this 
segment since the merger in 2008. In the year following the merger, the company 
released its newest addition to the Call of Duty-franchise, Modern Warfare 2. This 
game, and other high definition games, contributed to a growth of 239.0% in revenues 
relative to 2008. In the two following years the growth rate has declined considerably, 
but still at a level that can be considered very high. In these years, growth was 
primarily driven by continued high sales from the Call of Duty-franchise, but was also 
positively affected by the release of Skylanders: Spyro’s Adventure in 2011. Overall, 
the figure reveals that there is a trend of lower growth rates; a trend that is highly 
likely to continue into the future as its popular franchises has already established a 
position in the market. Moreover, the company has received some unwanted public 
attention from its community that may affect the future growth. Many consumers has 
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it does not provide the wanted service in terms of game fixes, lack good support 
channels, and in general does not satisfy the community’s needs. These are issues that 
may put some pressure on future growth opportunities for the company.  
 
 The historical trend reveals that growth has rapidly declined, and shows all 
signs of continuing in this direction. In the future it is likely that Activision Blizzard’s 
revenues from this segment will converge towards similar growth levels expected for 
the gaming software industry as a whole. The forthcoming two years will see the 
release of the next generation consoles, and one should expect many consumers in 
2012 to postpone game their purchases in anticipation for the new consoles. When 
consumers postpone their purchases, it will directly lower the opportunity for 
software publishers to capture revenue growth. For this reason, it is assumed that the 
growth rate for Activision Blizzard will fall in 2012 to 4.5%, almost a half of what 
was observed in 2011.  
After this initial year of forecast, it is expected that growth again will rise. The 
reason for this is outlined in the industry analysis as the tendency for software 
revenues to experience a bounce back in terms of growth in the year following new 
hardware releases. A similar trend is assumed to happen in 2013 after the Nintendo 
Wii U launch, but not the year after the release of the new Xbox and PlayStation 
(2013). The rationale for this is that the introduction of the Wii U in 2011 will drive 
revenues in 2013 and eliminate a great deal of the effect that normally should be 
observed in 2014. Based on this information it is assumed that Activision Blizzard 
will have a growth in 2013 similar to the growth in 2011, 10.0%. This is 
approximately 85% higher than the real growth of 5.4% expected for industry as a 
whole (Gartner, Inc., 2011; IMF, 2012). The higher growth is justified by their 
existing game franchises that have proved great abilities to capture revenues and it is 
assumed to be the main driver of the additional growth in 2013.  
The following two years of the forecast assumes that a fall in growth to 5.2% 
and 4.4% in 2014 and 2015, respectively. The expected industry real growth is 
expected to be 3.5% for the same period (Gartner, Inc., 2011; IMF, 2012), which 
means that Activision Blizzard will be outperforming the market with approximately 
















M&A: The Case of Microsoft Corporation and Activision Blizzard Inc. 
© Robert Stenmark  60 
Blizzard’s performance towards the overall market performance. This is a reasonable 
assumption as one would think that introduction of the new consoles will make the 
high definition market wider and attract more competitors to the market. As more 
companies enter the market, the competition intensifies and it is likely that the drive 
for survival will increase the overall software quality in the fight to pursue revenues. 
The increased software quality across the industry is likely to reduce the importance 
of older established franchises, which will lose much of their ability to generate 
excessive revenues. Furthermore, the expected high growth in the online segment is 
also an effect that is probable to put a damper on potential growth for the high 
definition segment. After 2015, it is assumed that the industry growth gradually will 
decline to levels similar to the long-term expected growth of advanced economies of 
1.9%. The reason for this is that the consumer expenditure on entertainment is 
expected to increase relative to other expenditures. It is further assumed that using the 




 The software revenues from casual platforms are generated by games 
published for Sony PlayStation 2, Nintendo Wii and handheld devices. This segment 
has experienced a significant reduction in importance over the last three years, 
reducing its proportion of total revenues with over 10%. The demand for casual 
games was down 37.4% and 15.3% relative to the prior year, for 2010 and 2011, 
respectively. The main driver for this development has been the declining demand for 
games for the Nintendo Wii. This is a trend that is expected to continue as the next-
generation console from Nintendo is launched later this year, and thereby further 
reducing the number of games sold for the current generation console. In forecasting 
the revenues for this segment is assumed that the demand for games of the Nintendo 
Wii will follow structure similar to games associated with the PlayStation 2. After the 
introduction of the newer console, PlayStation 3, games for the PlayStation 2 declined 
at a moderate intensity and reached sales of roughly $200 million after three to fours 
years. For this reason it is assumed that the demand in the casual platform segment 
will have an annual decline of 12.5% up until 2015. The following year, 2016, is 
assumed to have a lower reduction in demand of 10%.  
Moreover, games for PlayStation 2 is assumed to be cut from Activision 
Blizzard’s product portfolio as of the end of 2011, as revenues generated in this 
segment is currently close to zero. With the shortening of product cycles and 
intensified competition, the retirement for Nintendo Wii games are assumed to 
happen earlier in their life cycle, in 2018. To account for the retirement of these 
casual games, demand will fall with 25% and 30% for 2017 and 2018 respectively. 
The remaining forecast periods are expected to have an annual decline of 10% caused 
by Activision Blizzard’s long-term focus on high-definition games. This focus is 
strengthened by the expansion of the number of high-definition consoles available in 
the market after 2013.  
 
PC	  and	  Other	  
 Revenues in the PC and Other segment have historically been generated by 
the demand for PC games. However, recently, the product portfolio offered by this 
segment has expanded to include toys for the highly popular game Skylanders: 
Spyro’s Adventure. In the forthcoming years Activision Blizzard is expected to 
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release Diablo III and it is currently developing a new MMORPG game that will, if 
successful, support long-term growth.  
In 2010, the company had a relative growth of 97.0% due to the release of the 
newest addition to the game franchise StarCraft. This was a high and non-sustainable 
growth and in 2011 the relative growth fell to 15.1%. Unlike the growth in 2010 that 
was driven by StarCraft sales, the growth in 2011 was generated by the increased 
sales of toys to Skylanders: Spyro’s Adventure. This information points in the 
direction of high games sales in the introduction year, followed by fewer sales in the 
years following the release. In a matter of fact, this was observed when the game 
Diablo II was released in 2000 (Karimzad & Grant, 2012). The game sold 2 million 
units in the launch year, followed by a slow growth in the installed base in the 
succeeding years. By 2009, the game had been sold in over 7 million copies and had 
proved as a good long-term provider of growth. For this reason, it is assumed that 
most games sales is generated in the launch year followed by years were sales support 
current level of revenues and provides some growth.  
 It should be noted that this market is quite mature but that it still has potential 
for growth. However, with the expected growth in online games that are designed for 
the same platform (PC), it will probably be hard to capture extraordinary high levels 
of growth that are persistent. With the expected release of the game Diablo III in 
2012, it is assumed that growth will be fairly high, as past Diablo-releases has 
generated high sales volumes. Although recent growth has been very high, it is 
assumed that the growth in 2012 will be high but still at lower levels that in 2011. The 
reason for this is that one should expect to observe intensified competition in the 
market for games for computers (for both online and regular games). The growth in 
2012 is set at 12.0%, which mainly is attributed to the release of Diablo III and the 
continued sales of toys for Skylanders: Spyro’s Adventure. The following years it is 
assumed that the intensified competition will put a damper on the growth 
opportunities and growth will fall to industry wide levels in 2014-2015. This is 
indicates by a real growth of 7.0% and 3.5% for 2013 and 2014-2015, respectively. In 
subsequent years, similar to online subscriptions, the growth is expected to gradually 
decline to a long-term private consumer spending growth of 1.3%. 
 
Distribution	  
 The distribution business, formerly owned my Blizzard, “consists of 
operations in Europe that provides warehousing, logistical, and sales distribution 
services to third-party publishers of interactive entertainment software, [their] own 
publishing operations, and manufacturers of interactive entertainment hardware” 
(Activision Blizzard Inc., 2011a, p. 4). Over the last three years the business unit has 
reported very unstable growth (see Figure 32), and no distinct trend can be discerned 
based on these data.  
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Nevertheless, since the distribution business is located in Europe it is likely 
that its revenues are highly correlated with the real GDP in this region. The 
International Monetary Fund (2012) reports an expected real GDP growth of -0,3%, 
0.9% and 1.7%, for the years 2012, 2013 and 2017, respectively. Moreover, it is 
assumed a real GDP growth at the end of the forecast of 1.7%, equal the average 
growth for the period 1994 to 2013 (IMF, 2012). Using this information it is possible 
to derive potential growth rates for the distribution segment (see Table 12 for the 
complete growth rates assumed in the forecast). Furthermore, when calculating the 
prospective growth for the distribution business it is also important to consider that 
digital delivery of software is increasing at the expense of physical distribution, i.e. 
physical distribution should be expected to decline in the long-term. To account for 
the potential of digital deliveries, the growth rates have been adjusted down slightly to 
































2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E
Real$GDP 10.3% 0.9% 1.1% 1.2% 1.5%
Distribution 10.3% 0.8% 0.9% 1.0% 1.2%
2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E
Real$GDP 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7%
Distribution 1.4% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4%
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Expense	  Forecast	  	  
  As specified earlier, the expenses are presented in an orderly fashion on a 
consolidated level. The operational expenses are classified as Cost of Revenue, 
Product Development, Sales and Marketing, General and Administrative, and 
Impairment and Restructuring. Expenses have, in general, decreased considerably 
over the last three years, which may be due to recent restructuring that has focused on 
“development and publication of a reduced slate of titles on a going forward-basis” 
(Activision Blizzard Inc., 2011a, p. 46). In addition, Activision Blizzard currently has 
some of the lowest costs across the industry, in terms of total revenue. For this reason, 
substantial future reductions in expenses are unlikely.  
 
Cost	  of	  Revenue	  
 Cost of revenue includes expenses related to manufacturing, software 
royalties, and online subscriptions and intellectual property licenses. Total cost of 
revenue has decreased from 53.9% to 36.9% relative to total revenue after the merger 
in 2008. The decline originates from fewer game titles released over the period, and 
an increased focus on franchises that have proved to be successful, which has led to a 
reduction in Product Costs. The Product Costs are the largest driver of costs for 
Activision Blizzard, and currently accounts for 23.8% of the total revenues. As 
already mentioned, its reduction is a result of overall restructuring of the company’s 
operations, and is assumed to stabilize at the current percentage of total revenues for 
the future. Moreover, Activision Blizzard has announced that its all of its 
restructuring plans are completed (Activision Blizzard Inc., 2011a, p. 46), and it is 
consequently fair to assume that all cost reductions associated with restructuring are 
completed. Keeping the forecasted Product Costs constant also allows some room for 
years with higher costs that are offset by the expected cost savings associated with 
digitally delivered products. 
 Another expense classified as cost of revenue is expenses that occur in the 
process of handling online subscriptions. One would think that most rational way to 
forecast this line item is through the use of a historical percentage of the online 
subscriptions revenue. However, an analysis of the costs associated with online 
subscriptions reveals that the costs have a more consistent relationship with the total 
revenues (see Figure 33). For this reason, an average cost of 5.1% to total revenues 
for the last three years is used to forecast the Online Subscription expenses. This rate 
is slightly higher than for the fiscal year 2011, but is still consistent with historical 
expenses. 
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 The last two drivers of the cost of revenue are Software Royalties and 
Amortization and Intellectual Property Licenses, both of which have been very erratic 
over the last three years in terms of total revenues. The relationship between these 
expenses and the total revenues is illustrated in Figure 34. Unusually high 
amortization expenses in 2009 caused the high level of cost in Software Royalties and 
Amortization. In 2010 and 2011, amortization was at more normal levels and 
accounted for 30-40% of this type of expenses. This leads to suggest that the more 
recent expenses are more representative of what future expenses may look like. 
Hence, a weighted-average of the last three years is used to forecast the expenses, and 
assigning the more recent observations higher weighting. This yields a rate, in terms 
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 The formula applied to obtain a weighted-average rate for the forecast is the 
following: 
 

























 This formula allows the most recent expense to account for more but still 
allows older expenses to adjust the forecast rate slightly. The formula is also applied 
to the expenses associated with Intellectual Property Licenses, as the more recent 
observations are more representative. The Intellectual Property Licenses have 
decreased over the last three years due to a more focused portfolio of products and 
fewer titles released during the years. In addition, the proportion of more in-house 
titles sold has increased compared to affiliated titles sold, leading to lower expenses 
associated with licenses. It is likely that this type of pattern in the expenses will 
persist, and that a weighted-average of the historical expenses of 4.4% be a reliable 
estimate for the forecast period in this valuation.  
 All the above assumptions related to the cost of revenue leads to a forecasted 
cost that accounts for 39.6% of the total revenues, which is 2.7% higher than the 
current rate.   
 
Product	  Development	  Expenses	  
 The product development expenses have increased over the last three years. 
Despite of that, in terms of total revenues, the expenses have decreased from 14.7% to 
13.6%. Table 7 identified a median R&D expense for entertainment software 
companies of 5.9% of total revenues, which points in the direction of high R&D 
expenses for Activision Blizzard. However, the companies included in the median 
estimate are competitors identified by Microsoft and most of them can be classified as 
conglomerates. Comparing cost of Activision Blizzard with companies of a more 
similar nature, i.e. other pure-play entertainment software publishers may present a 
more reliable sample for comparison. For this reason, an analysis of pure-play 
companies’ costs was performed. The result from the analysis is summarized in Table 
13 (for the complete list of companies and costs see Appendix 13). As the table 
includes several drivers of costs for the industry, the table will also be used as 
reference when discussing the other forecasted costs. 
As can be observed in the table, when comparing Activision Blizzard’s 
product development expenses to other pure-play companies, they are rather low. This 
does not imply that their R&D expenses are at lower levels, but that they are lower in 
percentage-terms to total revenues. Moreover, their choice of strategy and the 
likelihood that there exist some benefits to scale in this industry makes the lower 
percentage of R&D expenses come across as sensible. However, it should be noted 
that the product development are the most important driver of success in this line of 
business. Without proper allocation of resources to development of new games, the 
company may lose valuable customers and consequently risk the future survival of the 
company. Additionally, if more companies were to enter the market it is likely that 
overall quality of the software increases due to the intensified competition. 
Accordingly, it is assumed that the product development expenses can be managed at 
a lower level than the industry, but still increase over the length of the forecast to 
levels that are more similar to the industry. 
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 At initiation of the forecast the product development expenses are assumed to 
account for 14.2% of total revenues, which is identical to the three-year average R&D 
expenses. After 2012, it is assumed that the expenses gradually will increase to 17.7% 
of total revenues by the end of the forecast. The justification for this trend is based on 
the above discussion on how crucial the product development is for the industry. 
Furthermore, the reason why the costs do not increase to the same level of the 
industry is the likely cost savings that are embedded in their strategy of focusing on 
developing their existing game franchises rather than developing a large portfolio of 
games. 
 
Sales	  and	  Marketing	  Expenses	  
 The sales and marketing expenses incurred at Activision Blizzard over the last 
three years have been more or less consistent in terms of total revenues. The average 
for the three years is 11.9%, which is considerably lower than the industry median of 
20.5%. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that Activision Blizzard is able to 
restrain some of expenses related to sales and marketing due to its fine reputation and 
its well-established game franchises. Assuming that Activision Blizzard are able to 
preserve their reputation and continue releasing new titles that build on their existing 
franchises, the forecasted sales and marketing expenses are set equal to the average 
for the last three years. The expenses will persist a constant proportion of revenues 
throughout the explicit forecast. Moreover, since its revenues are very high and 
expected to increase, the relative expenditures associated with marketing will increase 
over the extent of the forecast. 
 
General	  and	  Administrative	  Expenses	  
 In the course of the last three years, general and administrative expenses have 
been fairly consistent, ranging from 8.4% to 9.6% of total revenues. As these 
expenses tend to be variable, they should be highly consistent with the sum of 
revenues earned in a given year. Furthermore, considering that the procedures that 
give rise to the expenses are often related to headcount, it is reasonable to assume that 
overall cost associated with general and administrative procedures will converge to 
the median of pure-play companies in the long run. In order for this to be true, access 
















Activision$Blizzard 36.9% 13.6% 11.5% 9.6% 0.5% 72.1%
Average* 39.5% 28.3% 19.6% 29.0% 0.5% 92.7%
Median* 39.5% 26.4% 20.5% 9.9% 0.0% 98.2%
Average$Costs$Across$the$Industry** 87.3%
Median$Costs$Across$the$Industry** 89.0%
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assumptions in mind, and having knowledge of the industry median, the forecasted 
costs are assumed to converge to the median of 9.9% of total revenues over the next 
three years (2012-2014). For the rest of the forecast these expenses will remain 
consistent with the industry median. 
 
Impairment	  and	  Restructuring	  
Impairment losses are recognized when the recoverable (marketable) value of 
the intangible asset is lower than its book value (IFRS Foundation, 2012; FASB, 
2012). For this reason, the size of the annual impairment loss is dependent on the 
development of the economic situation in the markets in which Activision Blizzard’s 
intangible assets are marked-to-market. Moreover, future income streams from these 
assets will also affect impairments losses. To calculate the potential outcomes that 
may affect the book value of the intangible assets requires making dubious 
assumptions about numerous intricate variables, and is consequently, unlikely to 
provide any reliable estimate for the market values of the assets. That being the case, 
it is assumed that there will not be any future impairment losses due to fair value 
remeasurements in the forecasted period.  
Over the last three years, Activision Blizzard has recognized costs associated 
with restructuring for both 2009 and 2011. These costs have amounted to 
approximately 0.5% of the total revenues for each respective year. Nevertheless, in 
the explicit forecast period it will not be recognized any costs associated with 
restructuring as the company has announced that it does not intend “to incur 
significant additional restructuring expenses” (Activision Blizzard Inc., 2011a, p. 46).  
 
Operational	  Margin	  
As discussed in the company analysis, Activision Blizzard has experienced an 
increase in operational margin due to an overall reduction in expenses. The company 
has led a change in strategy that has enabled them to capture high revenues and at the 
same time reduce costs. This has resulted in increased margins for the company. Over 
the last three years operational expenses have accounted for 100.6%, 89.5% and 
72.1% of the total revenues, respectively. The most recent observation is significantly 
better than the median of pure-play competitors, which has total operational expenses 
of 89.0% to total revenues. This illustrates how low margins are and how hard it is to 
succeed in this line of business. It should also be noted that there are a number of 
companies that are unable to secure a positive operating income, and that aim for 
positive cash flows in the future through their continued operations. 
The above assumptions related to the expenses indicate that the initial forecast 
has costs amounting to 75.4% of total revenues. An over the course of time to costs 
will slowly converge to a rate of 83.8%. As already mentioned, this assumes that 
Activision Blizzard is able to preserve some of its reputation as a publisher of high 
quality entertainment software in the increasingly competitive industry.  
 
Tax	  on	  EBITA	  
 Analyzing the effective tax that historically has been paid by Activision 
Blizzard reveals little consistent pattern (see Table 14). After the company merger in 
2008, the company had two years where the operations yielded a negative bottom line 
and a resulting tax benefit. In the more recent years, however, operations have yielded 
a positive bottom line and the effective tax rate has been more consistent. It is 
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reasonable to assume that the future effective tax rate will be similar to this. 
Furthermore, it might be tempting to use an average for the last two years as a proxy 
for the tax rate, but the fact that the forecasted income before taxes are more similar to 











 The capital expenditures are executed in order to secure the continued 
operation of the company’s assets, which in turn provides future economic gains. As 
with Microsoft, investments related to intangible assets (intangible assets, software 
development and intellectual property licenses) are also included as capital 
expenditures due to the nature of Activision Blizzards core operations. It should be 
noted that investments in goodwill should also have been included, but since goodwill 
are assumed to remain constant it will not bring about any capital expenditures. 
Unlike Microsoft, the company carries out most of its capital expenditures in assets in 
order to preserve their overall value, i.e. assets are held at a level that preserves their 
overall value. For this reason it is assumed that all capital expenditures will be equal 
to each category’s levels of depreciation. In the balance sheet the trend of replacing 
worn out assets is observed by the highly consistent values for these accounts (not 
including intangible assets). It is hard to make any explicit assumptions for the 
intangible assets. However, since the account includes the value of the franchises and 
the company expects to release several new additional titles building on these, it is 
reasonable to assume that the account will hold a future value similar to the current 
value. These capital expenditures are assumed to equal the expected annual 
amortization of 19 million. 
 Historically, the capital expenditures related to property and equipment has 
been $65 millions, $99 millions, and $69 million for 2009, 2010 and 2011, 
respectively. This is very close to the corresponding amounts for depreciation, which 
was $76 million, $68 million, and $75 million. These expenses are mainly related to 
acquisition of updated computer equipment to perform day-to-day operations 
(Activision Blizzard Inc., 2011a). Moreover, Activision Blizzard has announced that 
they will acquire computer hardware and software for approximately $100 million 
during 2012 (Activision Blizzard Inc., 2011a, p. 60). For this reason, capital 
expenditures related to property and equipment is assumed to be equal to $100 million 
in 2012, and the following years it will equal to the annual depreciation. It is 
noteworthy to mention that by assuming that capital expenditures related to property 
and equipment is constant, it will not take into account potentially high prices for 
technology products that may be required in the future. 
 The last type of capital expenditure is related to software development and 
intellectual property licenses (current and non-current assets). It should be pointed out 




2008 2009 2010 2011
Income$before$Income$Tax (187) (8) 492 1,331
Effective$Amount$of$Income$Tax (80) (121) 74 246
Corresponding$Income$Tax$Rate G43.0% G1534.0% 15.0% 19.0%
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company is relies on the success of its software development. What is interesting to 
point out is that the annual historical amortization for these assets often has exceeded 
the accounts’ balance, i.e. these intangible assets have been replaced in total. The fact 
that the amortization exceeds the total value of the accounts may be due to the 
recognition criteria applied to amortization. Moreover, the accounts’ combined 
balance is fairly equal from year to year, suggesting that it is reasonable to assume 
that they will remain at this level in the future as well. For this reason, these capital 
expenditures is set equal to 100% of its current value, in line with the above 
information. 
 
Depreciation	  and	  Amortization	  
 The depreciation and amortization applied in the valuation is based on 
historical rates. As noted earlier, the accounts have had a fairly consistent balance and 
applying rates similar to historical levels should hence provide a reliable estimate for 
future depreciation/amortization. Furthermore, since the accounts will take on very 
consistent values for the future, the depreciation/amortization rates are held constant 
throughout the forecast. The depreciation rate applied for property and equipment is 
set equal to the rate observed in 2011, assuming that this rate is the most reflective of 
future depreciation. The depreciation rate applied to the property and equipment 
corresponds to 44.4% of prior-year balance of the account. Amortization for the 
intangible assets has been more volatile, and taken on ratios from 21.0% to 45.6% of 
prior year account balance. A rate of 21.1% is applied in the forecast because it seems 
more reflective of future amortization, and since most of the intangible assets are 
amortized over 10-12 years. 
 Amortization related to software development and intellectual property 
licenses have historically been amortized in total. For this reason it is assumed that the 
same pattern persist in the future.  
 
Dividends	  
Activision Blizzard has not announced any target for its future dividends. The 
company’s first cash dividend of $0.150 per share was announced 2010, and 
accounted for approximately 45.2% of the total net income. The following year, the 
dividend payout was $0.165 per share, equivalent to a payout ratio of 17.9%. 
Assuming that the company will continue to perform well and that they will transfer 
some of this wealth to its shareholders, the payout ratio is set at 30.0%, slightly lower 
than the average payout rate. This payout ratio will still allow for an increase in 
retained earnings, and at the same time provide financial flexibility for the company. 
As the future may offer an environment with intense competition, this financial buffer 
may be good to have if the financial situation were to change in the company. 
 
Net	  Operating	  Working	  Capital	  
 The net operating working capital is calculated with the same formula as 
applied for Microsoft. The operating assets and liabilities that are included in the 
calculation are Accounts Receivable, Inventories, Software Development, Intellectual 
Property Licenses, Other Current Assets, Accounts Payable, Deferred Revenues, 
Accrued Expenses and Other Liabilities. The accounts Software Development and 
Intellectual Property Licenses will, for reasons outlined under capital expenditures, 
remain constant over the forecast period.  
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 Starting with the asset side, the first item is the Accounts Receivable. This is 
revenue that will be received from companies such as Wal-Mart and GameStop. 
Measured in relation to total revenues, this line item has decreased from 17.3% to 
13.7% over the last three years. Assuming that revenues from these sources will be a 
smaller part of total revenues in the future should be a reasonable assumption. The 
reason for this is the expected increase in digital delivery of games, and consequently 
it is probable that the retailers will sell less game copies in the future. For this reason, 
the forecast is based on a continuation of the declining trend in Accounts Receivables. 
The initial forecast is based on the same ratio to revenues as in 2011, followed by a 
gradual reduction to a ratio of 10.0% in 2021. The second item in the calculation is 
the Inventories, which has been quite unstable over the last three years when 
measured in terms of cost of revenue (see Figure 35). 
 
 
 As the inventories have been slightly volatile over the last three years, using 
the average (as depicted in Figure 35) seems as a satisfactory proxy for the future. 
However, it should be noted that the figure also includes the CAGR for the relative 
values of the inventory. These growth rates display a direct decline in inventory of 
11.4%, and provide additional information to the forecast. The reduction over the 
period may be caused by the 12.2% increase in revenues from digital delivered 
products, which naturally should reduce inventories. As the digital deliveries are 
expected to increase in the future, it is reasonable to assume that the inventory will be 
affected. With this in mind, it is assumed that the forecast will depict a reduction in 
the inventory in terms of cost of revenue from 8.2% to 5.3% over the forecast. This is 
equivalent to an annual decline of 4.8% in the forecast rate, or a cumulative decline in 
inventory of 17% relative to 2011. The third and final asset item is the Other Current 
Assets, which has been assumed constant for the future due to its nature.  
 On the liabilities side, the first item is the accounts payable. When measured 
in terms of cost of revenue, this item has historically increased from 13.1% to 22.2%. 
This is reasonable, as the company’s historical performance has significantly 
increased over the last couple of years. For this reason it assumed that they to some 
extent are able to maintain the same level of credit in the future. However, as their 
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revenue will decrease due to stricter credit terms. For this reason it is assumed that the 
accounts payable will account for 22.2% of cost of revenues at the initiation of the 
forecast, and slowly decline to the average for the last three years, 17.5%. The second 
liability item is the deferred revenues, which are deferred from several of the 
segments listed in the revenue forecast. For this reason these revenues are forecasted 
based on total revenue. Its rate to total revenues was 33.3%, 38.8% and 31.0% for the 
fiscal years 2009, 2010 and 2011, respectively. The forecast bases the deferred 
revenues on the same rate as in 2011 with a gradual increase to 2016 to the average of 
the last three years of 34.4%. From thereon the deferred revenues are expected to 
remain at a constant level of total revenues. The assumed increase is based on the fact 
that Activision Blizzard expects to build on its digital revenue channels in the future, 
and since these frequently require payments for a whole year of membership they may 
require deferral. The fourth item is the accrued expenses and other liabilities, which 
includes costs such as accrued payroll related cost and deferred cost of sales. The 
account has been forecasted based on a rate to total operating expenses. The rate has 
been fairly consistent over the last three years, around 20.0%. Consequently, it is 
assumed that the future accrued expenses are equal to the average rate over the last 
three years, 20.1%.  
 The calculation of the net working capital, using these items, unveils that 
Activision Blizzard has had negative working capital over the last three years. When 
applying the above assumptions the forecasted net working capital yields comparable 
results. This is similar to Microsoft, and indicates that the company is unable to fund 
its short-term liabilities using solely short-term assets.  
 
Financial	  Leverage	  
The financial leverage for the company is assumed to converge to the level of 
debt in the industry in the long term. This would suggest using the current debt-to-
equity level of the industry, which is 9.8%. However, it is likely that the future will 
bring much lower debt ratios, and that most companies will converge to no debt. The 
findings on operating costs for the pure-play companies, or more specifically the 
median operating margin of 11% (total revenues subtracted for all operating 
expenses), indicates a likely shift in the debt ratio. Such a low operating margin 
leaves little room for expenses besides the operational ones. Furthermore, one would 
expect that financial flexibility is highly valued in this industry, as a financial shortfall 
may force the companies to turn down projects that may yield high profit potentials. 
Despite of that, it can also be argued that the companies should exploit the current 
favorable pricing in the debt market to take on cheap debt on a shorter-term basis. 
Nevertheless, this paper will assume that long-term financial flexibility is valued 
higher than access to relatively cheap capital for Activision Blizzard, and 
consequently no short- or long-term debt is issued in the forecast period, leaving the 
company purely equity-financed.  
 
Cost	  of	  Capital	  
The cost of capital is calculated using the same theoretical analogy as for 
Microsoft. Moreover, as Activision Blizzard is very similar to Microsoft in terms of 
were it performs its operations and in terms of investor composition, the same risk 
free rate (3.42%) and market risk premium (5.20%) is applied to this valuation. This 
means that in order to calculate the cost of capital, the only components needed are 
the relevant measures for the beta. The reason for this is that the company is entirely 
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financed with debt, and for this reason the latter term in the WACC formula (the term 
that includes the cost of debt and the marginal tax rate) is omitted. In other words, 
when the company is entirely financed by debt the cost of capital can be calculated 
using only the CAPM model. 
Damodaran (2012a) identifies a relevant beta for the entertainment technology 
sector as 1.48. This beta is, similar to Microsoft’s beta, adjusted for the level of cash 
in the industry and consequently reflects the actual riskiness of the assets specific to 
the industry. Moreover, since Activision Blizzard is purely equity financed and it is 
expected to remain independent of debt in the future, the unlevered beta and the 
levered beta will be identical. Applying the identified beta to the CAPM model yields 
a cost of equity 11.2% for both the unlevered cost of equity and for the levered cost of 
equity.  
 
     
 














Finally, when applying the cost of capital to the free cash flow forecasted for 
Activision Blizzard yields an equity value (adjusted for off-balance-sheet items such 
as operating leases) of $13.4 billion, equivalent to $11.71 per share (Appendix 14). 
This value reflects a long-term sustainable growth rate of 1.9%, based to the average 
forecasted real growth in advanced economies 2011-2017 (IMF, 2012), after the 
explicit forecast period. The long term sustainable growth rate is set at this level 
because the majority of revenues will yield from the segment associated with high 
definition platforms, and this rate should reliably measure future growth if Activision 
Blizzard continues to release good titles.  
The obtained value per stock is in line with both the range for 2011 and 2012 
(see Table 2). Moreover, comparing the obtained equity value of $13.3 billion to the 
average $13.2 market capitalization of Activision Blizzard in 2011, suggests a 
underpricing of 1.5% in the active market. 
 
Tax	  Shields	  and	  Costs	  of	  Financial	  Distress	  
 The tax shields and costs of financial distress are essential components needed 
to estimate the value of the company when applying the APV method. As outlined in 
the literature review, the tax shields and costs of financial distress need to be 
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the company. As Activision Blizzard is a company solely financed by equity, the 
obtained valuation of the company is the unlevered value. In other words, the 
unlevered value can be directly inserted into the APV model. Moreover, since the 
company has no debt outstanding it is considered to have no probability of default, 
and consequently the value of financial side effects (debt) and present value of 
bankruptcy costs are zero. As a result, the value obtained using the APV method is the 
equivalent of the WACC value.  
 
Sensitivity	  Analysis	  
The just presented valuation may be subject to high uncertainty with regards 
to the assumptions for the future; especially since the entertainment software industry 
is very hit driven. Performing a sensitivity analysis on Activision Blizzard’s valuation 
will bring greater clarity to the possible future values of equity. Similar to Microsoft’s 
valuation, the relevant variables that will be analyzed are the terminal growth rate, the 
level of debt, and some operating measures.  
 A change in the terminal growth rate of Activision Blizzard has the potential 
of providing a fair increase in the value of equity (see Table 16). However, the impact 
is not as large as for Microsoft, since the free cash flows of the company are more 
limited in size. Moreover, the lower terminal growth rates are more likely to be 
realized as the competition has intensified, and the consumer expenditures are likely 
to be relatively low in the future. This poses the left side of the table as more likely if 











Furthermore, as Activision Blizzard currently has no debt, it is interesting to 
analyze the valuation impact of an increased leverage. As Table 17 illustrates, the 
level of debt provides higher value for the equity. The value-added of issuing debt is 
much higher than the equivalent for Microsoft. Their difference can be ascribed to 
Activision Blizzard’s higher cost of equity, i.e. when leverage is increased the WACC 
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 Changes in the operating variables is very likely to occur, and will have 
considerable impact on the equity value of the company (see Figure 36). This is very 
dependent on the company’s ability to develop future successful hit titles. An 
increased number of hit titles will enable revenue growth, and costs may also be 
affected. Moreover, since the margins are slim in this industry a reduction in costs 
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7.  Valuation of the Merged Company 
In this section of the paper the valuation of the merged company is assessed. 
As outlined in the literature review, the value of the merged company will equal each 
respective company’s standalone value, in addition to the value of potential 
opportunities that the deal creates, also known as synergies. Since the companies’ 
standalone values are already calculated independently, what remains in order to 
obtain a value for the combined company is to value the synergies that are associated 
with the merger. The most frequent approach to this is to calculate the consolidated 
value of the two companies without synergies, for so to value the combined company 
with the potential synergies (Damodaran, 2005b). The total value of synergies will 
equal the difference between the two values obtained, and will be an important 
component when settling on what price to pay for the target.  
 
7.1  Valuation of the Merged Company Without Synergies 
The standalone values for Microsoft and Activision Blizzard have already 
been calculated, and can theoretically be added together to find the value of the 
merged company without synergies. However, in in order to make a reliable analysis 
of the implemented synergies, the underlying estimates for Microsoft and Activision 
Blizzard’s values should be at a consolidated level.  
Since Microsoft and Activision Blizzard operate in fairly similar industries, 
they have very comparable operations, which should make consolidation fairly 
straightforward. The consolidation will be built on the same assumptions as outlined 
in the standalone valuations, and should for this reason yield the same results.  
However, since the companies have different recognition of some elements in the 
financial statements, some additional assumptions still have be made to consolidate 
the underlying estimates that drives the enterprise value. Following, these underlying 
assumptions will be briefly discussed. 
There are two essential parts that needs to be commented on the consolidation 
of the financial information for the two companies and its valuations. The first 
element that needs to be assessed is the income statements, and its components. When 
consolidating this financial information it is assumed that all revenues that derive 
from Activision Blizzard’s operations will be consolidated under the Entertainment 
and Devices Division of Microsoft. This is the most rational distribution of the 
revenues, as Microsoft has all its game related revenues in this division. Moreover, 
the operational expenses will be allocated to their respective counterparts based on 
where they make the most operational sense. The other element that needs to be 
assessed is the cost of capital. The cost of capital of the independent valuations is 
built on the same values of risk free rate of return, market risk premium and long-term 
growth. Consequently, these will also apply in the consolidated valuation. However, 
since the companies are subject to different tax rates, target debt rates and betas, some 
assumptions needs to be in order. Since two companies are slightly different in these 
terms, the following assumptions have been used.  
First, it will be assumed that the marginal tax rate that will apply in the 
calculation of the cost of capital can be found with the following formula, which 
yields a marginal effective tax rate of 19.39%.  
 
Marginal Effective Tax Rate = Consolidated Provision for Income Taxes
Consolidated Income before Income Taxes
 
M&A: The Case of Microsoft Corporation and Activision Blizzard Inc. 
© Robert Stenmark  76 
 Second, when the companies are consolidated the debt ratio in the companies 
will change since Microsoft has debt and Activision Blizzard has not. Naturally, this 
means that when the companies are merged the total amount of debt to equity will 
decrease. For this reason it is assumed that the level of debt is kept at independent 
levels, leading to a somewhat lower debt-to-equity ratio for the merged company of 
7.03%.  
 Third, as the companies operate in slightly different industries they are 
exposed to different levels of systematic risk, i.e. they have different betas. The 
solution to obtain a single unlevered beta for the valuation is to use a weighted-















 The results of calculating the cost of equity and the cost of capital using the 
obtained unlevered beta can be observed in Table 19. Using this information to find 
the consolidated value of the company yields an enterprise value without synergies of 
$357.1 billion. This value is only 0.5% higher than the one obtained when simply 
adding the two enterprise values ($355.3 billion). It should be noted that this minor 
difference is directly linked to the cost of capital applied to the consolidated free cash 
flows. When the cash flows are discounted, the slight difference is created when the 
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7.2  Valuation of the Merged Company With Synergies 
The value of the two companies combined has now been established (see 
Appendix 15 for the integrated financial information and the corresponding 
valuation), and the synergies can be implemented to finalize the valuation of the 
merged company. In order to do this, an evaluation of the probable synergies and the 
merged company’s ability to succeed in realizing these is required.  
 When acquiring a company there exists a plenitude of potential synergies, 
both operational ones and financial ones. The synergies that are accessible often tend 
to differ depending on the industry and the companies that are involved in the merger.   
One should however analyze potential synergies with caution. The reason for this is 
that some synergies are more apparent than others and hard to realize, while others are 
not that apparent but easier to realize. Moreover, other synergies may appear as 
effortless to realize when they in fact are remote, and hence pose no or little value for 
the company on both a short- and a long-term basis. When including costs of 
implementation in the consideration, they might even be value destroying for the 
company. 
 In the following section, an analysis of the potential synergies created in the 
merger will be carried out. The equity markets have too often been witness to the 
failure of companies’ efforts to achieve anticipated synergies, as the companies have 
been overly optimistic when analyzing the synergies. This has lead many companies 
to lose money in the longer term due to restructuring charges that exceeds the upside 
potential of the synergies, or that the price paid for the target is too high. As a result 
of this, the upcoming analysis will be rather conservative in the attempt to avoid 
overestimating the value of the synergies that can be created.  
 
7.2.1	   	   Analysis	  of	  Potential	  Synergies	  
Microsoft and Activision Blizzard are companies that operate in a high paced 
industry, which is characterized by high competition and frequent technological 
innovations. A consolidation of the companies can enable them to streamline their 
operations and improve the exposure to the entertainment software industry. The 
consolidation provides means to achieve operating as well as financial synergies 
(Damodaran, 2005b). 
Prior to analyzing the operating- and financial synergies, some general 
considerations and assumptions will be discussed briefly. As Microsoft and Activision 
Blizzard both are very similar companies in term of their operations, they avoid some 
consolidation issues that might have posed as a problem otherwise. First, since both of 
the companies are U.S. listed; a reconciliation of the financial statements will not be 
troublesome or increase costs of accounting. Second, since the nature of the two 
companies is suggestive of fairly similar systems of employee benefits/compensation, 
it is assumed that this will not have an effect on future enterprise value. If benefit 
plans were in fact different, a reconciliation of the two policies would be likely to 
occur, and consequently the enterprise value would be affected. Third, it is assumed 
that the companies do not have conflicting suppliers that otherwise could have posed 
a potential problem after a merger. If they have such relationships, it is assumed that 
these issues can be resolved in the short-term by terminating the relevant contracts, 
and that this will have no effect on the enterprise value. 
 
M&A: The Case of Microsoft Corporation and Activision Blizzard Inc. 
© Robert Stenmark  78 
Operating	  Synergies	  
 These are synergies that are concerned with the operations of the combined 
company, and that increases operating income from existing assets (Damodaran, 
2005b). On a general level, these synergies can be separated into revenue synergies 
and cost synergies. On the one hand, competitors and costumers reactions 
significantly affect revenue synergies, and they are for this reason very hard to predict 
(Sirower & Sahni, 2006). On the other hand, synergies associated with costs are 
concerned with internal issues that more reliably can be estimated, and consequently 
easier to realize. It is for this reason more likely that the operations of Microsoft and 
Activision Blizzard will yield more value through cost synergies, compared to 
revenue synergies. 
 Other components that will be discussed include synergies associated with 
working capital and capital expenditures. These will have an effect on the operating 




As already mentioned, these are synergies that may be hard to realize due to 
their reliance on external factors. Moreover, Sirower and Sahni (2006) suggest 
postponing implementation associated with revenues synergies until the business has 
stabilized and the new cost structures have been firmly established. For these reasons, 
the considered synergies will tend to be more conservative rather than optimistic, and 
they will come into affect one year after the consolidation at the earliest. 
First, one of the more apparent synergies that are highly likely to take place is 
an increase in bundling of products, i.e. selling Microsoft’s console in the 
combination with a game from Activision Blizzard, or an accessory for the console 
and a related game. In other words, the products are sold at a bundled price that is 
lower than the sum of the prices for the separate products, providing the company 
with additional revenues that yields a marginally higher cost. This is a strategy that is 
already implemented by Microsoft with a limited number of popular games. However, 
these bundled packages with third-party games are seldom observed in retail stores 
when new consoles are launched (due to a lag in the game development when new 
consoles are released). Moreover, it is highly likely that Microsoft earns some 
royalties from this type of bundling, which will result in a slight reduction in revenues 
from royalties if the product is bundled with Activision Blizzard games. Activision 
Blizzard would, on the other side, reduce its cost of such bundling, since some of the 
past products have been sold this way. Finally, as both companies have a strong 
reputation and its products are highly popular, it is likely that an increased amount of 
bundling of their products will enable them to capture additional revenues in the 
future. For this reason it is assumed a conservative increase of 0.75% in revenues in 
terms of each respective year’s revenues, starting in 2014. This represents an increase 
that is net of higher costs and lost royalties for Microsoft. The calculation of the 
increase will be based revenues from 90% of Microsoft’s Entertainment and Devices 
division (Xbox revenues), and revenues from Activision Blizzard’s high definition 
segment. The increase in sales from bundled products should be extra apparent in 
2013 because of the launch of the new console. For this reason the increase in 2013 is 
set at 1.5% of the revenues, which is assumed to originate from the consumers higher 
demand for bundled products in launch years. 
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Second, Activision Blizzard has its own distribution business in Europe that 
“provides warehousing, logistical, and sales distribution services” (Activision 
Blizzard Inc., 2011a, p. 4) to publishers of interactive entertainment software and 
hardware. This presents an opportunity for Microsoft to utilize this distribution 
network instead of third party sources, to distribute its product in Europe. This would 
lead to an increase in distribution revenues for Activision Blizzard, while it will 
provide Microsoft with lower somewhat lower cost (will also be discussed under cost 
synergies).  
The financial information available for Microsoft, does not allow for a direct 
interpretation of on how much they spend on distribution of their products. Estimates 
from the time of the new millennium presented distribution costs that were 
approximately 6% of the final price of the product (Campa & Goldberg, 2006). This 
percentage will be applied to the total revenues for the Entertainment and Devices 
division to obtain an estimate for the distribution costs. This will produce an estimate 
that will undervalue the distribution costs as it is based on revenues for Microsoft and 
not for the final price. However, the technological innovations have been high paced 
over the last ten years, and would suggest that margins may have been pushed down, 
making 6% a reliable estimate. Furthermore, as Microsoft is a global company it will 
be assumed that 30% or the distribution costs can be allocated to the European 
market. The obtained value for the European distribution costs can now be allocated 
to Activision Blizzard as increased revenues from distribution. This synergy directly 
assumes that the quality of the new distribution offered by Activision Blizzard is 
equivalent to the prior distribution channel, and that the contract with the old 
distributor can be terminated within 2012.  
 Third, the merger presents a great opportunity for the company to enter the 
mobile games industry. Microsoft already holds expertize within mobile software 
development, while Activision Blizzard has a great deal of games that have already 
has been developed. This ideally means that the new company could publish existing 
games directly for use on mobile phones. However, this market is characterized by 
intense competition from both third-party publishers, as well as independent 
developers, and the published games have a much lower price range (i.e. lower 
margins) compared to console/PC games. Considering that neither Microsoft nor 
Activision Blizzard has established a market in this segment it would be immensely 
complicating to forecast what growth or market share that potentially can be captured. 
One way to determine a proxy for potential revenues that could be captured would be 
to examine companies of similar size to Activision Blizzard, and use their fraction of 
mobile sales to total sales to forecast the synergies. In this situation Electronic Arts is 
comparable, and approximately 5.0% of their total revenues originate from mobile 
games (Electronic Arts Inc., 2011a). Nevertheless, Electronic Arts have been 
developing games for mobile phones for several years, which makes their sales ratio 
much higher than what can be expected. Recognizing that there exists limited 
information available to build a reliable forecast and that the revenue synergies are to 
be held conservative, suggests leaving out this synergy to avoid an overestimation of 
the potential synergies. Furthermore, not knowing if all the needed expertize is in 
place or the amount of costs associated with entering this market also favors this 
decision. 
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Cost	  Synergies	  
 Cost synergies are easier to implement since they are concerned with internal 
matters that more reliably can be predicted, and that management to a greater extent 
can control (Sirower & Sahni, 2006). Since management holds internal information 
on historical cost reductions and measures that can reduce the overall costs, they are 
able to forecast the additional value created with increased accuracy and the realized 
cost reductions usually do not stray far from projections.  
 It noteworthy to mention that the cost synergies mainly will affect the 
Entertainment and Devices division (EDD) of Microsoft, and it is for this reason 
assumed that costs that derive from this division will have the same proportion of 
costs as the average over the last three years. As Microsoft does not present exact 
financial data on expenses related to each division, these expenses are calculated 
based on reported increased amounts of expenses and their respective percentage 
increases for the last three years. The findings are presented in Table 20 (see 
Appendix 16 for detailed information on its calculations). The table reports the 
average expenses for the division to the total expenses for the given expense group, 
e.g. the average cost of revenue for the EDD division accounts for 32.9% of the total 
cost of revenues. These percentages will be used to calculate the future expenses, and 












The first synergy is linked to the costs that Microsoft can save in transferring 
its European distribution contract to Activision Blizzard. Referring to back to the 
section on revenue synergies, the merged company will be able to reduce its costs 
slightly due to the European distribution business of Activision Blizzard. Expanding 
the above discussion to include the cost reduction, will lead to a slight reduction in 
costs for Microsoft. It will be assumed that Activision will charge a price equal to its 
cost, i.e. it charges no premium for its service. As the margins are small for 
distribution of products, it will also be assumed that Activision Blizzard is able to 
provide a 6% discount to the current distribution costs (equal to the distribution cost 
in terms of the final price).  
Second, when games are to be released the publisher needs to pay a fee to the 
official manufacturer of the given console, know as a license fee. This fee is paid for 
the use of technology owned by the manufacturer. The license fees from Activision 
Blizzard will be eliminated after the merger, together with the corresponding revenues 
that Microsoft recognizes. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that Microsoft make 
use of some of these license fees to cover operational expenses concerned with the 
approval of new games and associated promotional material, while also charging a 
premium for the service rendered. This means that approval process and its costs 
allow Microsoft “substantial influence on the cost and the release schedule of 
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As a result of the merger, the effect of the license fees are cancelled out, but the net 
effect will still carry a cost reduction for Microsoft’s approval process. Furthermore, 
the console manufacturers hold the exclusive right to manufacture all games for each 
of their respective consoles. In effect, the merger will also allow for a cost reduction 
(net effect) in manufacturing of games published by Activision Blizzard, assuming 
that Microsoft currently charges a premium for this process. Given Activision 
Blizzard’s large number of successful products it is reasonable to assume that the 
merger will provide a sizable discount in production costs. Based on this discussion, it 
is assumed that the recurring approval costs for Microsoft are only a small proportion 
of its cost of revenue, while the discount that is obtainable for Activision is more 
sizable. For this reason the annual obtainable cost savings associated with these 
synergies are set to a cost reduction of 0.05% in approval costs, while a 8.9% discount 
in manufacturing of games for Activision Blizzard, both which are assumed to start in 
2013. Both reductions will be deducted from the cost of revenues for each respective 
company. Moreover, the 8.9% discount is based on the average operating margin for 
the EDD division for the last three years, obtained using information in Table 21. The 
rate is applied to Activision Blizzard’s product costs, assuming that 70% of these 
costs are attributable to manufacturing of games.  
 
 Third, knowledge sharing and exploitation of resources within research and 
development should be expected. However, since the companies have very specific 
expertize within their respective fields (Microsoft – consoles, Activision Blizzard – 
games), the expected cost savings should be somewhat limited. It is assumed that the 
savings mainly will be related to a headcount reduction of Microsoft’s game 
developers. It is further assumed that Activision Blizzard will provide the merged 
company with an improved workforce of game developers that replaces those who are 
relieved of their duty. Moreover, Microsoft produces very few games, and hence the 
existing number of game developers should be fairly low. For this reason it is 
assumed that the annual cost savings that is realized through headcount reduction 
amounts to only 1% of the annual R&D expenses for Microsoft, starting in 2013.  
Fourth, there are opportunities to reduce the total marketing expenses used to 
commercialize the merged company’s products. This synergy is tightly linked to the 
bundling of products discussed under potential revenues synergies. Increasing the 
practice of selling bundled products also enables increased use of cross marketing, i.e. 
marketing products collectively. The use of cross marketing provides the company 
with a direct opportunity to market their products more economical, since the total 
amount of advertising campaigns can be reduced. Moreover, both companies have 
very similar spending patters on their sales and marketing efforts. Microsoft’s EDD 




Revenues$Attributable$to$EDD$Division 6,416 6,224 8,716
Operating$Income$Attributable$to$EDD$Division 288 573 1,135
Operating$Margin 4.49% 9.21% 13.02%
Table&21:&Opera-ng&Margin&for&Microso6’s&EDD&Division&(Microso6&Corpora-on,&2011a)&&&
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while Activision Blizzard has slightly higher average expenditures of 11.9% to 
revenues. If all the future marketing campaigns were to be performed collectively, 
and the new company targeted approximately the same amount of marketing 
exposure, a reduction of the expenses could theoretically be divided in two. However, 
opening up the opportunity for independent marketing as well, would indicate a 
slightly lower reduction in the sales and marketing expenses. For this reason it is 
assumed that these expenses will fall by approximately three percentage points, to 
8.5% of total revenues from the entertainment software segment, starting in 2012. The 
reduction is predominantly attributed to the increase in bundling of products, which in 
effect enables an increased amount of cross marketing. 
Finally, the merger should clearly pose an opportunity to reduce expenses 
related to General and Administrative procedures. As Microsoft is a very large 
organization with a long track record and good functional strength, the company has 
over the years managed to reduce their expenses related to general and administrative 
procedures by centralizing these services. The forecasted period displays an expected 
spending on these services of 6.5% of Microsoft’s revenues. However, analyzing 
these expenses for the EDD division over the last three years shows a reduction from 
3.1% to 1.9% of its revenue (Microsoft Corporation, 2011a). It is more likely that the 
expenses will be similar to these as both companies publish games and probably have 
many similar procedures that can be integrated. For this reason, the consolidation will 
lead to a reduction of general and administrative expenses to 1.9% of total revenues in 
2013. This assumption will be justified by a reduction in total headcount and 
centralization of services rendered, where more divisions share the total costs (hence 
reducing cost per division). 
 
Working	  Capital	  Synergies	  
 One of the less apparent synergies that can be realized concerns the net 
working capital, albeit small effect compared to enterprise value. It is still important 
to take into consideration, as it may offer an easy adjustment to slightly improve 
value. A change in the right direction can be directly translated to a more effective use 
of the business’ short-term funds, and will hence add overall value. Although most of 
the components in the net working capital may seem hard to change, there are ways to 
improve its components so that it improves the value of the new company. The first, 
and most obvious improvement is to reduce inventories for Microsoft and Activision 
Blizzard’s expected increase in online delivery of products. However, this adjustment 
has already been built into the independent valuations, and an additional adjustment 
does not present itself as justifiable. The second improvement that can affect the value 
of the company relates to the credit lines available. Since Activision Blizzard is being 
merged with a company with a long track record and that appears as more financially 
stable, it may gain access to the same credit lines as available for Microsoft. 
 An analysis of the credit lines for the two companies will reveal if there are 
potential synergies that can be realized. The analysis is based on the calculation of 
average days receivables and average days payables, which will reveal the average 
number of days that are used to receive payments/pay outstanding payments. The 
results of the analysis are presented below (Appendix 17 provides an explanation on 
how the various estimates are calculated).  
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 The analysis unveils that there are in fact differences between the collection 
periods and the payment periods. On the one hand, Activision Blizzard has a lower 
collection period than Microsoft. This is a desirable position as it indicates that money 
is collected within a shorter time span. Since a move to a higher collection period is 
detrimental, it will be assumed that Activision Blizzard is able to maintain its credit 
policies for distant future. On the other hand, Activision Blizzard’s payment periods 
are much more frequent than those of Microsoft. This extended payment period may 
be ascribed to Microsoft’s historical performance, and to the fact that it is among the 
largest companies in the world. All things considered, it should be highly likely that 
Activision Blizzard will be granted extended payment periods due to Microsoft’s 
financial backing. This indirectly means that the company will be able to take on 
higher levels of accounts payable, as the calculations in the lower part of the Table 22 
suggests. Based on these findings, it will be assumed that Activision Blizzard will be 
granted identical payment terms as for Microsoft the year after the merger (2013), and 
its accounts payable balance will be calculated in relation to the average days payable 
for Microsoft each respective year. Moreover, the accounts balance will have a 
maximum limit equal to the total amount of purchases every given year. It is 
important to note that it is not the increase in accounts payable that will affect the 
value but rather the change in working capital, and that this change is purely 
attributable to Microsoft’s favorable credit terms.  
 
Capital	  Expenditure	  Synergies	  
 Microsoft and Activision operate in an industry that requires extensive 
investments in technological hardware and software in order to successfully perform 
day-to-day operations. For this reason, it is reasonable to assume that there will be 
potential for savings in capital expenditures related to property and equipment. 
Lacking access to the newest technological innovations may leave the companies 




2009 2010 2011 Average
Accounts)Receivable
Activision)Blizzard)Accounts)Receivable 739 673 649 687
Activision)Blizzard)Average)Days)Receivable)(in)days) 63))))))))))))))) 55))))))))))))))) 50))))))))))))))) 56
Microsoft)Accounts)Receivable 11,192 13,014 14,987 13,064
Microsoft)Average)Days)Receivable)(in)days) 70))))))))))))))) 76))))))))))))))) 78))))))))))))))) 75
Accounts)Payable
Activision)Blizzard)Accounts)Payable 302 363 390 352
Activision)Blizzard)Average)Days)Payable)(in)days) 48))))))))))))))) 62))))))))))))))) 81))))))))))))))) 64)))))))))))))))
Microsoft)Accounts)Payable 3,324 4,025 4,197 3,849
Microsoft)Average)Days)Payable)(in)days) 100))))))))))))) 119))))))))))))) 98))))))))))))))) 106)))))))))))))
2009 2010 2011 Average
Potential)for)Increase)of)Credit)Lines)for)Activision)Blizzard*
New)Potential)Accounts)Receivable)Balance 820))))))))))))) 926))))))))))))) 1,019)))))))))) 922)))))))))))))
Increase)in)Accounts)Receivable)Due)to)Increased)Credit)Lines 81))))))))))))))) 253))))))))))))) 370))))))))))))) 234.54))))))))
(in)percent) 10.9% 37.6% 57.0% 35.2%
New)Potential)Accounts)Payable)Balance 631))))))))))))) 690))))))))))))) 473))))))))))))) 598)))))))))))))
Increase)in)Accounts)Payable)Due)to)Increased)Credit)Lines 329))))))))))))) 327))))))))))))) 83))))))))))))))) 246)))))))))))))
(in)percent) 108.9% 90.2% 21.2% 73.4%
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losing market share. As a result, the majority of its assets in both companies’ property 
and equipment are related to computer equipment and software (see Table 23). This is 
also where the greatest potential for savings in future investments exists.  
 
 
Microsoft is clearly the company with the largest capital expenditures related 
to property and equipment. Put it in perspective, the average capital expenditures by 
Microsoft over the last three years were 34 times larger than Activision Blizzard’s 
equivalent. This indicates that the merger of the two companies mainly will lead to 
significant reductions for Activision Blizzard, since Microsoft already has high 
purchasing power. It is with high likelihood that the functional strength of Microsoft’s 
high purchasing power enables the acquisition of Activision Blizzard’s necessary 
assets at a significant discount, especially if using existing suppliers of the company. 
Furthermore, as both companies are of very similar character, it is natural to assume 
that they will have very similar investments in technological assets. It may even be 
that some of the prior investments have been identical in certain computer equipment 
and software, which now can be avoided. For this reason, it is reasonable to think that 
this will lead to additional savings in Activision Blizzard’s capital expenditures.  
Based on the above discussion it is assumed that the merger will provide the 
new company with savings in Activision Blizzard’s future capital expenditures. The 
savings are equivalent to a 30% reduction in Activision Blizzard’s capital 
expenditures, starting in 2013. Furthermore, since the acquisition will be carried out 
in 2012 there will also be a 10% reduction in capital expenditures for this year.   
 
Financial	  Synergies	  	  
 Financial synergies are mainly related to higher cash flows and favorable 
changes to the cost of capital (Damodaran, 2005b). An often-cited rationale of M&A 
transactions concerns the issue of tax benefits, i.e. acquiring a company with 
operating losses that allows for future tax deductions. Such a financial synergy does 
not present itself as an opportunity in this merger, as both companies are reporting 
operating gains. Another way to obtain tax benefits is through an increase in leverage, 
which in effect changes the cost of capital and decreases the effective amount of tax. 
As Microsoft and Activision Blizzard combined are able to report higher earnings 
before taxes and interest it should enable them to take on more debt (Damodaran, 
2012b), and it presents the merger as a possible financial synergy. However, the 
principal reason for the increased debt allowance available does not have its 
foundation in the merger, but rather that both companies hold unused debt capacity. 
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flexibility, in a highly competitive environment where the financial situation can be 
turned upside down within a short time frame. Furthermore, the only reason why 
Microsoft has increased its leverage over the last few years is to take advantage of the 
favorable pricing and liquidity of the debt markets (Microsoft Corporation, 2011a). 
For this reason it is assumed that the merged company values this financial flexibility, 
and consequently refrains from increasing leverage (debt).  
 
Other	  potential	  Synergies	  
 There are also additional synergies that may be realized. However, since the 
value of these synergies cannot reliably be measured, they will only briefly be 
referred to in this section.  
First, the merger of the two firms will offer Microsoft the opportunity to 
reduce risks associated with potential volatility in revenues generated in the EDD 
division. Prior to the merger, Microsoft’s revenues from this segment are highly 
dependent on the future demand for its console and related accessories, i.e. if demand 
for Microsoft’s console (and related accessories) experiences a negative shift, this will 
be highly reflected in the division’s revenues. However, following the merger, the 
company will also offer products that are related to Sony PlayStation and to Nintendo 
Wii. Consequently, the potential volatility in earnings will be reduced and the 
increased exposure will also enable Microsoft to benefit if competitors experience 
higher demand.  
Second, the console manufacturers hold the right to approve and to 
manufacture games for each respective console (it be internally developed games or 
third-party games). This indirectly means that “a manufacturer may give priority to its 
own products or those of competitors in the event of insufficient manufacturing 
capacity. Accordingly, it could cause unanticipated delays in the release of products 
as well as increases to projected development, manufacturing, marketing, or 
distribution costs, any of which could harm [Activision Blizzard’s] business or 
financial result” (Activision Blizzard Inc., 2011a, p. 25). As a consequence of the 
merger, the approval and manufacturing process for Activision Blizzard games and 
related promotional material will become smoother. This assumes that Activision 
Blizzard are informed of what is required to receive approval for certain games, and 
that they are capable of develop the games and promotional material that complies 
with these standards. A potential smoother approval and manufacturing process 
provides the company with increased flexibility, and a shorter time to market. These 
are capabilities that may be very important in this industry, as products are released at 
high pace and has relatively short life cycle. Furthermore, it may provide benefits 
such as increased time at disposal to further develop games prior to their release, more 
frequent content updates for customers, and the potential to establish a larger base of 
loyal consumers.  
 
Integration	  and	  Restructuring	  Costs	  
 Restructuring costs cannot directly be identified as a synergy, because it does 
not provide the company with additional value. However, the restructuring costs are a 
necessity for the integration of the companies and to realize the synergies that just 
have been discussed. The restructuring costs will start to materialize immediately as 
the companies start the negotiations regarding the deal. At this time, costs will be 
related to the presence of lawyers that help advice the deal and the time management 
has to spend discussing the deal structure. Furthermore, additional costs will occur 
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when the transaction takes place, since investment banks tend to oversee these 
transactions.  
When the transaction is completed and the companies are to be merged there 
will occur some costs to ensure a proper consolidation of the companies. Without 
measures to ensure that this happens, the operational efficiency of the merged 
company might be affected. This includes analyzing the structure of the new 
company, eliminating redundant positions that affect efficiency, retaining existing 
talent, combining existing reporting systems and realigning cultures to fit the overall 
image of the new company. All of these actions yields costs that are directly 
associated with the merger of the companies, and that has to be taken into account 
when considering the company with its potential synergies. 
When the merger between Activision and Blizzard took place in 2008, this 
was performed through a reversed acquisition, i.e. Blizzard as a private company 
bought currently public Activision in order to bypass the process of publicly listing 
the company. After the transaction Blizzard was consolidated into Activision. The 
consolidation required a restructuring of the company equivalent to 8.6% of 
Blizzard’s revenues for 2007 (Activision Blizzard Inc., 2008). The restructuring 
charge was charged to the income statement with 80.2% and 19.8%, for 2008 and 
2009, respectively. In Microsoft’s acquisition of Activision Blizzard we should 
observe a similar pattern for the percentage of restructuring costs and for the 
allocation to the income statement. However, due to the higher restructuring charge 
associated with this acquisition, it is charged to the income statement over three years 
following the transaction with 60%, 30% and 10%, respectively. 
It should be noted that Microsoft is an experienced acquirer with over a 
hundred past-acquisitions. The past experience with integration of these companies 
may have provided Microsoft with skills that enable them to realize the integration of 
Activision Blizzard at a lower cost than estimated above. However, without having 
any internal or private information to base a potential cost reduction on, it is assumed 
that 8.6% of Activision Blizzard’s revenues is a reliable estimate. 
 
7.2.2	   	   Value	  of	  Synergies	  
 Having outlined all the assumptions for the potential synergies that can be 
achieved by the merged company, it is now possible to implement them into the 
existing valuation model using the same valuation parameters (risk free rate, market 
risk premium etc.). The new value obtained in the model includes the value of the 
synergies, and their value-added can be found by subtracting the enterprise value 
without synergies (see Appendix 18 for the valuation results).  
 In order to properly analyze the effect and value of each synergy, they have 
been implemented into the valuation model on an individual basis. This way the 
isolated effect of each synergy will be obtained, and it provides a more complete 
overview of the synergies. Subsequently, all synergies have been included in the 
model to find the total value of synergies, and their net effect after restructuring. 
Table 24 summarizes the resulting synergies that are expected from the merger of 
Microsoft and Activision Blizzard.  
The total value of all synergies is estimated at $11.7 billion, after taking into 
the account the expenses related to restructuring. In absolute terms this may appear as 
very high, but compared it to the theoretical value of the merged company ($357.1 
billion) it only corresponds to a 3.3% increase in enterprise value. The reason for the 
low percent to total enterprise value can mainly be ascribed to the large value of 
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Microsoft. Compared to Activision Blizzard, the synergies amounts to 109.7% of the 
enterprise value, which reveals that the effect is in fact significant.  
 
 A more focused analysis reveals that most of the value is created through 
synergies that are associated with lower costs (see Figure 37 on next page for a full 
overview of the distribution of synergies). In fact, the cost synergies account for 
64.9% of the total synergies that they are expected to realize. This was not unexpected 
as cost synergies are related to factors that the company has a direct influence over. 
The cost synergies with the largest effect on value are the R&D savings, the cost 
reduction of cross-marketing efforts, and the large cutbacks on general and 
administrative expenses. All of these are related to the operational activities of the 
two companies and build on the functional strength of each respective company. 
 Synergies related to revenues are harder to realize because they are affected by 
competitors’ and consumers’ reaction to the merger (Sirower & Sahni, 2006). 
However, the merged company is still able to capture a significant proportion of the 
value through revenue synergies (32.7%). This can mainly be ascribed to the transfer 
of the distribution contract to Activision Blizzard, a decision that is largely unaffected 
by both consumers and competitors. Moreover, the synergies associated product 
bundling will be affected by external factors and is consequently expected to account 
for a lower proportion of the expected total synergy value. 
 The remaining synergies account for only 2.5% of the total value creation, but 
they pose improvements that more effortlessly can be realized. All things considered, 
they yield very high value compared with the time invested to get the necessary 
adjustments in place.  
The last element of the synergies is the expenses related to restructuring the 
merged company. The total restructuring expense is $298 millions, and represents 












Product&Bundling 1,487&&&&&&&&&& 358,621&&&&&&&&&&& 357,134&&&&&&&&&&&
Distribution&by&Activision&Blizzard 2,433&&&&&&&&&& 359,567&&&&&&&&&&& 357,134&&&&&&&&&&&
Cost&Synergies
Distribution&by&Activision&Blizzard 155&&&&&&&&&&&&& 357,289&&&&&&&&&&& 357,134&&&&&&&&&&&
Reduction&in&Approval&Expenses 101&&&&&&&&&&&&& 357,235&&&&&&&&&&& 357,134&&&&&&&&&&&
Manufacturing&Discount 866&&&&&&&&&&&&& 358,001&&&&&&&&&&& 357,134&&&&&&&&&&&
R&D&Savings 1,071&&&&&&&&&& 358,205&&&&&&&&&&& 357,134&&&&&&&&&&&
CrossKMarketing&Efforts 1,206&&&&&&&&&& 358,340&&&&&&&&&&& 357,134&&&&&&&&&&&
Reduction&in&General&and&Administrative 4,383&&&&&&&&&& 361,518&&&&&&&&&&& 357,134&&&&&&&&&&&
Working&Capital&Synergies 19&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& 357,153&&&&&&&&&&& 357,134&&&&&&&&&&&
Capital&Expenditure&Synergies 277&&&&&&&&&&&&& 357,412&&&&&&&&&&& 357,134&&&&&&&&&&&
Total&synergies 11,999&&&&&&&& 369,130&&&&&&&&&&& 357,134&&&&&&&&&&&
Restructuring 298&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Synergies&Net&of&Restructuring 11,701&&&&&&&& 368,835&&&&&&&&&&& 357,134&&&&&&&&&&&
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7.2.3	   	   Distribution	  of	  the	  Synergies	  
In the literature review it was pointed out that the synergies should be fairly 
allocated to both of the companies in the acquisition. In order to fairly allocate the 
synergies, they should be shared on a basis that reflects the unique strengths that each 
of the companies brings to the merged company. 
 It should be noted synergies of a general nature, which can be realized with 
other companies, theoretically should provide the target with a larger share of these 
synergies. However, for Activision Blizzard to capture a larger share of these general 
synergies, they will be required to open a bidding process for the company. The other 
bidding companies will then assist in pushing the price up, and consequently 
awarding Activision Blizzard with the proportion of synergies that they worthy of. 
Since the expected competition in a potential bidding situation is limited (discussed 
more in detail later on), it is reasonable to assume that Microsoft will try to reap some 
additional synergies that under competing conditions would have been distributed to 
Activision Blizzard. 
 The distribution of synergies is illustrated in Figure 38, and is based on the 
discussion above. This means that it is assumed that both companies are fully 
awarded for the unique strengths they bring to the merger, while the synergies that are 
of a general nature are divided equally.  
Most of the synergies created in the merger are enabled through the functional 
strength of Microsoft, which consequently is awarded with a higher share of 68.5% of 
the net synergies. Activision Blizzard is awarded with a lower share of 31.5%, which 
is equivalent to $3,690 millions in synergies. The value of these synergies represents a 
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8.  The Acquisition  
The acquisition process is an intricate process, and involves a whole range of 
steps necessary to complete the transaction. For this reason, no acquisitions are 
identical and the outcome depends on the preparations carried out prior to the 
transaction, the execution of the transaction, and the company’s ability to follow 
through on the intended improvements that ultimately creates value. This section will 
reflect on these issues to provide the reliable structure for the potential acquisition. 
It will be assumed that Microsoft will carry out the acquisition with the 
intensions of horizontally merging Activision Blizzard with its Entertainment and 
Devices division. The purposes of the merger are a strengthening of the division’s 
importance for Microsoft, and an increase the overall growth opportunities for the 
company. Furthermore, due to the high popularity of Activision Blizzard’s game titles 
it is assumed that the company name will be used as a brand name in Microsoft’s 
product portfolio post-merger. 
 
8.1  Classifying the Acquisition 
Microsoft intends to merger the Activision Blizzard with its Entertainment and 
Devices division. For this reason, there are two options available to Microsoft on how 
to carry out the acquisition. They can either choose to approach the board of directors 
at Activision Blizzard by pursuing a direct merger, or approach the shareholders 
directly through a tender offer. The main difference for Microsoft will be that the 
price in a tender offer will tend to be slightly higher, and that it may encounter 
shareholders that are unwilling to sell. However, since these shareholders tend to fall 
for the pressure in the long term, this does not pose as a significant threat for 
Microsoft.  
As the situation is now, Vivendi S.A (Vivendi) holds the majority of shares in 
Activision Blizzard. The large stake of Vivendi enables them to control many of the 
decisions made by the board of directors. This means that the decision on whom to 
approach should be indifferent for Microsoft. However, it will be assumed that 
Microsoft will be exposed to larger resistance if approaching the board directly, 
compared to approaching only the shareholders. They will for this reason gain from 
approaching the shareholders directly. Furthermore, it is very likely that Vivendi will 
sell their shares if they receive a good compensation for their investment. The 
reasoning behind this is that a potential sale will provide Vivendi with a more focused 
portfolio of product, as the company currently has extensive focus on mass media, 
music and telecommunication. 
In order to realize the discussed synergies it is essential that Microsoft is able 
to acquire a proportion of the company that allows for a merger (business 
combination) of the two companies. According to SEC, a merger can only occur if the 
business acquisition is probable. There are several guidelines for what is considered 
probable, and “the assessment of probability requires careful analysis of facts and 
circumstances” (Deloitte, 2009, p. 9). Due to the extent of these guidelines, they will 
not be discussed in length in this paper. However, an acquisition is frequently 
considered probable of the percentage ownership exceeds 50% (Deloitte, 2009). Thus, 
if Microsoft is unable to convince all shareholders to sell, it will be sufficient to 
acquire only the proportion currently held by Vivendi to enable the merger. 
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8.2  Other Potential Bidders 
When Microsoft approaches Activision Blizzard to present their offer, it is 
important to be aware that there may be other companies ready to show their interest 
in the company. These companies include other third-party publishers and console 
manufacturers. They may place counter-bids that threatens the intended deal and 
should for this reason be considered when determining Microsoft’s initial offer. 
 First, the third-party publishers may see economies of scale and large benefits 
from knowledge sharing in a potential merger with Activision Blizzard. These 
companies are characterized by their humble size, and their lack of financial 
flexibility to finance such a large transaction. For this reason, they pose as little threat 
individually, but they may submit a joint offer that can be a threat to Microsoft’s 
intended offer. However, considering the slim margins in the industry and the time 
necessary to assemble the required capital for a potential bid, such an offer would 
probably appear unfeasible for most third-party publishers.  
Second, there are the console manufacturers, which are direct competitors of 
Microsoft. These companies may be interested in bidding for Activision Blizzard for 
exactly the same reasons as Microsoft. On the one hand, Nintendo currently has little 
debt and high cash reserves that might pose as a threat in a potential bidding situation. 
However, recent financial difficulties in the company and negative reported operating 
results significantly reduces the likelihood of a threatening counter-bid from 
Nintendo. On the other hand, there is Sony, a company very similar to Microsoft in 
many aspects. Sony has large cash balances and could potentially afford to submit a 
bid that could win in potential bidding situation. However, it is unlikely that this 
would happen, considering that the company currently holds large amounts of low-
rated debt (BBB+) and have reported operating losses over the last three years. By 
placing a potentially higher bid than Microsoft, Sony will drastically reduce its 
financial flexibility and may even jeopardize the future of the company. For this 
reason, it is reasonable to assume that a bid from any of Microsoft’s direct 
competitors is less likely.  
Considering the general position of the other potential bidders, it seems 
unlikely that they will endanger Microsoft’s initial offer. Nevertheless, if a counter-
bid were to be presented, Microsoft is positioned as a strong candidate in a potential 
bidding war. The mere size of the company may scare of other companies interested 
in bidding for the company. In addition to the large amount of synergies that it 
expects to realize, it has access to considerable amount of funds to finance the 
acquisition.  
 
8.3  The Acquisition Price 
Since the acquisition will be carried out as a tender offer, Microsoft needs to 
identify a specific price that will be communicated to the shareholders of Activision 
Blizzard (Damodaran, 2002). Moreover, as Vivendi owns such a large stake in the 
company, it is also advisable to approach Vivendi directly to present the offer. This 
provides Microsoft with an increased likelihood of a successful acquisition of the 
necessary shares. 
Furthermore, it is desirable for Microsoft to offer a price that is perceived as a 
friendly proposal. The purpose of this is to indirectly communicate to the shareholders 
and stakeholders that Microsoft intends to acquire the company in order to attain 
Activision Blizzard’s greatest potential. For the proposal to be perceived as friendly, 
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the offering price needs to be higher than the traded price, but not too high as 
perceived as a hostile bid. 
The above allocation of the distributed synergies is based on the fact that 
Microsoft receives somewhat more synergies compared to a perfect competitive 
situation. Consequently, when offering Activision Blizzard a premium equal to the 
synergies it is allocated, Microsoft will in fact pay a price that is lower than its 
reservation price. This proposal will be perceived as more friendly to the existing 
shareholders. 
 Over the last year, Activision Blizzard’s average market capitalization has 
been $13,240 million. This is a value that is slightly lower than the theoretical value 
of $13,447, which signalizes an upside potential of 1.5% for the company. When 
structuring the bid based on the theoretical value and adding a premium for the 
synergies that it creates, yields an effective offering price of $17,137 million, or 


















It is important to consider that Microsoft’s current shareholders will only 
accept the decision of acquiring Activision Blizzard if they perceive that the 
transaction provides future value for the company. For this reason, it is essential to 
analyze the value that is created through the eyes of the shareholder. 
The value that is created for the acquiring company’s shareholders can be 
calculated using the formula presented in the literature review, and for the purpose of 
analysis restated below. 
 
Value Created for Acquirer = (StandaloneValue of Target +
+Value of Performance Improvements)




 On the one hand, assuming that all the potential synergies will be realized, 
yields a value for Microsoft’s shareholders of $8,011 million, identical to the 
synergies that are attributed to the company. Compared with the theoretical value of 
the Microsoft this is equivalent to an increase in the equity value of 2.4%. On the 
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$3,897 million paid for Activision Blizzard will transform into a direct loss for 
Microsoft’s shareholders. This loss will lead to a reduction in the equity value of 
1.2%. These calculations unveils that the there is a higher upside potential compared 
to the downside potential, which in effect yields a positive expected value for 
shareholders if both situations are equally likely. Moreover, as Microsoft is an 
experienced acquirer and has dealt with integration of companies before, it is likely 
that the resulting value created for shareholders will be positive. Consequently, it is 
reasonable to assume that the shareholders will accept the decision to acquire 
Activision Blizzard, and that Microsoft can proceed with the acquisition. 
 
8.4  Can the Premium Be Justified? 
In order to proceed to other considerations about the deal structure, it is 
important to perform a sanity check on the premium that is decided on. The Meet the 
Premium line, outlined in the literature review, provides a good framework to analyze 
if the offering price is sensible in relation to various combinations of synergies. 
Moreover, the model allows for a graphical representation of the findings, which can 
be used to enlighten and guide the hard decision on the acquisition premium.  
The framework is based on theory of accretive acquisitions, and assumes that 
the given cost- or revenue synergies must be fulfilled immediately and then 
maintained in perpetuity. In the application of the framework, the following equation 
is employed to the identified premium of 29.4% (see Appendix 19 for how the 
formula is derived). 
%SynC = Π
1−Π
⋅ (%P −%SynR)  
 
 The identified premium for the acquisition suggests that the merged company 
must realize at least 9.6% of cost synergies in order to be justified. It is also possible 
to justify the premium with revenue synergies only; however, this requires a 
percentage of synergies equal to the intended premium. For this reason it is clear that 
cost synergies are more preferable, as it involves lower uncertainty and a much lower 
percentage of synergies are needed to justify the premium. 
 In order to check if the synergy mix of the merger is sufficient to justify the 
intended premium, it is necessary to calculate the synergies’ overall significance. The 
calculation of the significance of the synergies was performed in three steps. First, the 
annual percent of revenue (cost) synergies was calculated on the basis of total 
revenues (cost) of Activision Blizzard. Second, the percentage of revenue (cost) 
synergies was discounted back at the weighted-average cost of capital, to reflect the 
time value of money. Third, the relevant percentage for the given synergy was 
assumed to be equal to the average percentage of the forecasted period. The synergy 
mix for Microsoft’s intended acquisition of Activision Blizzard is illustrated by the 
blue dot (A) in Figure 39. 
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 For simplicity, one could have chosen not to discount the future synergies 
back to current levels, and the figure would look much more appealing for 
shareholders of the firm (illustrated by the red dot (B) in the figure). However, by 
doing that, the time value of money neglected. In other words, the premium is paid 
today, and the benefits are collected in the future, the benefits should for this reason 
be discounted back in order to carry out a reliable comparison.  
 The maximum plausible cost and revenue synergies are assumed to be at 
levels that are similar to the undiscounted values of the synergies. This provides the 
synergies with a sensible range of possible outcomes if the synergies were to change 
in the future. This range is illustrated in the figure by the light blue box.  
 The result of the analysis places the synergy mix of the merger of Microsoft 
and Activision above the Meet the Premium line, and within the box of plausible 
outcomes. Consequently, the intended premium appears as sensible. 
 Finally, the implied maximum premium has been calculated to examine how 
much the premium could be increased if Microsoft’s initial offer is rejected (see Table 
26). The implied premium was obtained using the formula stated on the previous 
page, inserting the discounted percentage synergies. First, since revenue synergies are 
of a very uncertain nature, it may well be better to assume that these will not be 
realized in the future when calculating the implied premium. The results indicate that 
with only cost synergies in place, Microsoft will be able to increase its premium by 
1.3 percentage points. Second, if the relevant revenues synergies are included, the 
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It is noteworthy to mention that the framework applied in this section only 
considers synergies related to revenues and costs. Hence, the synergies related to 
working capital and capital expenditures in the merger of Microsoft and Activision 
Blizzard are not included in the analysis. This suggests that the maximum premium 
that can be offered is slightly higher than 34.3%.  
 
8.5  Financing the Acquisition 
 The necessary information to approach the shareholders of Activision Blizzard 
has now been established, and the intended premium suggests that Microsoft can 
proceed with its proposal. However, before the offer can be presented, the financing 
mix for the transaction needs to be determined.  
 A short analysis of Activision Blizzard’s average market value reveals that the 
company is underpriced by approximately 1.5% compared to its theoretical value. 
This poses as a good opportunity for Microsoft, as they will be investing in a 
company that is offered at a discount. When considering the synergies that are 
expected, the premium they intend to offer and the potential appreciation in value, the 
investment will yield an overall positive return for Microsoft. Ultimately, the return 
will also be highly affected by how Microsoft finances the acquisition. 
 One of the principal decisions in financing the transaction is the choice 
between debt and equity. Moreover, if equity is the preferred over debt, it must be 
determined whether the deal should be financed by cash or stock, or a combination of 
the two.  
 As stressed earlier, it is reasonable to think that Microsoft wants to limit the 
amount of debt they take on, in order to maintain their financial flexibility. Moreover, 
the company’s superior rating and the favorable pricing in the debt market are the 
foremost reason why the company has issued debt. That is to say, the company has 
not necessarily needed additional funds, but has used it as an opportunity to lower the 
total cost of capital. However, this does not mean that the company is unable to issue 
more debt. On the contrary, Microsoft possesses many of the characteristics needed to 
issue substantial amounts of debt to finance a potential acquisition. Considering that 
Microsoft is one of five companies in the world with a rating of AAA (The New York 
Times, 2011), the company is likely to withstand significant amounts of debt before it 
risks a downgrade of its bonds to junk status (below BBB). On the basis of the initial 
part of this paragraph it is assumed that Microsoft considers debt financing as an 
unfeasible alternative for the acquisition. 
 As equity is the preferred capital for Microsoft, the relevant follow-up 
question is if the company wants to proceed with cash or stock, or both. The choice 
between the two can highly affect the return on the deal. While cash deals are 
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negative returns. The reason for the low returns in stock deals is frequently associated 
with the tendency for companies to utilize stocks when the company is overvalued in 
the market.  
In Microsoft’s case, the market value of stock is undervalued by 30% 
compared to the theoretical value of the company. This leads to suggest that an 
acquisition using stock may not be such a wise decision, as it may convey to the 
market that the company considers the stock to be overvalued. Consequently, the 
stock may experience an immediate negative shift after the announcement of the 
acquisition, i.e. destroy value. Moreover, a stock deal also seems undesirable if 
Microsoft’s value suddenly were to rise. In this scenario, the premium paid for 
Activision Blizzard would indirectly be higher, and the target shareholders receives a 
higher effective price. 
Most the evidence presented points toward a pure cash transaction. A cash 
transaction will provide Microsoft with a tool to communicate to the market that it has 
confidence in the potential synergies, and that it is willing to carry all risks concerned 
with the realization of these. This is usually a good sign in a transaction, and is 
consequently valued by the shareholders. Moreover, the most convincing argument 
for the use of cash lays in the history of Microsoft, more precisely its acquisition 
history. Over the last few years Microsoft have executed several acquisitions of other 
technology companies, all of which have been financed by cash. The most recent 
example is Microsoft’s acquisition of Skype, which was an all-cash transaction of 
$8.5 billion.  
The above discussion and facts presented argues for a cash-only transaction in 
order to acquire Activision Blizzard. This is a decision that will yield value for both 
Microsoft and its investors, and the potential negative effects associated with stock 
deals will be avoided. Moreover, the company has the cash reserves necessary to fund 
a large transaction using its cash and cash equivalents, and by eliminating some of its 
short-term investments in marketable securities.  
 
8.6  The Initial Offer 
All the needed information to proceed with the offer is now in place. 
Microsoft will approach the shareholders with the intensions of expressing that a 
potential merger will provide Activision Blizzard with leeway, and the freedom to 
pursue its highest potentials through the increased financial flexibility provided by 
Microsoft. In addition, the merger enables the integration of two strong brands that 
together can revolutionize the software entertainment industry. Moreover, it is also 
important that Microsoft emphasizes that there are established clear restructuring 
plans for the merger, and that will be followed through. This presentation to the 
shareholders is critical, as it will determine if they will sell or not.  
Finally, Microsoft will present their tender offer to the existing shareholders of 
Activision Blizzard. The total price offered for the acquisition of all shares in the 
company will be $17,137 million, corresponding to $14.93 per share. And as the 
acquisition history of Microsoft suggest, the transaction will be entirely financed by 
cash.  
 
8.7  Other Considerations 
 This section will briefly discuss some important issues should be taken into 
consideration in the acquisition of Activision Blizzard. If Microsoft fails to reflect on 
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these issues, the acquisition may not be as successful as intended and ultimately hurt 
the shareholders of the company. 
 
8.7.1	   	   Winner’s	  Curse	  
 Even though competing companies seem less likely to present offers to 
acquire Activision Blizzard, a competing offer could be offered from companies that 
are not seen as direct threats. If this were to occur, it is important that Microsoft 
carefully examines the other bid(s) and takes it into consideration if they decide to 
increase their offer. The reason for this is that if the other bid is neglected, Microsoft 
may win the bidding war by winner’s curse. In other words, the reason why Microsoft 
wins is that it is the company that has overestimated the potential synergies the most, 
i.e. overpaying for the target.  
 The winner’s curse assumes that all estimates for the bids are contingent on a 
certain degree of subjectivity, i.e. the bids will tend to have different value estimates 
for the company in question. Moreover, since the value of the company should be 
roughly the same for all bidders, it is assumed that the average of all bids is the most 
accurate value for the target. That means that the companies that bids higher than the 
average value will tend to lose.  
Winner’s curse can be avoided by taking other bids into consideration before 
proceeding with a higher bid. This means that the competing bid is compared with the 
intended higher bid to check for potential overestimations of value. Since Microsoft 
has a lot of expected synergies, they may be provided with a higher threshold for its 
bids. Nevertheless, potential competing offers should still considered, in order to be 
certain that its synergies are not overly estimated.  
 
8.7.2	   	   Execution	  Risk	  
 It should be noted that an acquisition is not a one-shot decision, but a decision 
that takes place in several stages and that requires in-debt evaluations throughout the 
process. In all the stages of the process, the acquiring company will be faced with 
some degree of risks of execution. The company’s ability to reduce and manage these 
risks can determine if the company will be capable of successfully completing the 
transaction.  
The risks already starts early in the process when the due diligence is initiated 
on the target. At this time, expert opinions and thorough company analysis are 
elements of high importance. Initial risks include the focus of the acquisition, and 
considerations related to the transaction.  
When the initial assessment is performed and the companies are ready to 
announce the merger, other risks appear. The risks are now more related to how the 
companies are expected to operate after the merger. Issues that are likely to appear are 
how the leading roles of the two companies should be brought together, responsibility 
areas for the companies after the merger, and how the operations should be carried out 
to reflect the new image of the company.  
The final stage is concerned with the actual merger of the two companies, 
where proper integration of the two companies must be given extra attention. At this 
stage it is important to reconcile the two existing cultures and make sure that 
procedures are realigned to perform as efficiently as possible. Additionally, the 
execution of the restructuring plans needs to start in order to initiate the synergy 
realization.  
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 After the final stage is completed and the companies have been fully merged, 
the company still faces some risk. As this is the period when the synergies are to be 
realized, the risks are concerned with following through the intended synergies. To 
reduce these risks, continuous evaluations of the restructuring plans are essential. If 
the restructuring fails to realize its full potential, the plans needs to be reassessed and 
adjusted in order to ensure that the forecasted value is captured. 
 All of these stages are important to have in mind when carrying out an 
acquisition. Without proper focus these risks, they may become out of control and 
cause difficulties for the acquirer. If they were to become too high, the acquirer can 
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9.  Conclusion 
Mergers and acquisition are a phenomenon that has existed for over a hundred 
years. It has enabled companies to pursue additional growth opportunities, when the 
organic growth has slowed down. The ideal picture of a successful acquisition is 
characterized by the ability to create additional opportunities that otherwise would not 
be possible, employ resources more efficiently, and ultimately, create value for the 
shareholders. However, the undertaking of such transactions has often been argued to 
be a loser’s game, and that it is eventually the shareholders suffers from these 
decisions. 
 Microsoft has for long pursued a strategy of acquiring companies in the 
attempt to succeed in achieving the ideal picture of an acquisition. Their strategy 
builds on acquisitions of companies to enable the creation of additional growth and to 
preserve technological leadership in their industry. By obtaining control over 
Activision Blizzard, Microsoft will comply with the overall strategy, and will increase 
their focus in the entertainment software industry. Moreover, the acquisition will also 
allow for a natural expansion of Microsoft’s current product portfolio. 
The potential merger of a console manufacturer and a game publisher present 
itself as a way to create valuable opportunities that otherwise would not be possible. 
The opportunities, or synergies, that potentially can be created will especially 
apparent in the day-to-day operations of the merged company. This is due to the 
similarity of the functions that are performed in the two companies before the merger. 
The expected synergies in revenues are few, but have the potential to add 
considerable value. These opportunities build on the functional strengths of the two 
companies and their brands. The value from these improvements is enabled through 
increased product bundling and transferral of Microsoft’s European distribution 
contract to Activision Blizzard.  
As costs can more reliably be measured and controlled by the management, it 
presents greater opportunities for realizing substantial value through these synergies. 
Although there are many areas in which cost synergies provide value, the most 
valuable synergies are related to research and development, sales and marketing, and 
general and administrative. These are all areas that build on the core operations of the 
companies, and where they possess the distinctive expertize that have enabled their 
past success. 
Since the close interaction between the two companies enables the creation of 
the above opportunities, the synergies are distributed based on the unique strengths 
that they bring to the merged company. As Microsoft’s substantial size and functional 
strength enables most of the synergies, it is awarded almost two-thirds of the value 
created. Although Activision Blizzard is only allocated about one-third of the total 
value that is created, it is still considered substantial amount compared to its overall 
enterprise value.  
With the intension of acquiring Activision Blizzard, Microsoft will approach 
the company’s current shareholders and present a tender offer proposal. And in order 
to increase the likelihood of successfully realizing the intended acquisition, Microsoft 
will also directly approach the largest shareholder, Vivendi. The shareholders will be 
presented with a price that is equal to the theoretical value of the company in addition 
to a premium that is equal to the synergies that the company is awarded. Moreover, 
the acquisition will be financed with a cash-only transaction, as to maintain financial 
flexibility and in line with Microsoft’s acquisition history. 
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10.  Appendices 
Appendix 1: Company Information and SWOT Analysis 
 
 
Microsoft Corporation is recognized as a worldwide leader in software, 
services and solutions that help people and businesses realize their full potential 
(Microsoft Corporation, 2012a). They desire to create “technology that transform the 
way people work, play and communicate” (Microsoft Corporation, 2011a, p. 8).  
Microsoft was established in 1975 in the United States and started its voyage 
when entering the computer programming industry. Its early success was a result of a 
release of a highly popular operating system for computers. It has since then executed 
over a hundred acquisitions (Microsoft Corporation, 2012b) and developed a 
diversified product portfolio.  
The company currently operates in five distinct segments, which all have their 
own dedicated division. Its Windows & Windows Live Division (Windows Division) 
serves the market for computer operating systems with its associated software and 
services. In this segment Microsoft has significant market share, as can be seen in the 
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Services that improve productivity and efficiency are provided through the 
Server and Tools Division (STD), which markets server operating systems and cloud-
based services. IDC (2011) announced that in the second quarter of 2011, Microsoft’s 
revenues from servers represented 45.5% of the quarterly revenues market, which 
provides some perspective on Microsoft’s current market share. In terms of cloud 
services, Microsoft has increased its focus and offers multiple services in this segment 
(e.g. Office 365, SkyDrive). 
Furthermore, the Online Services Division mainly provides the online search 
engine Bing, and services for advertisers to attract customers. The most relevant 
market share in this segment is mainly Bing, albeit it has struggled competing with 
the leading search engine provided by Google. As of this reason Microsoft and 




 The Microsoft Business Division (MBD) provides computer productivity tools 
such as the Office suite for professionals and consumers. A substantial amount of the 
revenues in this department originates from the Office suit, since Microsoft is the 
market leader in this segment (Fildes, 2010). The final division is the Entertainment 
and Devices Division (EDD), which offers products meant to entertain people. Its 
prime products are the video game console Xbox 360 and associated products 
(Kinect, games etc.), Windows phone, and Mediaroom. This division is discussed at a 
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Activision Blizzard, Inc. is one of the leading companies in the industry of 
entertainment software publishing. The company was formed in 2008 through the 
merger of Activision and Blizzard Entertainment with the motive to form a pure-play 
video game publisher (Activision Blizzard Inc., 2007). The company is freely traded 
on the NASDAQ stock market, and the controlling shareholder is the multinational 
conglomerate Vivendi, which holds approximately 60% of the outstanding shares 
(Activision Blizzard Inc., 2011a). Vivendi is a French group that also holds ownership 
stakes in companies such as the music group Universal Music, the pay-tv group 
Canal+, and the telecommunications operator GVT. 
The merger of the two firms built a company with two strong competitive 
sides. On one side of the merger, it is the company formerly known as Activision. 
This company has its roots all the way back to 1979, when it was founded as the first 
independent developer and distributor of entertainment software. At this early stage 
the company produced games for the video game console Atari 2600, and attained 
several game-titles selling in the number of millions (Activision Blizzard Inc., 2012a). 
It has since then developed into a company producing games for multiple game 
consoles, computers and mobile phones. Its games are considered popular among 
gamers, and it holds several top selling franchises such as Guitar Hero, Call of Duty 
and the Tony Hawk series (Activision Blizzard Inc., 2007). 
On the other side of the merger is Blizzard Entertainment. Three students fresh 
out of UCLA founded the company in 1991 under the name Silicon & Synapse 
(Blizzard Entertainment, 2011). The company initially produced games for MS-DOS, 
Macintosh, Saga Genesis, and Super SNES (Blizzard Entertainment, 2012), but is 
now specializing in PC games. Similar to Activision, the company has since its 
establishment produced several top selling games in its category. Its most famous 
game titles are StarCraft, Diablo and the world most popular massively multiplayer 
online role-playing game (MMORPG) World of Warcraft (Activision Blizzard Inc., 
2007). These three games-series have a history that stretches for more than a decade, 
and has received several awards for their high popularity among gamers. In addition, 
they are all among the best-selling PC game titles of all time (Activision Blizzard 
Inc., 2007). 
As a consequence of the merger in 2008 (a reversed acquisition), the financial 
statements prior to this year are not directly comparable with subsequent years 
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Appendix 2: Statement of Financial Structure 
This appendix includes an analysis of the financial structure of Microsoft Corporation 
and Activision Blizzard based on their financial statements. In order to identify the 
financial structure in terms of working capital (WC), working capital need (WCN) 
and net cash (NC), the balance sheet of each of the companies have simplified into 
fewer line items. Following, the simplified balance sheet was rearranged to find the 
WC, the WCN and the NC. 
Microsoft and Activision Blizzard can be identified as having a similar capital 
structure. Both of the companies have a negative working capital need, meaning that 
the operations have a surplus due to high short-term financing sources (liabilities) for 
a lower portion of current assets. Simultaneously, the working capital is positive, 
meaning that the long-term capital in the companies is able to finance the investments 
in long-term assets. The result of this is a combined positive impact on net cash in the 
companies.  
This type of financial structure is common among companies that operate 
within retail or distribution of products/services (Yuan, Entwistle, & Stolowy, 2007). 
The tables related to calculating the Microsoft and Activision Blizzard’s financial 
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Revenue 2011 Δ 2010 Δ 2009 CAGR
Windows,and,Windows,Live,Division 18,778 !0.1% 18,792 20.7% 15,563 9.8%
Server,and,Tools 17,107 11.2% 15,390 4.8% 14,686 7.9%
Online,Services,Division 2,528 14.9% 2,200 4.3% 2,110 9.5%
Microsoft,Business,Division 21,986 13.7% 19,345 0.7% 19,211 7.0%
Entertainment,and,Devices,Division 8,716 40.0% 6,224 !3.0% 6,416 16.6%
Unallocated,or,other 828 55.3% 533 18.2% 451 35.5%
Consolidated 69,943 11.9% 62,484 6.9% 58,437 9.4%
Operating,Income,(Loss) 2011 Δ 2010 Δ 2009 CAGR
Windows,and,Windows,Live,Division 11,968 !2.3% 12,253 30.7% 9,372 13.0%
Server,and,Tools 6,453 21.3% 5,320 15.0% 4,627 18.1%
Online,Services,Division O2,638 9.5% O2,410 37.8% O1,749 22.8%
Microsoft,Business,Division 13,827 18.8% 11,642 4.4% 11,153 11.3%
Entertainment,and,Devices,Division 1,135 98.1% 573 99.0% 288 98.5%
Reconciling,amounts O3,584 9.3% O3,280 !1.4% O3,328 3.8%
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Appendix 4: Entertainment and Devices Division, Microsoft 
Principal products and services offered by the EDD: 
• Xbox 360 gaming and entertainment console – the product was officially 
launched in November 2005 to “provide a variety of entertainment choices for 
individuals and families through the use of the device, peripherals, content and 
online services” (Microsoft Corporation, 2011a, p. 12). Competing products 
from Nintendo and Sony arrived on the market in 2006. 
• Kinect for Xbox 360 – the product allows players to use their body as a means 
to control the game, and it also has enabled voice-control (Microsoft 
Corporation, 2012c). It is also awarded “the fastest-selling consumer 
electronics device” in history by Guinness World Records (Guinness World 
Records, 2011) 
• Xbox 360 video games – titles include Forza Motorsport series, Blue Dragon, 
Crack Down series, Gears of War series, Halo series, Mass Effect and Banjo-
Kazooie: Nuts & Bolts, among others. 
• Xbox accessories – includes products such as controllers, headsets, hard drives 
and various cables.  
• Xbox LIVE – this is Xbox’s online service. The service enables you to play 
online with friends, watch HD-movies online and access other online 
entertainment (Microsoft Corporation, 2012e). 
• Mediaroom – a product “designed to provide live, recorded, and on-demand 
television programming regardless of location or device” (Microsoft 
Corporation, 2011a, p. 12) 
• Windows Phone – a mobile phone operating system “designed to bring users 
closer to the people, applications, and content they need, while providing 
unique capabilities such as Microsoft Office and Xbox LIVE functionality” 
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Appendix 5: Digital Online Channels for Activision Blizzard, Inc. 
Some of the products Activision Blizzard is offering to its customers are “sold in a 
digital format, which allows the consumer to purchase and download the content at 
their convenience directly to their PC, console system or wireless device” (Activision 
Blizzard Inc., 2011a, p. 10). They are also offering consumers the opportunity to 
download value-added content to existing games in exchange a one-time fee through 
these online channels. This type of distribution has grown to be an increasingly 
important channel over the last years (Activision Blizzard Inc., 2011a), and 
contributed to stronger performance of the company. According to Activision 
Blizzard’s own estimates, the sales through digital channels were up double digits in 
2011 as compared with 2010 (Activision Blizzard Inc., 2011a, p. 43). The company 
has also expressed its intentions to continue to develop products that can be delivered 
through this channel.  
 Activision Blizzard currently “define[s] digital online channel-related sales as 
revenues from subscriptions and memberships, licensing royalties, value-added 
services, downloadable content, digitally distributed” (Activision Blizzard Inc., 
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Appendix 6: Product Information – Skylanders: Spyro’s Adventure 
Skylanders: Spyro’s Adventure is a game that “allows the player to transport 
real-life toys into virtual worlds of adventure through the ‘Portal of Power’” 
(Activision Blizzard Inc., 2011c, p. 1). The portal is connected to the console, and 
enables the transportation of the toy. The toys that can be used are purchased with the 
introduction package or separately, and each one of the characters has unique powers 
that can be used in the game. Players can also play with friends by placing two toys 
on the “Portal of Power,” this way the players can team up to play cooperative 
multiplayer or each other. Another special feature with the toys is that they have a 
memory function that enables it to be used on several different consoles and still 
recall the progress made in the game. 
The game is offered for personal computers (PC, Mac), video game consoles 
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Appendix 8: Increase in Installed Hardware Base 
The following table is calculated using LTD-data obtained from the investor relation 
web pages for the given companies (Microsoft Corporation, 2012g; Nintendo Co., 

















































(in$of$units$millions,$except$percentages) 2011 2010 2009
Installed$Hardware$Base$at$Year$End
Microsoft$Xbox$360 55.3 41.8 31.5
Sony$Playstation$3 62.0 47.9 33.5
Nintendo$Wii 95.0 86.0 70.9
Total$Installed$Hardware$Base 212.3 175.7 135.9
Annual$Increase
Microsoft$Xbox$360 13.5 10.3 11.2
Sony$Playstation$3 14.1 14.4 12.4
Nintendo$Wii 9.0 15.1 20.5
Total$Increase 36.6 39.8 44.1
Percentage$Increase
Microsoft$Xbox$360 32.3% 32.7% 55.2%
Sony$Playstation$3 29.4% 43.0% 58.8%
Nintendo$Wii 10.4% 21.3% 40.7%
Total$Percentage$Increase 20.8% 29.3% 48.1%
YearROverRYear$Rates
Microsoft$Xbox$360 31.1% R8.0% 28.7%
Sony$Playstation$3 R2.1% 16.1% 15.9%
Nintendo$Wii R40.6% R26.5% R20.9%
Total$Percentage$Increase R8.1% R9.9% R2.7%
Share$of$Annual$Increase
Microsoft$Xbox$360 36.9% 25.9% 25.4%
Sony$Playstation$3 38.6% 36.2% 28.1%
Nintendo$Wii 24.5% 37.9% 46.5%
Total$ 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
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Appendix 9: Geographical Segmentation of Console Market 
The following table illustrates the geographical market shares in the games console 














































(in$$millions$of$dollars) 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007
Europe 10,715$$$$$$$$ 10,312$$$$$$$$ 10,017$$$$$$$$ 10,043$$$$$$$$ 8,373$$$$$$$$$$
United$States 8,703$$$$$$$$$$ 8,092$$$$$$$$$$ 7,620$$$$$$$$$$ 7,802$$$$$$$$$$ 7,036$$$$$$$$$$
Rest$of$the$World 7,352$$$$$$$$$$ 7,101$$$$$$$$$$ 6,784$$$$$$$$$$ 6,920$$$$$$$$$$ 6,901$$$$$$$$$$
Global 26,769$$$$$$$$ 25,504$$$$$$$$ 24,421$$$$$$$$ 24,765$$$$$$$$ 22,310$$$$$$$$
(in$percent) 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007
Europe 40.0% 40.4% 41.0% 40.6% 37.5%
United$States 32.5% 31.7% 31.2% 31.5% 31.5%
Rest$of$the$World 27.5% 27.8% 27.8% 27.9% 30.9%
Global 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Geographical,Growth,of,Console,Market
(in$percent) 2011=2010 2010=2009 2009=2008 2008=2007
Europe 3.9% 2.9% H0.3% 19.9%
United$States 7.6% 6.2% H2.3% 10.9%
Rest$of$the$World 3.5% 4.7% H2.0% 0.3%
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Appendix 10: Growth in Entertainment Software  
The growth in the entertainment industry has been met by two different trends, one 
where high definition games are experiencing a positive growth, while the growth for 
products for casual platforms are experiencing a negative growth. The following table 
and graph illustrates the large growth that has been observed for high definition 


















































2007$ 2008$ 2009$ 2010$ 2011$
Growth'in'High'Definition'Software'Units
(in$of$units$millions,$except$percentages) Units Annual'Growth CAGR
2007 53 $$$$: $$$$:
2008 75 41.5% 41.5%
2009 85 13.3% 26.6%
2010 105 23.5% 25.6%
2011 114 8.6% 21.1%
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Appendix 11: Stock Performance  
The following figure illustrates the stock performance of Microsoft Corporation 
(MSFT) and Activision Blizzard (ATVI), both which are listed at the NASDAQ Stock 
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Appendix 12: R&D Costs for Competitors Recognized by Microsoft 
The following table is the extensive version of Table 6 in section 6.1.1 in the paper, 
and includes all the companies recognized by Microsoft. The table calculates the 
R&D of the direct competitors in relation to total revenues. The industry R&D costs 
for the years 2009 to 2011 are obtained by assigning each division with its share of 
total revenues, and then multiplying with the median/average for that given market 
segment. It is observed that the average is lower than the median (the distribution of 
R&D costs are negatively skewed), indicating that majority of the R&D spending is 






















R&D$Expense Revenues R&D<ratio R&D$Expense Revenues R&D<ratio
Main$Competitors$for: Main$Competitors$for:
Windows(and(Windows(Live(Division Microsoft(Business(Division
Apple 2,429 108,249 2.2% Adobe 738 4,216 17.5%
Google 3,762 29,321 12.8% Apple 2,429 108,249 2.2%
Yahoo! 1,222 7,209 17.0% Google 3,762 29,321 12.8%
Average 10.7% IBM 6,258 60,721 10.3%
Median 12.8% Oracle 4,519 35,622 12.7%
SAP 2,571 18,872 13.6%
Servers(and(Tools(Division Average 11.5%
HewlettSPackard 3,254 127,245 2.6% Median 12.8%
IBM 6,258 60,721 10.3%
Oracle 4,519 35,622 12.7% Entertainment(and(Devices(Division
CA$Technologies 471 4,429 10.6% Nintendo 634 12,221 5.2%
VMWare 775 3,767 20.6% Sony 5,309 89,327 5.9%
Adobe 738 4,216 17.5% Apple$ 2,429 108,249 2.2%
Intel 8,350 53,999 15.5% Google 3,762 29,321 12.8%
Google 3,762 29,321 12.8% Research$in$Motion 1,351 19,907 6.8%
Salesforce.com 188 1,657 11.3% Average 6.6%
Average 12.7% Median 5.9%
Median 12.7%
Industry$Research$and$Development$Costs*
Online(Services(Division 2009 2010 2011 Average
Google 3,762 29,321 12.8%
Yahoo! 1,222 7,209 17.0% Average$R&D 11.1% 11.1% 10.9% 11.0%
Average 14.9% Median$R&D 12.0% 12.0% 11.8% 12.0%
Median 14.9% *(Calculated(as(the(Proportion(of(the(Operating(Segments'(Revenues(to(Total(Revenues
Extensive)List)of)Compe0tors’)Spending)on)R&D)in)Rela0on)to)Total)Revenues,)Based)on)Compe0tors’)Annual)Reports)
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Appendix 13: Pure-Play Entertainment Software Companies’ Costs 
The following two tables is the extensive version of Table 9 in section 6.1.2 in the 
paper. The tables include most of the pure-play entertainment software companies 
that are listed at stock exchanges in the world, and hence have public financial 
statements. The information is split into two tables as the companies have opted for 
different recognition of their costs. The first table illustrates companies that have 
equal recognition of costs as Activision Blizzard, and are companies that have 
American or European origins, while the second table illustrates companies with 
different recognition of costs and that have Japanese origins. It should also be noted 
that the tables includes lines that also are corrected for large outliers, and that the 
second table includes two lines that classifies the average and median costs across the 































Activision$Blizzard 36.9% 13.6% 11.5% 9.6% 0.5% 72.1%
Electronic$Arts 41.8% 32.1% 20.8% 8.4% 4.5% 108.7%
Ubisoft$Entertainment 35.1% 35.6% 20.7% 6.8% 0.0% 98.2%
TakeITwo$Interactive$Software,$Inc. 60.6% 6.2% 15.5% 9.6% 0.0% 93.1%
Atari$SA 39.2% 24.3% 17.3% 18.2% 0.0% 99.1%
THQ$Inc. 78.1% 11.9% 23.5% 6.8% 0.1% 120.4%
Interplay$Entertainment,$Corp. 14.2% 37.2% 15.7% 101.1% 0.0% 168.2%
Zoo$Entertainment,$Inc. 173.4% 26.4% 22.8% 77.5% 0.0% 340.6%
Perfect$World$Co,$Ltd. 18.0% 17.0% 19.5% 9.9% 0.0% 64.4%
Zynga,$Inc. 28.9% 63.8% 20.5% 22.3% 0.0% 135.5%
Minimum 14.2% 6.2% 15.5% 6.8% 0.0% 64.4%
Maximum 173.4% 63.8% 23.5% 101.1% 4.5% 340.6%
Average 54.4% 28.3% 19.6% 29.0% 0.5% 136.5%
Median 39.2% 26.4% 20.5% 9.9% 0.0% 108.7%
Average$without$Large$Outliers 39.5% 28.3% 19.6% 29.0% 0.5% 92.7%










Konami'Corporation 64.5% 19.3% 84.1%
Sega'Sammy'Holdings,'Inc. 54.8% 24.6% 79.4%
Capcom'Co.'Ltd. 61.8% 23.5% 85.3%
Namco'Bandai'Holdings 61.9% 28.6% 90.5%
Tecmo'Koei'Holdings'Co.'Ltd. 64.0% 25.7% 89.7%
Square'Enix'Holdings'Co.'Ltd. 56.7% 31.9% 88.3%
Nexon'Corporation 17.2% 39.7% 55.9%
Minimum 17.2% 19.3% 55.9%
Maximum 64.5% 39.7% 90.5%
Average 54.4% 27.6% 81.9%
Average'Costs'Across'the'Industry'without'Large'Outliers* 87.3%
Median'Costs'Across'the'Industry'without'Large'Outliers* 89.0%
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2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E
Revenue:
Windows-&-Windows-Live-Division 15,563 18,792 18,778 19,591 20,281 20,934 21,608 22,304 22,943 23,529 24,063 24,549 24,990
Server-and-Tools-Division 14,686 15,390 17,107 18,281 19,366 20,360 21,264 22,081 22,815 23,471 24,054 24,571 25,028
Online-Services-Division 2,110 2,200 2,528 2,955 3,323 3,631 3,833 4,014 4,176 4,319 4,445 4,554 4,641
Microsoft-Business-Division 19,211 19,345 21,986 22,218 25,107 25,349 25,594 27,590 27,830 28,048 29,361 29,547 29,715
Entertainment-and-Devices-Division 6,416 6,224 8,716 9,936 11,637 12,191 12,770 13,377 14,013 14,490 14,843 15,102 15,291
Unallocated-and-other 451 533 828 737 805 833 859 903 927 948 977 993 1,007
Total-revenue 58,437 62,484 69,943 73,719 80,519 83,297 85,928 90,270 92,704 94,804 97,743 99,317 100,673
Operating-expenses:
Cost-of-revenue 12,155 12,395 15,577 15,458--- 18,573--- 19,214--- 18,235--- 18,929--- 19,440--- 19,880--- 20,496--- 20,826--- 21,111---
Research-and-development 9,010 8,714 9,043 10,393--- 11,351--- 11,743--- 12,114--- 12,726--- 11,086--- 11,337--- 11,689--- 11,877--- 12,039---
Sales-and-Marketing 12,879 13,214 13,940 15,039--- 16,909--- 17,055--- 17,400--- 18,078--- 18,541--- 18,961--- 19,549--- 19,863--- 20,135---
General-and-administrative 4,030 4,063 4,222 4,776 5,216 5,396 5,567 5,848 6,006 6,142 6,332 6,434 6,522
Total-operating-expenses 38,074 38,386 42,782 45,666 52,050 53,408 53,316 55,581 55,072 56,320 58,065 59,001 59,806
Operating'income'(EBIT) 20,363 24,098 27,161 28,053 28,469 29,889 32,612 34,688 37,632 38,484 39,677 40,316 40,867
Windows-&-Windows-Live-Division 9,372 12,253 11,968 12,361--- 12,545--- 13,170--- 14,370--- 15,285--- 16,582--- 16,957--- 17,483--- 17,765--- 18,007---
Server-and-Tools 4,627 5,320 6,453 6,665----- 6,764----- 7,101----- 7,748----- 8,241----- 8,941----- 9,143----- 9,427----- 9,578----- 9,709-----
Online-Services-Division (1,749) (2,410) (2,638) (2,725)---- (2,765)---- (2,903)---- (3,167)---- (3,369)---- (3,655)---- (3,738)---- (3,854)---- (3,916)---- (3,969)----
Microsoft-Business-Division 11,153 11,642 13,827 14,281--- 14,493--- 15,216--- 16,602--- 17,659--- 19,158--- 19,591--- 20,199--- 20,524--- 20,804---
Entertainment-and-Devices-Division 288 573 1,135 1,172----- 1,190----- 1,249----- 1,363----- 1,450----- 1,573----- 1,608----- 1,658----- 1,685----- 1,708-----
Reconciling-amounts (3,328) (3,280) (3,584) (3,702)---- (3,757)---- (3,944)---- (4,303)---- (4,577)---- (4,966)---- (5,078)---- (5,236)---- (5,320)---- (5,393)----
Other-income-(expense):
Dividends-and-interest-income 744 843 900 961--------- 1,049----- 1,085----- 1,120----- 1,176----- 1,208----- 1,235----- 1,274----- 1,294----- 1,312-----
Interest-expense (38) (151) (295) (377)-------- (391)-------- (386)-------- (370)-------- (349)-------- (356)-------- (410)-------- (465)-------- (522)-------- (579)--------
Net-recognized-gains-(losses)-on-investments (125) 348 439 296--------- 341--------- 341--------- 341--------- 341--------- 341--------- 341--------- 341--------- 341--------- 341---------
Net-losses-on-derivatives (558) (140) (77) (258) (258) (258) (258) (258) (258) (258) (258) (258) (258)
Net-gains-(losses)-on-foreign-currency-remeasurements (509) 1 (26) W---------- W---------- W---------- W---------- W---------- W---------- W---------- W---------- W---------- W----------
Other (56) 14 (31) (29)---------- (32)---------- (33)---------- (34)---------- (35)---------- (36)---------- (37)---------- (38)---------- (39)---------- (40)----------
Total-other-income-(expense) (542) 915 910 593 709 750 799 874 899 871 853 816 776
Income'before'income'taxes'(EBT) 19,821 25,013 28,071 28,646 29,179 30,639 33,411 35,562 38,531 39,356 40,530 41,133 41,643
Provision-for-income-taxes 5,252 6,253 4,921 5,557----- 5,661----- 5,944----- 6,482----- 6,899----- 7,475----- 7,635----- 7,863----- 7,980----- 8,079-----
Net'income 14,569 18,760 23,150 23,089 23,518 24,695 26,929 28,663 31,056 31,721 32,668 33,153 33,564
Earnings-per-share:
Basic 1.63 2.13 2.73 2.72 2.77 2.91 3.17 3.38 3.66 3.74 3.85 3.90 3.95
Diluted 1.62 2.10 2.69 2.69 2.74 2.87 3.13 3.34 3.61 3.69 3.80 3.86 3.91
WeightedWaverage-shares-outstanding:
Basic 8,945 8,813 8,490 8,490----- 8,490----- 8,490----- 8,490----- 8,490----- 8,490----- 8,490----- 8,490----- 8,490----- 8,490-----
Diluted 8,996 8,927 8,593 8,593----- 8,593----- 8,593----- 8,593----- 8,593----- 8,593----- 8,593----- 8,593----- 8,593----- 8,593-----
Cash-dividends-declared-per-common-share 0.52 0.52 0.64 0.72-------- 0.74-------- 0.77-------- 0.84-------- 0.90-------- 0.97-------- 0.99-------- 1.02-------- 1.04-------- 1.05--------
Total-Dividends-Declared 4,651 4,583 5,434 6,144 6,258 6,571 7,166 7,627 8,264 8,440 8,692 8,822 8,931
Past'Performance Forecasted'Performance
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2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E
Assets
Current'Assets:
Cash'and'Cash'Equivalents 6,076 5,505 9,610 12,552 30,021 47,254 65,691 86,709 110,861 135,554 161,100 186,928 213,467
Short@Term'investments 25,371 31,283 43,162 53,141''' 53,141''' 53,141''' 53,141''' 53,141''' 53,141''' 53,141''' 53,141''' 53,141''' 53,141'''
Total'cash,'cash'equivalents,'and'short'term'investments 31,447 36,788 52,772 65,693 83,162 100,395 118,832 139,850 164,002 188,695 214,241 240,069 266,608
Accounts'Receivable,'Net'of'Allowances 11,192 13,014 14,987 15,090''' 16,482''' 17,050''' 17,589''' 18,477''' 18,976''' 19,406''' 20,007''' 20,329''' 20,607'''
Inventories,'Net 717 740 1,372 1,228''''' 1,475''''' 1,526''''' 1,448''''' 1,503''''' 1,544''''' 1,579''''' 1,628''''' 1,654''''' 1,677'''''
Deferred'Income'Taxes,'Net 2,213 2,184 2,467 2,350''''' 2,350''''' 2,350''''' 2,350''''' 2,350''''' 2,350''''' 2,350''''' 2,350''''' 2,350''''' 2,350'''''
Other 3,711 2,950 3,320 2,608''''' 2,608''''' 2,608''''' 2,608''''' 2,608''''' 2,608''''' 2,608''''' 2,608''''' 2,608''''' 2,608'''''
Total'Current'Assets 49,280 55,676 74,918 86,969 106,077 123,929 142,827 164,789 189,480 214,638 240,834 267,010 293,849
Property'and'Equipment:
Opening'balance 6,242 7,535 7,630 8,162''''' 8,645''''' 9,241''''' 9,782''''' 10,275''' 10,794''' 11,264''' 11,688''' 12,105''' 12,470'''
Additions 3,119 1,977 2,355 2,580''''' 2,818''''' 2,915''''' 3,007''''' 3,159''''' 3,245''''' 3,318''''' 3,421''''' 3,476''''' 3,205'''''
Revaluations/Disposals (126) (82) 177 @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @''''''''''
Depreciation (1,700) (1,800) (2,000) (2,098)'''' (2,222)'''' (2,375)'''' (2,514)'''' (2,641)'''' (2,774)'''' (2,895)'''' (3,004)'''' (3,111)'''' (3,205)''''
Closing'balance 7,535 7,630 8,162 8,645 9,241 9,782 10,275 10,794 11,264 11,688 12,105 12,470 12,470
Equity'and'Other'Investments 4,933 7,754 10,865 9,068''''' 9,068''''' 9,068''''' 9,068''''' 9,068''''' 9,068''''' 9,068''''' 9,068''''' 9,068''''' 9,068'''''
Goodwill 12,503 12,394 12,581 19,698''' 19,698''' 19,698''' 19,698''' 19,698''' 19,698''' 19,698''' 19,698''' 19,698''' 19,698'''
Intangible'Assets:
Opening'balance 1,973 1,759 1,158 744''''''''' 890''''''''' 1,027''''' 1,137''''' 1,227''''' 1,311''''' 1,383''''' 1,444''''' 1,501''''' 1,549'''''
Additions 354 343 242 369''''''''' 403''''''''' 417''''''''' 430''''''''' 452''''''''' 464''''''''' 474''''''''' 489''''''''' 497''''''''' 463'''''''''
Disposals 56 (496) (266) @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @''''''''''
Amortization (624) (448) (390) (222)'''''''' (266)'''''''' (307)'''''''' (340)'''''''' (367)'''''''' (392)'''''''' (414)'''''''' (432)'''''''' (449)'''''''' (463)''''''''
Closing'balance 1,759 1,158 744 890 1,027 1,137 1,227 1,311 1,383 1,444 1,501 1,549 1,549
Deferred'Income'Taxes 279''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @''''''''''
Other'Long@Term'Assets 1,599''''' 1,501''''' 1,434''''' 1,403''''' 1,403''''' 1,403''''' 1,403''''' 1,403''''' 1,403''''' 1,403''''' 1,403''''' 1,403''''' 1,403'''''
Total'Assets 77,888 86,113 108,704 126,673 146,514 165,016 184,498 207,063 232,297 257,938 284,609 311,198 338,037
Liabilities'and'Shareholders''Equity
Current'Liabilities:
Accounts'Payable 3,324''''' 4,025''''' 4,197''''' 4,471''''' 5,371''''' 5,557''''' 5,274''''' 5,474''''' 5,622''''' 5,749''''' 5,928''''' 6,023''''' 6,105'''''
Short@Term'Debt 2,000''''' 1,000''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @''''''''''
Accrued'Compensation 3,156 3,283 3,575 3,681''''' 3,928''''' 3,971''''' 4,002''''' 4,107''''' 4,121''''' 4,117''''' 4,147''''' 4,117''''' 4,077'''''
Income'Taxes 725 1,074 580 580 580 580 580 580 580 580 580 580 580
Short@Term'Unearned'Revenue 13,003 13,652 15,722 15,850''' 17,312''' 17,909''' 18,475''' 19,408''' 19,931''' 20,383''' 21,015''' 21,353''' 21,645'''
Securities'Lending'Payable 1,684 182 1,208 1,210 1,210 1,210 1,210 1,210 1,210 1,210 1,210 1,210 1,210
Other' 3,142 2,931 3,492 3,011 3,011 3,011 3,011 3,011 3,011 3,011 3,011 3,011 3,011
Total'Current'Liablities 27,034 26,147 28,774 28,803 31,412 32,237 32,551 33,791 34,476 35,051 35,891 36,295 36,629
Long'Term'Debt 3,746''''' 4,939''''' 11,921''' 12,368''' 12,201''' 11,699''' 11,050''' 11,251''' 12,958''' 14,702''' 16,497''' 18,320''' 20,165'''
Newly'Issued'Debt @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @''''''''''
Long@Term'Unearned'Revenue 1,281''''' 1,178''''' 1,398''''' 1,493''''' 1,631''''' 1,687''''' 1,740''''' 1,828''''' 1,878''''' 1,920''''' 1,980''''' 2,012''''' 2,039'''''
Deferred'Income'Taxes @'''''''''' 229''''''''' 1,456''''' 1,456''''' 1,456''''' 1,456''''' 1,456''''' 1,456''''' 1,456''''' 1,456''''' 1,456''''' 1,456''''' 1,456'''''
Other'Long@Term'Liabilites 6,269''''' 7,445''''' 8,072''''' 8,525''''' 8,525''''' 8,525''''' 8,525''''' 8,525''''' 8,525''''' 8,525''''' 8,525''''' 8,525''''' 8,525'''''
Total'Liabilities 38,330 39,938 51,621 52,645 55,225 55,604 55,322 56,851 59,292 61,654 64,349 66,607 68,813
Stockholders''Equity:
Common'Stock'and'Paid@In'Capital 62,382 62,856 63,415 63,415 63,415 63,415 63,415 63,415 63,415 63,415 63,415 63,415 63,415
Retained'Deficit,'including'accumulated'comprehensive'income:
Opening'Balance (26,563) (22,824) (16,681) (6,332) 10,613 27,873 45,997 65,761 86,797 109,589 132,870 156,845 181,176
Net'Income 14,569 18,760 23,150 23,089 23,518 24,695 26,929 28,663 31,056 31,721 32,668 33,153 33,564
Other'Comprehensive'Income (171) 86 808 @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @''''''''''
Common'Stock'Cash'Dividend (4,620) (4,547) (5,394) (6,144)'''' (6,258)'''' (6,571)'''' (7,166)'''' (7,627)'''' (8,264)'''' (8,440)'''' (8,692)'''' (8,822)'''' (8,931)''''
Common'Stock'Repurchased (6,039) (8,156) (8,215) @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @''''''''''
Closing'Balance (22,824) (16,681) (6,332) 10,613 27,873 45,997 65,761 86,797 109,589 132,870 156,845 181,176 205,809
Total'Shareholders''Equity' 39,558 46,175 57,083 74,028 91,288 109,412 129,176 150,212 173,004 196,285 220,260 244,591 269,224
Total'Liabilities'and'Shareholders''Equity 77,888 86,113 108,704 126,673 146,514 165,016 184,498 207,063 232,297 257,938 284,609 311,198 338,037
Past'Position Forecasted'Position
Debt%Position%+%Microsoft%Corporation
2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E
Short&term)debt 2,000 1,000 &)))))))))) &)))))))))) &)))))))))) &)))))))))) &)))))))))) &)))))))))) &)))))))))) &)))))))))) &)))))))))) &)))))))))) &))))))))))
Long&term)debt 3,746 4,939 11,921 12,368 12,201 11,699 11,050 11,251 12,958 14,702 16,497 18,320 20,165
Operating)leases 2,385 1,898 1,952 2,078 2,078 2,078 2,078 2,078 2,078 2,078 2,078 2,078 2,078
Total)debt 8,131 7,837 13,873 14,446 14,279 13,777 13,128 13,329 15,036 16,780 18,576 20,398 22,243
Cash)and)cash)equivalents 6,076 5,505 9,610 12,552 30,021 47,254 65,691 86,709 110,861 135,554 161,100 186,928 213,467
Net%debt 2,055 2,332 4,263 1,894 (15,742) (33,477) (52,563) (73,380) (95,825) (118,774) (142,524) (166,529) (191,224)
Interest)expense/Debt 0.47% 1.93% 2.13% 2.61% 2.74% 2.80% 2.82% 2.62% 2.37% 2.44% 2.50% 2.56% 2.60%
Forecasted%PositionPast%Position
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2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E
!!!!Total!Revenues 58,437 62,484 69,943 73,719 80,519 83,297 85,928 90,270 92,704 94,804 97,743 99,317 100,673
8!!!Total!Operating!Expenses 38,074 38,386 42,782 45,666 52,050 53,408 53,316 55,581 55,072 56,320 58,065 59,001 59,806
+!!Amortization 624 448 390 222 266 307 340 367 392 414 432 449 463
=!!Earnings!Before!Interest,!Taxes,!and!Amortization!(EBITA) 20,987 24,546 27,551 28,276 28,736 30,196 32,952 35,055 38,024 38,898 40,109 40,765 41,330
8!!!Provision!for!Income!Taxes 5,252 6,253 4,921 5,557 5,661 5,944 6,482 6,899 7,475 7,635 7,863 7,980 8,079
=!!Operating!Profit!(NOPLAT) 15,735 18,293 22,630 22,718 23,075 24,252 26,470 28,156 30,549 31,263 32,246 32,785 33,251
+!!Depreciation 1,700 1,800 2,000 2,098 2,222 2,375 2,514 2,641 2,774 2,895 3,004 3,111 3,205
8!!!Increase!in!Operating!Working!Capital 1,061 393 (441) 1,261 971 205 (147) 296 146 110 190 55 34
8!!!Investments!in!Property,!Plant,!and!Equpment (3,119)!!!!!!!!!! (1,977)!!!!!!!!! (2,355)!!!!!!!!! (2,580)!!!!!!!!!! (2,818)!!!!!!!!! (2,915)!!!!!!!!! (3,007)!!!!!!!!! (3,159)!!!!!!!!! (3,245)!!!!!!!!! (3,318)!!!!!!!!! (3,421)!!!!!!!!! (3,476)!!!!!!!!! (3,205)!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8!!!Investments!in!Goodwill!and!Acquired!Intangibles (749) (343) (429) (7,486) (403) (417) (430) (452) (464) (474) (489) (497) (463)
=!!Free!Cash!Flow 14,628 18,166 21,405 16,012 23,046 23,500 25,400 27,481 29,761 30,476 31,529 31,979 32,822
Terminal!Value 445,095!!!!!!!!!!!














2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E
Accounts(Receivables 11,192 13,014 14,987 15,090((( 16,482((( 17,050((( 17,589((( 18,477((( 18,976((( 19,406((( 20,007((( 20,329((( 20,607(((
Inventories 717 740 1,372 1,228((((( 1,475((((( 1,526((((( 1,448((((( 1,503((((( 1,544((((( 1,579((((( 1,628((((( 1,654((((( 1,677(((((
Other(Current(Assets 3,711 2,950 3,320 2,608((((( 2,608((((( 2,608((((( 2,608((((( 2,608((((( 2,608((((( 2,608((((( 2,608((((( 2,608((((( 2,608(((((
Accounts(Payable 3,324 4,025 4,197 4,471((((( 5,371((((( 5,557((((( 5,274((((( 5,474((((( 5,622((((( 5,749((((( 5,928((((( 6,023((((( 6,105(((((
Accrued(Compensation 3,156 3,283 3,575 3,681((((( 3,928((((( 3,971((((( 4,002((((( 4,107((((( 4,121((((( 4,117((((( 4,147((((( 4,117((((( 4,077(((((
ShortFTerm(Unearned(Revenue 13,003 13,652 15,722 15,850((( 17,312((( 17,909((( 18,475((( 19,408((( 19,931((( 20,383((( 21,015((( 21,353((( 21,645(((
Working(Capital (3,863) (4,256) (3,815) (5,076) (6,047) (6,252) (6,105) (6,401) (6,547) (6,657) (6,847) (6,902) (6,936)
Change(in(Net(Working(Capital (1,061) (393) 441 (1,261) (971) (205) 147 (296) (146) (110) (190) (55) (34)
Past*Position Forecasted*Position
Additional)Estimations)for)Using)the)APV)5)Microsoft)Corporation
2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E
Discounted+FCFs+of+Forecast+Period+(Discounted+at+Unlevered+Cost+of+Equity) 14,615+++++++++ 19,200++++++++ 17,871++++++++ 17,630++++++++ 17,411++++++++ 17,210++++++++ 16,086++++++++ 15,190++++++++ 14,063++++++++ 13,174+++++++++++++
Discounted+FCFs+of+Terminal+Value++(Discounted+at+Unlevered+Cost+of+Equity) 178,653+++++++++++
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2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E
Revenue:
Online*Subscriptions 1,248********** 1,230********** 1,357********** 1,416********** 1,477********** 1,540********** 1,607********** 1,676********** 1,738********** 1,791********** 1,836********** 1,870********** 1,893**********
High*Definition*Platforms 1,441********** 1,887********** 2,075********** 2,168********** 2,386********** 2,510********** 2,619********** 2,719********** 2,809********** 2,889********** 2,962********** 3,026********** 3,084**********
Casual*Platforms 1,002********** 627************* 531************* 465************* 407************* 356************* 311************* 280************* 210************* 147************* 132************* 119************* 107*************
PC*and*Other 165************* 325************* 374************* 419************* 448************* 464************* 480************* 494************* 506************* 517************* 526************* 534************* 540*************
Distribution 423************* 378************* 418************* 417************* 420************* 424************* 428************* 433************* 439************* 445************* 452************* 458************* 465*************
Total*revenue 4,279********** 4,447********** 4,755********** 4,884********** 5,137********** 5,294********** 5,445********** 5,602********** 5,702********** 5,790********** 5,907********** 6,007********** 6,089**********
Operating*expenses:
Cost*of*Revenue*J*Product*Costs 1,432********** 1,350********** 1,134********** 1,165********** 1,225********** 1,262********** 1,299********** 1,336********** 1,360********** 1,381********** 1,409********** 1,433********** 1,452**********
Cost*of*Revenue*J*Online*Subscriptions 212************* 241************* 238************* 250************* 263************* 271************* 279************* 287************* 292************* 297************* 303************* 308************* 312*************
Cost*of*Revenue*J*Software*Royalties*and*Amortization 348************* 338************* 218************* 302************* 318************* 327************* 337************* 346************* 352************* 358************* 365************* 371************* 376*************
Cost*of*Revenue*J*Intellectual*Property*Licenses 315************* 197************* 165************* 217************* 228************* 235************* 242************* 249************* 253************* 257************* 262************* 267************* 270*************
Product*Development 627************* 635************* 646************* 692************* 746************* 788************* 831************* 876************* 914************* 952************* 995************* 1,037********** 1,078**********
Sales*and*Marketing 544************* 516************* 545************* 582************* 612************* 631************* 649************* 667************* 679************* 690************* 703************* 715************* 725*************
General*and*Administrative 395************* 375************* 456************* 474************* 504************* 525************* 540************* 556************* 566************* 575************* 586************* 596************* 604*************
Impairment*of*Intangible*Assets 409************* 326************* J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J**************
Restructuring 23*************** J************** 25*************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J**************
Total*operating*expenses 4,305********** 3,978********** 3,427********** 3,682********** 3,897********** 4,041********** 4,177********** 4,318********** 4,417********** 4,508********** 4,624********** 4,727********** 4,818**********
Operating'income'(EBIT) (26)''''''''''''' ' 469''''''''''''' 1,328'''''''''' 1,202'''''''''' 1,240'''''''''' 1,253'''''''''' 1,269'''''''''' 1,284'''''''''' 1,285'''''''''' 1,282'''''''''' 1,284'''''''''' 1,280'''''''''' 1,272''''''''''
Other*income*(expense):
Interest*Income 15*************** 8***************** 14*************** 10*************** 10*************** 10*************** 10*************** 10*************** 10*************** 10*************** 10*************** 10*************** 10***************
Interest*Expense (4)**************** (5)**************** (4)**************** (4)**************** (4)**************** (4)**************** (4)**************** (4)**************** (4)**************** (4)**************** (4)**************** (4)**************** (4)****************
Unrealized*Gain*(Loss)*on*Trading*Securities 3***************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J**************
Unrealized*Gain*(Loss)*on*ARS*Rights*from*UBS (3)**************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J**************
Net*Realized*Gain*on*Investments J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J**************
Change*in*Fair*Value*of*Other*Financial*Liability 8***************** 22*************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J**************
Net*Realized*and*Unrealized*Loss*on*Foreign*Exchange*Contracts (1)**************** (2)**************** (7)**************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J************** J**************
Total*other*income*(expense) 18*************** 23*************** 3***************** 5***************** 5***************** 5***************** 5***************** 5***************** 5***************** 5***************** 5***************** 5***************** 5*****************
Income'before'income'tax'(EBT) (8)'''''''''''''''' 492''''''''''''' 1,331'''''''''' 1,207'''''''''' 1,246'''''''''' 1,259'''''''''' 1,274'''''''''' 1,290'''''''''' 1,290'''''''''' 1,287'''''''''' 1,289'''''''''' 1,286'''''''''' 1,277''''''''''
Provision*for*income*taxes (121)************ 74*************** 246************* 229************* 237************* 239************* 242************* 245************* 245************* 245************* 245************* 244************* 243*************
Net'income 113''''''''''''' 418''''''''''''' 1,085'''''''''' 978''''''''''''' 1,009'''''''''' 1,019'''''''''' 1,032'''''''''' 1,045'''''''''' 1,045'''''''''' 1,043'''''''''' 1,044'''''''''' 1,041'''''''''' 1,034''''''''''
Earnings*per*share:
Basic 0.09 0.34 0.93 0.85************ 0.88************ 0.89************ 0.90************ 0.91************ 0.91************ 0.91************ 0.91************ 0.91************ 0.90************
Diluted 0.09 0.33 0.92 0.85************ 0.87************ 0.88************ 0.89************ 0.90************ 0.90************ 0.90************ 0.90************ 0.90************ 0.89************
WeightedJaverage*shares*outstanding:
Basic 1283 1222 1148 1148 1148 1148 1148 1148 1148 1148 1148 1148 1148
Diluted 1311 1236 1156 1156 1156 1156 1156 1156 1156 1156 1156 1156 1156
Cash*dividends*declared*per*common*share 0.000 0.150 0.165 0.256********** 0.264********** 0.266********** 0.270********** 0.273********** 0.273********** 0.272********** 0.273********** 0.272********** 0.270**********
Total*dividends*declared 0 189 194 293************* 303************* 306************* 310************* 313************* 314************* 313************* 313************* 312************* 310*************
Past'Performance Forecasted'Performance
Balance'Sheet'+'Activition'Blizzard,'Inc.
2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E
Assets
Current'Assets:
Cash'and'Cash'Equivalents' 2,768 2,812 3,165 3,865 4,743 5,596 6,459 7,302 8,100 8,891 9,696 10,491 11,273
Short@Term'Investments 477 696 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360
Total'Cash,'Cash'Equivalents'and,'Short@Term'Investments 3,245 3,508 3,525 4,225 5,103 5,956 6,819 7,662 8,460 9,251 10,056 10,851 11,633
Accounts'Receivable,'Net'of'Allowances 739 673 649 667''''''''''''' 677''''''''''''' 674''''''''''''' 670''''''''''''' 666''''''''''''' 655''''''''''''' 642''''''''''''' 633''''''''''''' 622''''''''''''' 609'''''''''''''
Inventories,'Net 241 112 144 159''''''''''''' 159''''''''''''' 156''''''''''''' 153''''''''''''' 149''''''''''''' 145''''''''''''' 140''''''''''''' 136''''''''''''' 132''''''''''''' 127'''''''''''''
Software'Development 224 147 137 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 169
Intellectual'Property'Licenses 55 45 22 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41
Deferred'Income'Taxes,'Net 498 648 507 507 507 507 507 507 507 507 507 507 507
Other'Current'Assets 327 299 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 396
Total'Current'Assets 5,329 5,432 5,380 6,163 7,052 7,899 8,754 9,591 10,373 11,146 11,938 12,717 13,482
Long@Term'Investments 23 23 16 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
Software'Development 10 55 62 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
Intellectual'Property'Licenses 28 28 12 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Property'and'Equipment,'Net 138 169 163 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194
Other'Assets 9 15 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Intangible'Assets,'Net 618 160 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88
Trademark'and'Trade'Names 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433
Goodwill 7,154 7,132 7,111 7,111 7,111 7,111 7,111 7,111 7,111 7,111 7,111 7,111 7,111
Total'Assets 13,742 13,447 13,277 14,087 14,976 15,823 16,678 17,514 18,296 19,070 19,861 20,641 21,406
Liabilities'and'Shareholders''Equity
Current'Liabilities:
Accounts'Payable 302 363 390 430''''''''''''' 440''''''''''''' 441''''''''''''' 442''''''''''''' 443''''''''''''' 439''''''''''''' 434''''''''''''' 431''''''''''''' 427''''''''''''' 421'''''''''''''
Short@Term'Debt @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @''''''''''''''
Deferred'Revenues 1,426 1,726 1,472 1,512'''''''''' 1,642'''''''''' 1,745'''''''''' 1,849'''''''''' 1,925'''''''''' 1,960'''''''''' 1,990'''''''''' 2,030'''''''''' 2,064'''''''''' 2,093''''''''''
Accrued'Expenses'and'Other'Liabilities 779 871 694 739''''''''''''' 782''''''''''''' 811''''''''''''' 839''''''''''''' 867''''''''''''' 887''''''''''''' 905''''''''''''' 928''''''''''''' 949''''''''''''' 967'''''''''''''
Total'Current'Liabilities 2,507 2,960 2,556 2,681 2,864 2,997 3,130 3,235 3,285 3,329 3,390 3,440 3,481
Long@Term'Debt @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @''''''''''''''
Deferred'Income'Taxes,'Net 270 120 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55
Other'Liabilities 209 164 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 174
Total'Liabilities 2,986 3,244 2,785 2,910 3,093 3,226 3,359 3,464 3,514 3,558 3,619 3,669 3,710
Stockholders''Equity:
Common'Stock @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @''''''''''''''
Additional'Paid@In'Capital 12,376 12,353 9,616 9,616 9,616 9,616 9,616 9,616 9,616 9,616 9,616 9,616 9,616
Less:'Treasury'Stock,'at'cost (1,235) (2,194) @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @''''''''''''''
Retained'Earnings (361) 57 948 1,561'''''''''' 2,267'''''''''' 2,980'''''''''' 3,703'''''''''' 4,434'''''''''' 5,166'''''''''' 5,896'''''''''' 6,627'''''''''' 7,356'''''''''' 8,080''''''''''
Acculated'Other'Comperehensive'Loss (24) (13) (72) @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @'''''''''''''' @''''''''''''''
Total'Shareholders''Equity' 10,756 10,203 10,492 11,177 11,883 12,596 13,319 14,050 14,782 15,512 16,243 16,972 17,696
Total'Liabilities'and'Shareholders''Equity 13,742 13,447 13,277 14,087 14,976 15,823 16,678 17,514 18,296 19,070 19,861 20,641 21,406
Past'Position Forecasted'Position
M&A: The Case of Microsoft Corporation and Activision Blizzard Inc. 


















2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E
Short'term!debt '!!!!!!!!!!!!!! '!!!!!!!!!!!!!! '!!!!!!!!!!!!!! '!!!!!!!!!!!!!! '!!!!!!!!!!!!!! '!!!!!!!!!!!!!! '!!!!!!!!!!!!!! '!!!!!!!!!!!!!! '!!!!!!!!!!!!!! '!!!!!!!!!!!!!! '!!!!!!!!!!!!!! '!!!!!!!!!!!!!! '!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Long'term!debt '!!!!!!!!!!!!!! '!!!!!!!!!!!!!! '!!!!!!!!!!!!!! '!!!!!!!!!!!!!! '!!!!!!!!!!!!!! '!!!!!!!!!!!!!! '!!!!!!!!!!!!!! '!!!!!!!!!!!!!! '!!!!!!!!!!!!!! '!!!!!!!!!!!!!! '!!!!!!!!!!!!!! '!!!!!!!!!!!!!! '!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Operating!leases 417 474 388 388 388 388 388 388 388 388 388 388 388
Total!debt 417 474 388 388 388 388 388 388 388 388 388 388 388
Cash!and!cash!equivalents 2,768 2,812 3,165 3,865 4,743 5,596 6,459 7,302 8,100 8,891 9,696 10,491 11,273
Net%debt (2,351) (2,338) (2,777) (3,477) (4,355) (5,208) (6,071) (6,914) (7,712) (8,503) (9,308) (10,103) (10,885)
Interest!expense/Debt 0.96% 1.05% 1.03% 1.12% 1.12% 1.12% 1.12% 1.12% 1.12% 1.12% 1.12% 1.12% 1.12%
Past%Position Forecasted%Position
Operating*Working*Capital*0*Activision*Blizzard,*Inc.
2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E
Accounts(Receivable,(Net(of(Allowances 739 673 649 667 677 674 670 666 655 642 633 622 609
Inventories,(Net 241 112 144 159 159 156 153 149 145 140 136 132 127
Software(Development 224 147 137 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 169
Intellectual(Property(Licenses 55 45 22 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41
Other(Current(Assets 327 299 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 396
Accounts(Payable 302 363 390 430 440 441 442 443 439 434 431 427 421
Deferred(Revenues 1,426 1,726 1,472 1,512 1,642 1,745 1,849 1,925 1,960 1,990 2,030 2,064 2,093
Accrued(Expenses(and(Other(Liabilities 779 871 694 739 782 811 839 867 887 905 928 949 967
Working(Capital (921) (1,684) (1,208) (1,250) (1,422) (1,561) (1,701) (1,814) (1,880) (1,941) (2,015) (2,081) (2,139)




2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E
!!!!Total!Revenues 4,279 4,447 4,755 4,884 5,137 5,294 5,445 5,602 5,702 5,790 5,907 6,007 6,089
8!!!Total!Operating!Expenses 4,305 3,978 3,427 3,682 3,897 4,041 4,177 4,318 4,417 4,508 4,624 4,727 4,818
+!!Amortization 585 449 331 252 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294
=!!Earnings!Before!Interest,!Taxes,!and!Amortization!(EBITA) 559 918 1,659 1,453 1,534 1,547 1,562 1,578 1,579 1,575 1,577 1,574 1,565
8!!!Provision!for!Income!Taxes (121) 74 246 229 237 239 242 245 245 245 245 244 243
=!!Operating!Profit!(NOPLAT) 680 844 1,413 1,224 1,297 1,308 1,320 1,333 1,333 1,331 1,332 1,329 1,322
+!!Depreciation 76 68 75 69 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82
8!!!Increase!in!Operating!Working!Capital 558 763 (476) 42 172 139 140 112 66 61 74 66 58
8!!!Investments!in!Property,!Plant,!and!Equpment (65)!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (99)!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (69)!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (100)!!!!!!!!!!!!! (82)!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (82)!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (82)!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (82)!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (82)!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (82)!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (82)!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (82)!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (82)!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8!!!Investments!in!Goodwill!and!Acquired!Intangibles (355) (277) (217) (294) (294) (294) (294) (294) (294) (294) (294) (294) (294)
=!!Free!Cash!Flow 894 1,299 726 941 1,176 1,153 1,167 1,152 1,106 1,098 1,113 1,102 1,087
Terminal!Value 12,019!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E
Revenue:
Windows-&-Windows-Live-Division 15,563 18,792 18,778 19,591 20,281 20,934 21,608 22,304 22,943 23,529 24,063 24,549 24,990
Server-and-Tools-Division 14,686 15,390 17,107 18,281 19,366 20,360 21,264 22,081 22,815 23,471 24,054 24,571 25,028
Online-Services-Division 2,110 2,200 2,528 2,955 3,323 3,631 3,833 4,014 4,176 4,319 4,445 4,554 4,641
Microsoft-Business-Division 19,211 19,345 21,986 22,218 25,107 25,349 25,594 27,590 27,830 28,048 29,361 29,547 29,715
Entertainment-and-Devices-Division 10,695 10,671 13,471 14,820 16,774 17,484 18,216 18,979 19,715 20,280 20,751 21,110 21,380
Unallocated-and-other 451 533 828 737 805 833 859 903 927 948 977 993 1,007
Total-revenue 62,716 66,931 74,698 78,603 85,656 88,591 91,374 95,872 98,407 100,594 103,650 105,324 106,762
Operating-expenses:
Cost-of-revenue 14,462 14,521 17,332 17,392 20,607 21,310 20,391 21,147 21,697 22,172 22,835 23,205 23,522
Research-and-development 9,637 9,349 9,689 11,085 12,098 12,531 12,945 13,602 12,000 12,289 12,684 12,914 13,117
Sales-and-Marketing 13,423 13,730 14,485 15,621 17,521 17,686 18,049 18,746 19,220 19,650 20,252 20,578 20,859
General-and-administrative 4,425 4,438 4,678 5,250 5,720 5,922 6,107 6,404 6,572 6,716 6,918 7,030 7,126
Other-operational-expenses 432 326 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total-operating-expenses 42,379 42,364 46,209 49,348 55,946 57,449 57,492 59,899 59,489 60,828 62,689 63,728 64,624
Operating)income)(EBIT) 20,337 24,567 28,489 29,255 29,710 31,142 33,881 35,972 38,917 39,766 40,961 41,597 42,138
Windows-&-Windows-Live-Division 9,372 12,253 11,968 12,361 12,545 13,170 14,370 15,285 16,582 16,957 17,483 17,765 18,007
Server-and-Tools 4,627 5,320 6,453 6,665 6,764 7,101 7,748 8,241 8,941 9,143 9,427 9,578 9,709
Online-Services-Division (1,749) (2,410) (2,638) (2,725) (2,765) (2,903) (3,167) (3,369) (3,655) (3,738) (3,854) (3,916) (3,969)
Microsoft-Business-Division 11,153 11,642 13,827 14,281 14,493 15,216 16,602 17,659 19,158 19,591 20,199 20,524 20,804
Entertainment-and-Devices-Division 262 1,042 2,463 2,374 2,430 2,502 2,632 2,734 2,858 2,890 2,942 2,965 2,979
Reconciling-amounts (3,328) (3,280) (3,584) (3,702) (3,757) (3,944) (4,303) (4,577) (4,966) (5,078) (5,236) (5,320) (5,393)
Other-income-(expense):
Dividends-and-interest-income 759 851 914 970 1,059 1,095 1,129 1,186 1,218 1,245 1,283 1,304 1,322
Interest-expense (42) (156) (299) (381) (395) (390) (374) (354) (360) (414) (469) (526) (584)
Net-recognized-gains-(losses)-on-investments (125) 348 439 296 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 341
Net-losses-on-derivatives (558) (140) (77) (258) (258) (258) (258) (258) (258) (258) (258) (258) (258)
Net-gains-(losses)-on-foreign-currency-remeasurements (510) (1) (33) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other (48) 36 (31) (29) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40)
Total-other-income-(expense) (524) 938 913 598 715 755 804 880 904 877 859 822 781
Income)before)income)taxes)(EBT) 19,813 25,505 29,402 29,853 30,424 31,897 34,686 36,852 39,821 40,643 41,820 42,418 42,920
Provision-for-income-taxes 5,131 6,327 5,167 5,787 5,897 6,183 6,724 7,144 7,720 7,880 8,108 8,224 8,321
Net)income 14,682 19,178 24,235 24,067 24,527 25,714 27,962 29,708 32,101 32,763 33,712 34,194 34,598
Total-Cash-Dividends-Declared 4,651 4,772 5,628 6,437 6,561 6,877 7,475 7,940 8,577 8,753 9,006 9,134 9,241
Past)Performance Forecasted)Performance
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2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E
Assets
Current'Assets:
Cash'and'Cash'Equivalents 8,844 8,317 12,775 16,417 34,764 52,850 72,150 94,011 118,962 144,445 170,795 197,418 224,740
Short@Term'investments 25,848 31,979 43,522 53,501 53,501 53,501 53,501 53,501 53,501 53,501 53,501 53,501 53,501
Total'cash,'cash'equivalents,'and'short'term'investments 34,692 40,296 56,297 69,918''' 88,265''' 106,351' 125,651' 147,512' 172,463' 197,946' 224,296' 250,919' 278,241'
Accounts'Receivable,'Net'of'Allowances 11,931 13,687 15,636 15,756 17,159 17,724 18,259 19,143 19,631 20,048 20,640 20,951 21,216
Inventories,'Net 958 852 1,516 1,386 1,634 1,682 1,601 1,653 1,689 1,719 1,764 1,786 1,804
Software'Development'and'Intellectual'Property'Licenses 279 192 159 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210
Deferred'Income'Taxes,'Net 2,711 2,832 2,974 2,857 2,857 2,857 2,857 2,857 2,857 2,857 2,857 2,857 2,857
Other 4,038 3,249 3,716 3,004 3,004 3,004 3,004 3,004 3,004 3,004 3,004 3,004 3,004
Total'Current'Assets 54,609 61,108 80,298 93,132 113,129 131,828 151,582 174,380 199,853 225,784 252,771 279,727 307,332
Property'and'Equipment:
Opening'balance 6,391 7,673 7,799 8,325 8,839 9,435 9,976 10,469 10,988 11,458 11,882 12,299 12,664
Additions 3,184 2,076 2,424 2,680 2,900 2,998 3,090 3,242 3,327 3,400 3,503 3,558 3,287
Revaluations/Disposals (126) (82) 177 @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @''''''''''
Depreciation (1,776) (1,868) (2,075) (2,167) (2,304) (2,457) (2,596) (2,723) (2,856) (2,977) (3,086) (3,193) (3,287)
Closing'balance 7,673 7,799 8,325 8,839 9,435 9,976 10,469 10,988 11,458 11,882 12,299 12,664 12,664
Equity'and'Other'Investments 4,956 7,777 10,881 9,089 9,089 9,089 9,089 9,089 9,089 9,089 9,089 9,089 9,089
Software'Development 10 55 62 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
Intellectual'Property'Licenses 28 28 12 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Trademark'and'Trade'Names 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433
Goodwill 19,657 19,526 19,692 26,809 26,809 26,809 26,809 26,809 26,809 26,809 26,809 26,809 26,809
Intangible'Assets:
Opening'balance 3,256 2,377 1,318 832 978 1,115 1,225 1,315 1,399 1,471 1,532 1,589 1,637
Additions 354 343 243 387''''''''' 421''''''''' 435''''''''' 448''''''''' 470''''''''' 482''''''''' 493''''''''' 507''''''''' 515''''''''' 482'''''''''
Disposals (338) (824) (266) @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @''''''''''
Amortization (895) (578) (463) (241)'''''''' (285)'''''''' (326)'''''''' (358)'''''''' (385)'''''''' (411)'''''''' (432)'''''''' (450)'''''''' (467)'''''''' (482)''''''''
Closing'balance 2,377 1,318 832 978 1,115 1,225 1,315 1,399 1,471 1,532 1,589 1,637 1,637
Deferred'Income'Taxes 279''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @''''''''''
Other'Long@Term'Assets 1,608''''' 1,516''''' 1,446''''' 1,415''''' 1,415''''' 1,415''''' 1,415''''' 1,415''''' 1,415''''' 1,415''''' 1,415''''' 1,415''''' 1,415'''''
Total'Assets 91,630 99,560 121,981 140,759 161,490 180,839 201,176 224,577 250,593 277,008 304,470 331,839 359,443
Liabilities)and)Shareholders')Equity
Current'Liabilities:
Accounts'Payable 3,626''''' 4,388''''' 4,587''''' 4,900''''' 5,811''''' 5,998''''' 5,716''''' 5,917''''' 6,061''''' 6,183''''' 6,359''''' 6,450''''' 6,526'''''
Short@Term'Debt 2,000''''' 1,000''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @''''''''''
Accrued'Compensation'and'Expenses 3,935 4,154 4,269 4,421 4,711 4,782 4,840 4,974 5,008 5,023 5,076 5,066 5,045
Income'Taxes 725 1,074 580 580 580 580 580 580 580 580 580 580 580
Short@Term'Unearned'Revenue 14,429 15,378 17,194 17,362 18,953 19,654 20,324 21,333 21,891 22,373 23,045 23,418 23,737
Securities'Lending'Payable 1,684 182 1,208 1,210 1,210 1,210 1,210 1,210 1,210 1,210 1,210 1,210 1,210
Other' 3,142 2,931 3,492 3,011 3,011 3,011 3,011 3,011 3,011 3,011 3,011 3,011 3,011
Total'Current'Liablities 29,541 29,107 31,330 31,484 34,277 35,235 35,681 37,026 37,761 38,380 39,280 39,735 40,110
Long'Term'Debt 3,746''''' 4,939''''' 11,921''' 12,368''' 12,201''' 11,699''' 11,050''' 11,251''' 12,958''' 14,702''' 16,497''' 18,320''' 20,165'''
Long@Term'Unearned'Revenue 1,281''''' 1,178''''' 1,398''''' 1,493''''' 1,631''''' 1,687''''' 1,740''''' 1,828''''' 1,878''''' 1,920''''' 1,980''''' 2,012''''' 2,039'''''
Deferred'Income'Taxes 270''''''''' 349''''''''' 1,511''''' 1,511''''' 1,511''''' 1,511''''' 1,511''''' 1,511''''' 1,511''''' 1,511''''' 1,511''''' 1,511''''' 1,511'''''
Other'Long@Term'Liabilites 6,478''''' 7,609''''' 8,246''''' 8,699''''' 8,699''''' 8,699''''' 8,699''''' 8,699''''' 8,699''''' 8,699''''' 8,699''''' 8,699''''' 8,699'''''
Total'Liabilities 41,316 43,182 54,406 55,555 58,318 58,831 58,681 60,315 62,807 65,212 67,967 70,276 72,524
Stockholders''Equity:
Common'Stock'and'Paid@In'Capital 74,758 75,209 73,031 73,031 73,031 73,031 73,031 73,031 73,031 73,031 73,031 73,031 73,031
Less:'Treasury'Stock,'at'cost (1,235) (2,194) @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @''''''''''
Retained'Deficit/Earnings,'incl.'Comprehensive'Income: (23,209) (16,637) (5,456) 12,174 30,140 48,978 69,464 91,232 114,755 138,765 163,472 188,532 213,889
Total'Shareholders''Equity' 50,314 56,378 67,575 85,205 103,171 122,009 142,495 164,263 187,786 211,796 236,503 261,563 286,920
Total'Liabilities'and'Shareholders''Equity 91,630 99,560 121,981 140,759 161,490 180,839 201,176 224,577 250,593 277,008 304,470 331,839 359,443
Past)Position Forecasted)Position
Integrated)Debt)Position)0)MSFT0ATVI
2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E
Short&term)debt 2,000 1,000 &)))))))))) &)))))))))) &)))))))))) &)))))))))) &)))))))))) &)))))))))) &)))))))))) &)))))))))) &)))))))))) &)))))))))) &))))))))))
Long&term)debt 3,746 4,939 11,921 12,368 12,201 11,699 11,050 11,251 12,958 14,702 16,497 18,320 20,165
Operating)leases 2,802 2,372 2,340 2,466 2,466 2,466 2,466 2,466 2,466 2,466 2,466 2,466 2,466
Total)debt 8,548 8,311 14,261 14,834 14,667 14,165 13,516 13,717 15,424 17,168 18,964 20,786 22,631
Cash)and)cash)equivalents 8,844 8,317 12,775 16,417 34,764 52,850 72,150 94,011 118,962 144,445 170,795 197,418 224,740
Net)debt (296) (6) 1,486 (1,583) (20,097) (38,685) (58,634) (80,294) (103,537) (127,277) (151,832) (176,632) (202,109)
Interest)expense/Debt 0.49% 1.88% 2.10% 2.57% 2.70% 2.75% 2.77% 2.58% 2.33% 2.41% 2.47% 2.53% 2.58%
Past)Position Forecasted)Position
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2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E
Accounts(Receivables 11,931 13,687 15,636 15,756((( 17,159((( 17,724((( 18,259((( 19,143((( 19,631((( 20,048((( 20,640((( 20,951((( 21,216(((
Inventories 958 852 1,516 1,386((((( 1,634((((( 1,682((((( 1,601((((( 1,653((((( 1,689((((( 1,719((((( 1,764((((( 1,786((((( 1,804(((((
Software(Development(and(Intellectual(Property(Licenses 279 192 159 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210
Other(Current(Assets 4,038 3,249 3,716 3,004((((( 3,004((((( 3,004((((( 3,004((((( 3,004((((( 3,004((((( 3,004((((( 3,004((((( 3,004((((( 3,004(((((
Accounts(Payable 3,626 4,388 4,587 4,900((((( 5,811((((( 5,998((((( 5,716((((( 5,917((((( 6,061((((( 6,183((((( 6,359((((( 6,450((((( 6,526(((((
Accrued(Compensation(and(Expenses 3,935 4,154 4,269 4,421((((( 4,711((((( 4,782((((( 4,840((((( 4,974((((( 5,008((((( 5,023((((( 5,076((((( 5,066((((( 5,045(((((
ShortLTerm(Unearned(Revenue 14,429 15,378 17,194 17,362((( 18,953((( 19,654((( 20,324((( 21,333((( 21,891((( 22,373((( 23,045((( 23,418((( 23,737(((
Working(Capital (4,784) (5,940) (5,023) (6,326) (7,469) (7,813) (7,806) (8,215) (8,427) (8,598) (8,861) (8,983) (9,075)




2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E
!!!!Total!Revenues 62,716 66,931 74,698 78,603 85,656 88,591 91,374 95,872 98,407 100,594 103,650 105,324 106,762
8!!!Total!Operating!Expenses 42,379 42,364 46,209 49,348 55,946 57,449 57,492 59,899 59,489 60,828 62,689 63,728 64,624
+!!Amortization 1,209 897 721 474 560 601 633 660 686 707 725 742 757
=!!Earnings!Before!Interest,!Taxes,!and!Amortization!(EBITA) 21,546 25,464 29,210 29,729 30,269 31,743 34,515 36,633 39,603 40,473 41,686 42,339 42,895
8!!!Provision!for!Income!Taxes 5,131 6,327 5,167 5,787 5,897 6,183 6,724 7,144 7,720 7,880 8,108 8,224 8,321
=!!Operating!Profit!(NOPLAT) 16,415 19,137 24,043 23,942 24,372 25,560 27,791 29,489 31,883 32,594 33,578 34,115 34,574
+!!Depreciation 1,776 1,868 2,075 2,167 2,304 2,457 2,596 2,723 2,856 2,977 3,086 3,193 3,287
8!!!Increase!in!Operating!Working!Capital 1,619 1,156 (917) 1,303 1,143 345 (7) 408 212 171 263 122 92
8!!!Investments!in!Property,!Plant,!and!Equpment (3,184)!!!!!!!!!! (2,076)!!!!!!!!! (2,424)!!!!!!!!! (2,680)!!!!!!!!!! (2,900)!!!!!!!!! (2,998)!!!!!!!!! (3,090)!!!!!!!!! (3,242)!!!!!!!!! (3,327)!!!!!!!!! (3,400)!!!!!!!!! (3,503)!!!!!!!!! (3,558)!!!!!!!!! (3,287)!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8!!!Investments!in!Goodwill!and!Acquired!Intangibles (1,104) (620) (646) (7,779) (696) (710) (723) (745) (757) (768) (782) (790) (757)
=!!Free!Cash!Flow 15,522 19,465 22,131 16,953 24,222 24,654 26,567 28,633 30,867 31,574 32,642 33,081 33,909
Terminal!Value 459,309!!!!!!!!!!!
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Appendix 16: Average Operational Expenses for the EDD  
Since Microsoft does not report exact financial data on expenses related to each 
division, the expenses have been calculated based on reported increase in expenses 
(amounts and percentages). The average percent reported in Table 15 is based on the 
average costs of the EDD division to the total of the given expense. 
 
 
In order to calculate an estimate for the expenses based on the reported increase in 
amount of expenditure and reported increase in percent, the following formula has 
been applied: 
 
     Estimate of Given Expenset−1 =
Increase in Given Expense Groupt
Percentage Increase in Given Expense Groupt
 
 
Furthermore, to find the proportion of expenses to the total expenses of the company, 
this formula was applied: 
 
Proportion of total = Estimate of Given Expense
Company Total of Given Expense
 
 
This, for example, means that in 2009 the cost of revenue for the Entertainment and 






Increase((Decrease)(in(Cost(of(revenue N/A (496)((((((((((( 1,800((((((((((
(in(percent) N/A ;12% 49%
Calculated(Cost(of(Revenue 4,133(((((((((( 3,673(((((((((( 5,473((((((((((
Percent(of(Total(Cost(of(Revenue 34.0% 29.6% 35.1%
Increase((Decrease)(in(Research(and(Deveopment(Expenses N/A 54((((((((((((((( 119(((((((((((((
(in(percent) N/A 6% 12%
Calculated(Research(and(Deveopment(Expenses 900((((((((((((( 992((((((((((((( 1,111((((((((((
Percent(of(Total(Research(and(Deveopment(Expenses 10.0% 11.4% 12.3%
Increase((Decrease)(in(Sales(and(Marketing(Expenses N/A (75)(((((((((((((( 90(((((((((((((((
(in(percent) N/A ;9% 12%
Calculated(Sales(and(Marketing(Expenses 833((((((((((((( 750((((((((((((( 840(((((((((((((
Percent(of(Total(Sales(and(Marketing(Expenses 6.5% 5.7% 6.0%
Total(Operational(Expenses(in(EDD 6065 5550 7589
Residual(is(General(and(Administrative(Expenses 198((((((((((((( 135((((((((((((( 165(((((((((((((
Percent(of(Total(General(and(Administrative(Expenses 4.9% 3.3% 3.9%
Calcula&on)of)Costs)A.ributable)to)the)Entertainment)and)Devices)Divison)
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Appendix 17: Calculation of Collection and Payment Periods 
This appendix is a supplement to Table XX, and summarizes how the various 
estimates in the table are calculated. In order to calculate the average collection period 
for accounts receivable (called “Average Days Receivable” in the table), the 
following formula has been applied: 
 









Similarly, the formula applied to calculate the average payment period for accounts 
payable (called “Average Days Payable” in the table) is the following: 
 









The reason why the formulas are multiplied by 365 is to convert the fraction into days 
(the number 365, represents the number of days in a year). Furthermore, since the 
average payment period for Microsoft is longer than Activision Blizzard’s equivalent, 
it is desirable to increase Activision Blizzard’s Accounts Payable to reflect 
Microsoft’s payment term. In order to do this, the following formula has been applied 
to Activision Blizzard’s financials: 
 







&⋅Cost of Revenue  
This formula produces a value that reflects Microsoft’s payment terms in relation to 
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2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E
Revenue:
Windows-&-Windows-Live-Division 15,563 18,792 18,778 19,591 20,281 20,934 21,608 22,304 22,943 23,529 24,063 24,549 24,990
Server-and-Tools-Division 14,686 15,390 17,107 18,281 19,366 20,360 21,264 22,081 22,815 23,471 24,054 24,571 25,028
Online-Services-Division 2,110 2,200 2,528 2,955 3,323 3,631 3,833 4,014 4,176 4,319 4,445 4,554 4,641
Microsoft-Business-Division 19,211 19,345 21,986 22,218 25,107 25,349 25,594 27,590 27,830 28,048 29,361 29,547 29,715
Entertainment-and-Devices-Division 10,695 10,671 13,471 14,820 17,205 17,812 18,559 19,338 20,090 20,667 21,146 21,512 21,788
Unallocated-and-other 451 533 828 737 805 833 859 903 927 948 977 993 1,007
Total-revenue 62,716 66,931 74,698 78,603 86,087 88,919 91,717 96,230 98,781 100,981 104,046 105,727 107,170
Operating-expenses:
Cost-of-revenue 14,462 14,521 17,332 17,392 20,508 21,208 20,287 21,040 21,588 22,061 22,721 23,089 23,404
Research-and-development 9,637 9,349 9,689 11,085 12,008 12,444 12,855 13,498 11,887 12,172 12,563 12,787 13,006
Sales-and-Marketing 13,423 13,730 14,485 15,387 17,347 17,536 17,924 18,627 19,125 19,569 20,162 20,489 20,767
General-and-administrative 4,425 4,438 4,678 5,250 5,331 5,515 5,692 5,977 6,143 6,284 6,476 6,581 6,670
Other-operational-expenses 432 326 25 253 127 42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total-operating-expenses 42,379 42,364 46,209 49,367 55,320 56,745 56,758 59,142 58,743 60,085 61,921 62,945 63,847
Operating)income)(EBIT) 20,337 24,567 28,489 29,236 30,767 32,174 34,959 37,088 40,038 40,895 42,124 42,782 43,323
Windows-&-Windows-Live-Division 9,372 12,253 11,968 12,361 12,545 13,170 14,370 15,285 16,582 16,957 17,483 17,765 18,007
Server-and-Tools 4,627 5,320 6,453 6,665 6,764 7,101 7,748 8,241 8,941 9,143 9,427 9,578 9,709
Online-Services-Division (1,749) (2,410) (2,638) (2,725) (2,765) (2,903) (3,167) (3,369) (3,655) (3,738) (3,854) (3,916) (3,969)
Microsoft-Business-Division 11,153 11,642 13,827 14,281 14,493 15,216 16,602 17,659 19,158 19,591 20,199 20,524 20,804
Entertainment-and-Devices-Division 262 1,042 2,463 2,374 2,861 2,830 2,975 3,092 3,232 3,276 3,337 3,367 3,387
Reconciling-amounts (3,328) (3,280) (3,584) (3,702) (3,757) (3,944) (4,303) (4,577) (4,966) (5,078) (5,236) (5,320) (5,393)
Other-income-(expense):
Dividends-and-interest-income 759 851 914 970 1,059 1,095 1,129 1,186 1,218 1,245 1,283 1,304 1,322
Interest-expense (42) (156) (299) (381) (395) (390) (374) (354) (360) (414) (469) (526) (584)
Net-recognized-gains-(losses)-on-investments (125) 348 439 296 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 341
Net-losses-on-derivatives (558) (140) (77) (258) (258) (258) (258) (258) (258) (258) (258) (258) (258)
Net-gains-(losses)-on-foreign-currency-remeasurements (510) (1) (33) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other (48) 36 (31) (29) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40)
Total-other-income-(expense) (524) 938 913 598 715 755 804 880 904 877 859 822 781
Income)before)income)taxes)(EBT) 19,813 25,505 29,402 29,834 31,481 32,929 35,763 37,968 40,942 41,772 42,983 43,604 44,104
Provision-for-income-taxes 5,131 6,327 5,167 5,783 6,102 6,383 6,933 7,360 7,938 8,098 8,333 8,454 8,321
Net)income 14,682 19,178 24,235 24,051 25,379 26,546 28,830 30,607 33,005 33,674 34,650 35,150 35,783
Total-Cash-Dividends-Declared 4,651 4,772 5,628 6,437 6,561 6,877 7,475 7,940 8,577 8,753 9,006 9,134 9,241
Past)Performance Forecasted)Performance
M&A: The Case of Microsoft Corporation and Activision Blizzard Inc. 









2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E
Assets
Current'Assets:
Cash'and'Cash'Equivalents 8,844 8,317 12,775 16,411 35,783 54,594 74,787 97,573 123,450 149,868 177,182 204,785 233,315
Short@Term'investments 25,848 31,979 43,522 53,501 53,501 53,501 53,501 53,501 53,501 53,501 53,501 53,501 53,501
Total'cash,'cash'equivalents,'and'short'term'investments 34,692 40,296 56,297 69,912''' 89,284''' 108,095' 128,288' 151,074' 176,951' 203,369' 230,683' 258,286' 286,816'
Accounts'Receivable,'Net'of'Allowances 11,931 13,687 15,636 15,756 17,159 17,724 18,259 19,143 19,631 20,048 20,640 20,951 21,216
Inventories,'Net 958 852 1,516 1,386 1,634 1,682 1,601 1,653 1,689 1,719 1,764 1,786 1,804
Software'Development'and'Intellectual'Property'Licenses 279 192 159 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210
Deferred'Income'Taxes,'Net 2,711 2,832 2,974 2,857 2,857 2,857 2,857 2,857 2,857 2,857 2,857 2,857 2,857
Other 4,038 3,249 3,716 3,004 3,004 3,004 3,004 3,004 3,004 3,004 3,004 3,004 3,004
Total'Current'Assets 54,609 61,108 80,298 93,126 114,148 133,572 154,219 177,941 204,341 231,207 259,158 287,093 315,906
Property'and'Equipment:
Opening'balance 6,391 7,673 7,799 8,325 8,829 9,400 9,916 10,385 10,879 11,325 11,724 12,116 12,457
Additions 3,184 2,076 2,424 2,670 2,876 2,973 3,065 3,217 3,302 3,376 3,478 3,534 3,262
Revaluations/Disposals (126) (82) 177 @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @''''''''''
Depreciation (1,776) (1,868) (2,075) (2,167) (2,304) (2,457) (2,596) (2,723) (2,856) (2,977) (3,086) (3,193) (3,287)
Closing'balance 7,673 7,799 8,325 8,829 9,400 9,916 10,385 10,879 11,325 11,724 12,116 12,457 12,432
Equity'and'Other'Investments 4,956 7,777 10,881 9,089 9,089 9,089 9,089 9,089 9,089 9,089 9,089 9,089 9,089
Software'Development 10 55 62 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
Intellectual'Property'Licenses 28 28 12 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Trademark'and'Trade'Names 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433
Goodwill 19,657 19,526 19,692 26,809 26,809 26,809 26,809 26,809 26,809 26,809 26,809 26,809 26,809
Intangible'Assets:
Opening'balance 3,256 2,377 1,318 832 978 1,115 1,225 1,315 1,399 1,471 1,532 1,589 1,637
Additions 354 343 243 387''''''''' 421''''''''' 435''''''''' 448''''''''' 470''''''''' 482''''''''' 493''''''''' 507''''''''' 515''''''''' 482'''''''''
Disposals (338) (824) (266) @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @''''''''''
Amortization (895) (578) (463) (241)'''''''' (285)'''''''' (326)'''''''' (358)'''''''' (385)'''''''' (411)'''''''' (432)'''''''' (450)'''''''' (467)'''''''' (482)''''''''
Closing'balance 2,377 1,318 832 978 1,115 1,225 1,315 1,399 1,471 1,532 1,589 1,637 1,637
Deferred'Income'Taxes 279''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @''''''''''
Other'Long@Term'Assets 1,608''''' 1,516''''' 1,446''''' 1,415''''' 1,415''''' 1,415''''' 1,415''''' 1,415''''' 1,415''''' 1,415''''' 1,415''''' 1,415''''' 1,415'''''
Total'Assets 91,630 99,560 121,981 140,744 162,474 182,524 203,729 228,031 254,948 282,273 310,674 338,998 367,786
Liabilities)and)Shareholders')Equity
Current'Liabilities:
Accounts'Payable 3,626''''' 4,388''''' 4,587''''' 4,900''''' 5,960''''' 6,015''''' 5,733''''' 5,935''''' 6,076''''' 6,198''''' 6,375''''' 6,466''''' 6,541'''''
Short@Term'Debt 2,000''''' 1,000''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @''''''''''
Accrued'Compensation'and'Expenses 3,935 4,154 4,269 4,421 4,711 4,782 4,840 4,974 5,008 5,023 5,076 5,066 5,045
Income'Taxes 725 1,074 580 580 580 580 580 580 580 580 580 580 580
Short@Term'Unearned'Revenue 14,429 15,378 17,194 17,362 18,953 19,654 20,324 21,333 21,891 22,373 23,045 23,418 23,737
Securities'Lending'Payable 1,684 182 1,208 1,210 1,210 1,210 1,210 1,210 1,210 1,210 1,210 1,210 1,210
Other' 3,142 2,931 3,492 3,011 3,011 3,011 3,011 3,011 3,011 3,011 3,011 3,011 3,011
Total'Current'Liablities 29,541 29,107 31,330 31,484 34,425 35,251 35,698 37,043 37,776 38,395 39,297 39,751 40,125
Long'Term'Debt 3,746''''' 4,939''''' 11,921''' 12,368''' 12,201''' 11,699''' 11,050''' 11,251''' 12,958''' 14,702''' 16,497''' 18,320''' 20,165'''
Long@Term'Unearned'Revenue 1,281''''' 1,178''''' 1,398''''' 1,493''''' 1,631''''' 1,687''''' 1,740''''' 1,828''''' 1,878''''' 1,920''''' 1,980''''' 2,012''''' 2,039'''''
Deferred'Income'Taxes 270''''''''' 349''''''''' 1,511''''' 1,511''''' 1,511''''' 1,511''''' 1,511''''' 1,511''''' 1,511''''' 1,511''''' 1,511''''' 1,511''''' 1,511'''''
Other'Long@Term'Liabilites 6,478''''' 7,609''''' 8,246''''' 8,699''''' 8,699''''' 8,699''''' 8,699''''' 8,699''''' 8,699''''' 8,699''''' 8,699''''' 8,699''''' 8,699'''''
Total'Liabilities 41,316 43,182 54,406 55,555 58,467 58,847 58,698 60,332 62,822 65,227 67,984 70,292 72,538
Stockholders''Equity:
Common'Stock'and'Paid@In'Capital 74,758 75,209 73,031 73,031 73,031 73,031 73,031 73,031 73,031 73,031 73,031 73,031 73,031
Less:'Treasury'Stock,'at'cost (1,235) (2,194) @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @'''''''''' @''''''''''
Retained'Deficit/Earnings,'incl.'Comprehensive'Income: (23,209) (16,637) (5,456) 12,158 30,976 50,646 72,001 94,667 119,095 144,015 169,659 195,675 222,217
Total'Shareholders''Equity' 50,314 56,378 67,575 85,189 104,007 123,677 145,032 167,698 192,126 217,046 242,690 268,706 295,248
Total'Liabilities'and'Shareholders''Equity 91,630 99,560 121,981 140,744 162,474 182,524 203,729 228,031 254,948 282,273 310,674 338,998 367,786
Past)Position Forecasted)Position
Integrated)Debt)Position)0)MSFT0ATVI)with)Synergies
2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E
Short&term)debt 2,000 1,000 &)))))))))) &)))))))))) &)))))))))) &)))))))))) &)))))))))) &)))))))))) &)))))))))) &)))))))))) &)))))))))) &)))))))))) &))))))))))
Long&term)debt 3,746 4,939 11,921 12,368 12,201 11,699 11,050 11,251 12,958 14,702 16,497 18,320 20,165
Operating)leases 2,802 2,372 2,340 2,466 2,466 2,466 2,466 2,466 2,466 2,466 2,466 2,466 2,466
Total)debt 8,548 8,311 14,261 14,834 14,667 14,165 13,516 13,717 15,424 17,168 18,964 20,786 22,631
Cash)and)cash)equivalents 8,844 8,317 12,775 16,411 35,783 54,594 74,787 97,573 123,450 149,868 177,182 204,785 233,315
Net)debt (296) (6) 1,486 (1,577) (21,116) (40,429) (61,271) (83,856) (108,026) (132,700) (158,218) (183,998) (210,684)
Interest)expense/Debt 0.49% 1.88% 2.10% 2.57% 2.70% 2.75% 2.77% 2.58% 2.33% 2.41% 2.47% 2.53% 2.58%
Past)Position Forecasted)Position
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2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E
Accounts(Receivables 11,931 13,687 15,636 15,756((( 17,159((( 17,724((( 18,259((( 19,143((( 19,631((( 20,048((( 20,640((( 20,951((( 21,216(((
Inventories 958 852 1,516 1,386((((( 1,634((((( 1,682((((( 1,601((((( 1,653((((( 1,689((((( 1,719((((( 1,764((((( 1,786((((( 1,804(((((
Software(Development(and(Intellectual(Property(Licenses 279 192 159 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210
Other(Current(Assets 4,038 3,249 3,716 3,004((((( 3,004((((( 3,004((((( 3,004((((( 3,004((((( 3,004((((( 3,004((((( 3,004((((( 3,004((((( 3,004(((((
Accounts(Payable 3,626 4,388 4,587 4,900((((( 5,960((((( 6,015((((( 5,733((((( 5,935((((( 6,076((((( 6,198((((( 6,375((((( 6,466((((( 6,541(((((
Accrued(Compensation(and(Expenses 3,935 4,154 4,269 4,421((((( 4,711((((( 4,782((((( 4,840((((( 4,974((((( 5,008((((( 5,023((((( 5,076((((( 5,066((((( 5,045(((((
ShortLTerm(Unearned(Revenue 14,429 15,378 17,194 17,362((( 18,953((( 19,654((( 20,324((( 21,333((( 21,891((( 22,373((( 23,045((( 23,418((( 23,737(((
Working(Capital (4,784) (5,940) (5,023) (6,326) (7,617) (7,830) (7,823) (8,232) (8,442) (8,613) (8,878) (8,999) (9,090)




2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E
!!!!Total!Revenues 62,716 66,931 74,698 78,603 86,087 88,919 91,717 96,230 98,781 100,981 104,046 105,727 107,170
8!!!Total!Operating!Expenses 42,379 42,364 46,209 49,367 55,320 56,745 56,758 59,142 58,743 60,085 61,921 62,945 63,847
+!!Amortization 1,209 897 721 474 560 601 633 660 686 707 725 742 757
=!!Earnings!Before!Interest,!Taxes,!and!Amortization!(EBITA) 21,546 25,464 29,210 29,710 31,326 32,774 35,592 37,748 40,724 41,603 42,850 43,524 44,080
8!!!Provision!for!Income!Taxes 5,131 6,327 5,167 5,783 6,102 6,383 6,933 7,360 7,938 8,098 8,333 8,454 8,321
=!!Operating!Profit!(NOPLAT) 16,415 19,137 24,043 23,927 25,224 26,391 28,659 30,388 32,786 33,504 34,516 35,070 35,758
+!!Depreciation 1,776 1,868 2,075 2,167 2,304 2,457 2,596 2,723 2,856 2,977 3,086 3,193 3,287
8!!!Increase!in!Operating!Working!Capital 1,619 1,156 (917) 1,303 1,291 213 (7) 409 210 171 265 121 91
8!!!Investments!in!Property,!Plant,!and!Equpment (3,184)!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (2,076)!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (2,424)!!!!!!!!! (2,670)!!!!!!!!!!! (2,876)!!!!!!!!!! (2,973)!!!!!!!!! (3,065)!!!!!!!!! (3,217)!!!!!!!!! (3,302)!!!!!!!!! (3,376)!!!!!!!!! (3,478)!!!!!!!!! (3,534)!!!!!!!!! (3,262)!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8!!!Investments!in!Goodwill!and!Acquired!Intangibles (1,104) (620) (646) (7,779) (696) (710) (723) (745) (757) (768) (782) (790) (757)
=!!Free!Cash!Flow 15,522 19,465 22,131 16,947 25,247 25,378 27,460 29,557 31,793 32,509 33,606 34,060 35,118
Terminal!Value 475,678!!!!!!!!!!!
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Appendix 19: Meet the Premium Line Formula Derived 
The following derivation of the meet the premium line is based on Sirower and 
Sahni’s article Avoiding the “Synergy Trap”: Practical Guidance on M&A Decisions 
for CEOs and Boards (2006). The Meet the Premium line formula presented in the 
article is based on the foundations of the market value in relation to the earnings and 
earning multiple of a company, which can be expressed as follows: 
 
MVT = ET ⋅
P
ET
          (1) 
 
When an acquiring company pays a premium for a company, this can be expressed in 
terms of the pre-announcement target equity market value. This can be 
mathematically represented as: 
 
%P ⋅MVT =%P ⋅ (ET ⋅
P
ET
) = (%P ⋅ET ) ⋅
P
ET
         (2) 
 
If it is now assumed that the price-earnings multiple is held constant, the formula can 
be rewritten using revenues, pretax profit margin and the effective tax rate of the 
company. 
 
%P ⋅ET =%P ⋅ (R ⋅Π) ⋅ (1−T )               (3) 
 
The needed cost synergies for an acquisition can now be formulated as follows: 
 
%SynC = Pre−Tax Synergies Required
Operating Cost Base




    (5) 
 
Both formulas present the same information; the only difference is that the latter uses 
the same variables in formula (3). 
 
In acquisitions that enable both cost synergies and revenue synergies, the formula can 
be rewritten to also reflect the revenue synergies. The relationship can then be 
expressed as follows: 
 
%SynC =%P ⋅ (R ⋅Π)− (R ⋅%SynR ⋅Π)
R ⋅ (1−Π)
(6) or %SynC = Π
1−Π
⋅ (%P −%SynR)      (7) 
 
The last formula (7) is the one that is applied to find the cost and revenue synergies 
that are required to satisfy the acquisition premium for Activision Blizzard.  
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